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Seventh Judicial District Court - Madison County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0000438 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss 
Rex Rammell vs. Idaho State Department of Agriculture 























New Case Filed Brent J. Moss 
Filing: R2 -Appeals And Transfers For Judicial Review To The District Brent J. Moss 
Court Paid by: Rammell, Rex (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0098517 Dated: 
6/10/2005 Amount: $72.00 (Check) 
Order Governing Procedure on Review 
Certificate of Administrative Record 
Order and Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/03/2005 10:00 AM) 
Transcript Filed 5X 
Notice of Lodging Administrative Record 
Brief in Response to the Court's Order Regarding Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction 
Brief RE: Timeliness of Petition for Judicial Review (No appearance fee 
paid) 
Reply Brief in Support of Dismissal of Petition for Judicial Review 
Hearing result for Hearing held on 10/03/2005 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Memorandum Decision RE: Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Order Dismissing Petition 
Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Department of Agriculture, Brent J. Moss 
Defendant; Rammell, Rex, Plaintiff. 
order date: 10/18/2005 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Brent J. Moss 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Rex Rammell Receipt number: 0101709 Dated: 
11/15/2005 Amount: $2.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Brent J. Moss 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Rex Rammell Receipt number: 0101710 Dated: 
11/15/2005 Amount: $2.00 (Cash) 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Paid by: Rammell, Rex 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0101746 Dated: 11/16/2005 Amount: $9.00 
(Check) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Transcripts For Appeal Per Brent J. Moss 
Page Paid by: Rammell, Rex Receipt number: 0101953 Dated: 11/30/2005 
Amount: $100.00 (Check) 
Filing of Clerk's Certificate Brent J. Moss 
Sent to Attorney's Brent J. Moss 
Notice of Transcript Lodged Brent J. Moss 
Appeal Lodged with Supreme Court Brent J. Moss 
Order Granting Motion to Vacate hearing(Oral Argument) Brent J. Moss 
Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Certificate of Amended Administrative Record Brent J. Moss 
User: GWE~1 
Date: 2/29/2008 
Time: 11:41 AM 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Madison County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0000438 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss 
Rex Rammell vs. Idaho State Department of Agriculture 



















Order Denying memorandum to Award Legal Fees Brent J. Moss 
Notice of Lodging Brent J. Moss 
Filing: I1A- Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior Brent J. Moss 
Appearance Paid by: Runft, John L (attorney for Rammell, Rex) Receipt 
number: 0002002 Dated: 4/9/2007 Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
Substitution Of Counsel 
Stipulation Re:Briefing Schedule 
Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review 
Response Brief of Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
Brief in Reply 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/24/2007 10:00 AM) 
Notice of Oral Argument 
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/24/2007 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Brent J. Moss 
Memorandum Decision Brent J. Moss 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Brent J. Moss 
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Runft, John L 
(attorney for Rammell, Rex) Receipt number: 0007531 Dated: 1/9/2008 
Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
( defendant) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Brent J. Moss 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: John Runft Receipt number: 0007532 Dated: 
1/9/2008 Amount: $94.00 (Check) 
Letter from Supreme Court Suspending Due dates Brent J. Moss 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal in No. 32538 and Augmenting the Brent J. Moss 
Record in No. 34927 
User: GWF" 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
(208)356-3690 
MADISON COUNr/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
REX RAMMELL aud LYNDA 




IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, 
Respondent. 
Case. No. CV-05- I./ 3 f 
Pl:lTITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the Petitioners, REX RAMMELL and LYNDA RAMMELL, 
d/b/a ELK COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS, (hereinafter "Elk Country"), aud pursuaut to Idaho 
,\ 
Code Sections, 67-5270 and 67-5272, hereby petition the Court for a review of that certain Fipal 
Order of the Deputy Director aud the underlying Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law aud 
regulatory aud statutory authority of the matter previously heard before the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture and more particularly identified as Case No. M03-02-04-l 130DC. In support of its 
Petition, Elk Country alleges as follows: 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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1. Rex Rammell and Lynda Rammell, d/b/a ELK COUNTRY TROPHY 
BULLS, are residents of the State ofidaho, County of Madison. The Rammells own an operate 
an elk ranch. 
2. The Idaho State Department of Agriculture (hereinafter "ISDA'') is a 
~ovemmental agency in the state ofidaho and is statutorily charged with regulating elk ranching 
within the state under a specific and limited grant of authority. 
3. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 
67-5270, et seq. 
4. ISDA filed an Administrative Complaint against Elk Country in June 
2004. After an exhaustive administrative proceeding, ISDA prevailed in the administrative 
proceeding and fines were levied against Elk Country in the amount of$29,000. Additionally, 
attorney fees and costs in excess of$29,000 are being sought against Elk Country pursuant to LC. 
§ 12-117. 
5. Having exhausted all administrative remedie$, Elk Country is now entitled 
to a review of this matter by the District Court. Elk Country hereby requests that a certified copy 
of the agency record be prepared and submitted for review. 
6. Preliminarily, the issues for which Elk Country seeks review are: 
i 
a) Whether the ISDA's actions were in violation of constitutional 
provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, including without limitation, rights of due 
process, just compensation, equal protection under the laws and a fundamental right to possess 
property and have liberty. 
b) Whether the rules promulgated by the ISDA exceeded the statutory 
grant of authority given by the legislature. 
>ETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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c) Whether the rules were made upon unlawful procedure, including 
without limitation, allowing an unqualified hearing officer to prevail, excluding testimony and 
evidence regarding the correctness of the rules in light of the legislative intent. 
d) Whether the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner or 
otherwise abused its discretion at the time the rules were promulgated, during the enforcement 
stage and/or at the administrative hearing. 
e) Whether the attorney fees and costs award should stand given that the 
Petitioners tried to cooperate with the agency to the extent that their rights were not.left 
unprotected, given that the agency dropped certain counts, given that certain allegations of the · 
Administrative Complaint were not upheld at the hearing and for such other reasons that might 
be revealed upon a review of the record, Additionally, Petitioners prevailed on some issues and 
otherwise did act with a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
f) Elk Couritry reserves the right to submit an amended petition at such 
time as the agency record is compiled and upon its review, which may restate the above-listed 
issues or state new issues as the case may be. 
7. Additionally, Elk Country seeks a stay of enforcement of the penalties and 
fees awards pursuant to LC. § 67-5274. 
,i 
8. Elk Country respectfully requests the opportunity to present additional 
evidence pursuant to LC. § 67-5276 as there were certain irregularities at the agency level or 
good reasons why the evidence was not previously produced. 
9. Petitioners reserve the right to identify other issues as the basis for this 
review upon further review of the public record on file herein and of the transcripts as they 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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become available. Appellants further reserve the right to submit a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities after review of the factual record to supplement this appeal. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for the judicial review of this matter and the 
determination that the ISDA exceeded its constitutional and statutory authority, reached a 
decision on unlawful procedure, or otherwise acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
Petitioners further ask that the requested sanctions by stayed and that no action be taken to 
enforce those matters pending the outcome of the review process. 
DATED this Ji£ day of June, 2005 . 





AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /tN/4ay of June, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW was served on the following as 
indicated below: 
PERSON SERVED 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0790 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
COUNTYOF $JMd1i;,iMl ) 
RexRammell 
SERVICE 
Hand Delivery ( ) 
Facsimile Transmission ( ) 
Mailing - United States Mail 
Postage Prepaid ( X ) 
. . C"' '>>···· 
SUBSCrBED and sworn to before me 1:•~'(jv\/l\ 
this l\J_''day of June, 2005, at ~£\I ~:Mr~ , Idaho. 




~""\ fj:J C ~ tL r'\ r 
' UJI '7! · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRI IT ~F ~El S 
2005 r-
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY..c::11.::.:11·:::.D1S::c0::_N :::,CCcc'"':'.:.IF:..cl ====.! 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 



















Case No. CV-05-438 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW 
The Court has before .it a petition for judieial review of a decision by the above-
named governmental entity. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that:. 
f. This review shall be determined on the record; 
2. The above-named governmental entity shall prepare the record and lodge it with the 
District Court. Upon such lodging, the Clerk of the Court' shall mail to counsel for 
the parties notice of that the record has been lodged. the fee for preparing the 
agency record shall be paid according to statute; 
3. A transcript of the proceedings before the agency ,shall be prepared at the 
petitioner's expense; 
4. Briefmg shall occur according to the following schedule: . 
a. Petitioner's brief shall ;_be filed with this Court within. 35 days of the date 
on which notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this 
Court is served; 
b. Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of 
Petitioner's brief; 
c. Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of 
Respondents' brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW 
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5. One original brief shall be filed with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 
134 E. Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. 
6. When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall 
schedule a hearing for oral argument in Rexburg on the next convenient law and 
motion day following the expiration of the time limit for Petitioner's reply brief. 
Notice of the hearing date shall be served upon this Court and counsel for 
Respondents. In the event that no hearing is scheduled, this Court will assume that 
the matter has been submitted for resolution without oral argument. 
So ordered. 
,i 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
. . -GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL was this It:,, day of June, 2005, served 
upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Brian J. Oalcey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O.Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
Clerk of the Court 
By:~~ 
awClerk 




LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
BRIAN J. OAKEY (ISB # 6838) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
2270 Old Penitentiary Road 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone: (208) 332-8509 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4623 
Attorneys for Respondent 
:..,: ..•. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 




IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, 
Respondent. . 1 
) 
) 









) _____________ ) 
Pursuant to the Order Governing Procedure on Review issued by this Comi on June 15, 
2005, I, Brian J. Oakey, Deputy Attorney General, on behalf of the Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture, hereby certify that the within is a true and accurate copy of the administrative record 
in the matter of Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Rex Rammel/ & Lynda Rammell, doing 
business as Elk Country Trophy Bulls, Case No. M03-02-04-1130DC. Pursuant to IRCP 
CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
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84(f)(3)(K), attached to this Certificate of Administrative Record is a Table of Contents 
identifying each pleading, order and exhibit considered in the administrative hearing with each 
document's corresponding tab number. 
DATED this Jr day of July 2005. 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG, Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division.of Natural Resources 
4S,,._._:_ ~ 
BRIAN J. OAKEY, Deputy Attorn 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11 ;,day of July, 2005. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires: 1:1.\':'; I ;J.l ,_381 I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -J.'!~ay of July, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD was served on the following as 
indicated below: 
Dr. :Rex Rarnmell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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D United States Mail, Postage Prepaid 
G:r United States Certified Mail, Return 
Receipt, Postage Prepaid, Article Number 
7000 1670 0013 7128 0243 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
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41. 11/30/04 RexRammell 
42. 12/1/04 Brian Oakey 
43. 12/1/04 . Brian Oakey 
44. 12/2//04 Jean Uranga 
45. 12/6/04 Brian Oakey 
46. 12/9/04 Rex Ramrnell 
47. 12/9/04 Rex Ramrnell 
48. 12/9/04 Brian Oakey 
49. 12/13/04 RexRammell 
50. 1/13/05 Brian Oakey 
51. 1/28/05 Rex Ramrnell 
52. 2/4/05 Brian Oakey 
·i 
53. 3/16/05 Rex Rarnmell · 
54. 3/17/05 Brian Oakey 
55. 3/23/05 Mike Everett 
56. 3/30/05 Mike Everett 
57. 4/6/05 Brian Oakey 
CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
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Idaho State Department of Agriculture's 
Response to Respondent, Rex Rammell's 
Second Request for Production of 
Documents to Complaint 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture's 
Response to Respondent, Rex Rammell's 
Second Set of Interrogatories to 
Complainant 
Notice of Service of Discovery 
Notice of Hearing on Motion in Limine 
Witnesses and Exhibits 
Affidavit of Brian Oakey 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture's 
Witness List and Copies of Exhibits 
Subpoena of Dr. Clarence Siroky, Dr. Dan 
Crowell, John Chatburn, Kelly Mortensen, 
Mark Hyndman, Bruce Donnell 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion to Compel Discovery 
··- Witnesses and Exhibits 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in 
Limine 
Certificate of Service 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture's 
Supplement1)1 Responses to Respondents' 
Interrogatodes Nos. 7, 10, 15 
Motion of Disqualification 
Memorandiµn in Support of Motion of 
Disqualification 
Certificate of Service 
Closing Argument and Prayer for Relief 
Rex Rammell 's Closing Argument 
Complainant's Response to Respondents' 
Closing Argument 
Petition for the Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture to Review the Preliminary 
Order 
Notice of Hearing 
Scheduling Notice 
Amended Scheduling Notice 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondents' Petition for the Idaho State 
Department of Agriculture to Review the 
Preliminary Order 
58. 4/14/05 RexRammell Brief m Support of the Idaho State 
Department of Agriculture's Review of the 
Preliminary Order 
59. 5/26/05 Brian Oakey Notice of Hearing 
60. 5/26/05 Brian Oakey Memorandum of Costs 
61. 5/26/05 Brian Oakey Affidavit of Brian J. Oakey in Support of 
Memorandum of Costs 
62. 6/13/05 RexRammell Objection to Memorandum of Costs 
ORDERS ISSUED 
Tab Date Filed Document Author Document Descriotion 
63. 11/18/04 Jean Uranga Order Granting Respondents' Motion to 
Amend Answer 
64. 12/9/04 Jean Uranga . Order on Respondents' Motion to Compel 
65. 12/13/04 Jean Uranga Order Denying Motion for Disqualification 
66. 3/3/05 Jean Uranga Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
·· :Preliminary Order 
67. 3/3/05 Jean Uranga Schedule for Review 
68. 5/1'2/05 ISDA Deputy Director Final Order of the Denuty Director 
69. 7/7/05 Jean Uranga Supplemental Recommended Order on Costs 
and Attorney's Fees 
70. 7/26/05 ISDA Deputy Director Notice of Scheduling for Review of 
Supplemental Recommended Order on Costs 
and Attorney's Fees 
EXHIBITS PRESENTED AT HEARING, D_ECEMBER 15, 16, AND 30, 2004 
Tab Exhibit Exhibit Descrintion 
71. Certificate ofEiqhibits filed by Jean Uranga, Hearing Officer 
ISDA Exhibits 
72. 001 Aerial Photo ofRammell Facility; Note: Original Reduced to 8.5" x 11" 
73. 002 Affidavit of Brian Oalcey 12/01/04 
74. 003 Stinulation I 0/28/04 
75. 004 E-mail from Rammell to Siroky 12/19/03 
76. 005 . Letter from Rammell to Crowell 12/31/03 
77. 006 E-mail from Mortensen to Crowell, Garidel & Hyndman 12/19/03 
78. 007 Letter from Denartment to Rammell 12/24/03 
79. 008 Letter from Departmept to Rannnell 08/18/04 
80. 009 Animal Industries Investigation Report/Case Summary 06/07 /04 
CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
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81. 010 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/22/04 Crowell 
82. 011 Animal Industries Investi9:ation Form 01/26/04 Crowell 
83. 012 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/27/04 Crowell 
84. 013 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/28/04 Crowell 
85. 014 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/29/04 Crowell 
86. 015 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/30/04 Crowell -
87. 016 Photo of North Side of Bullpen 
88. 017 Photo of East Perimeter of Fence 
89. 018 Photo of South Exterior of Fence 
90. 019 Photo of Gate on South Exterior Fence 
91. 020 Photo of Elk Tracks 
92. 021 Photo of Southwest Corner of Bullpen 
93. 022 Photo of Elk Outside of Facility 
94. 023 Photo of Same Elk as in Exhibit 22 . 
95. 025 Animal Industries Investigation Form O 1/22/04 Mortensen 
96. 026 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/26/04 Mortensen 
97. 027 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/27/04 Mortensen 
98. 028 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/28/04 Mortensen 
99. 029 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/29/04 Mortensen 
100. 031 CWD Sample Submission Fi5rm/Death Certificate 
101. 032 Removal Sheet 
102. 033 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/26/04 Hyndman 
103. 034 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/27/04 Hyndman 
104. 035 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/28/04 Hyndman 
105. 036 Animal Industries Investieation Form 01/29/04 Hyndman 
106. 037 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/26/04 Donnell 
107. 038 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/21/04 Donnell 
108. 039 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/28/04 Donnell 
109. 040 Animal Industries Investigation Form 01/29/04 Donnell 
110. 041 Letter from Department to Rarnrnell and Ward 06/27 /03 
111. 042 Memorandum Decision 07 /30/02 
~ 
112. 043 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Preliminary Order 05/05/03 
Rammell Exhibits i 
113. B Deoosition of Dan Crowell I 1/01/04 
114. Bl Letter from ISDA to M&M Court Reporting, Inc. 
115. C Affidavit of Dan Crowell in Sunnort of Administrative Warrant 
116. D Affidavit of Dan Crowell in Suooort of Amended Administrative Warrant 
117. E 
. Aoolication for Administrative Warrant 
118. F Return of Administrative Warrant 
119. J Cervidae Farms Facility Inspection Renort Dated December 30, 2003 
120. L Almual Domestic Cervidae Ranch Assessment - Certificate No. 40 
121. M Handwritten Note Dated January 20, 2003 
122. s Small Antler 
123. T Large Antler 




124. u Unedited Videotape 
125. V Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order issued by Patrick A. 
Takasugi . 
126. w E-mail from Mortensen to Crowell and Hyndman 
127. X Facility Inspection Report 09/09/04 
128. y 2002 Inventory Spreadsheet 
129. z ISDA Response to Respondent's First Set ofinterrogatories to Complainant 
130. AA ISDA Response to Respondent's First Request for Admissions to 
Complainant 
131. BB ISDA Response to Respondent's First Request for Production of Documents 
to Complainant 
132. cc ISDA Supplemental Responses to Respondent's Interrogatories 7, 10, 15 
133. DD ISDA Response to Respondent's Second Set ofinterrogatories to 
Complainant 
134. EE ISDA response to Respondent's Second Requests for Production of 
Documents to Complainant 
135. FF 2003 Inventory 
136. GO Annual Domestic Cervidae Assessed Fee Document 
·····-




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,, --
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON' . 




IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV 2005-438 
ORDER 
& 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
In the above captioned matter, the Petitioner has filed a petition for judicial 
review and this Court has issued an Order Governing Procedure on Review. In accord 
with the Order Governing Procedure on Review, the Respondent has submitted what it 
proposes to be the administrative record .. The Clerk of Court ha$ yet to file a notice of 
lodging and the Court is not in possession of any transcripts of the proceedings that 
occurred in the administrative action, 
The Court has conducted a cursory examination of the proposed administrative 
' 
record and of the petition for judicial _review. Based upon that examination, the Court is 
i 
raising, sue sponte, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before any of the parties bear 
any further expense in pursuing or defending this review. The petition in this matter 
seeks review of the Final Order of the Deputy Director. The petition was filed on June 
JO, 2005. The final order was entered and served on May 12, 2005. It appears that 
Petitioner filed his petition 29 days after the final order. According to statute, a petition 
for review needs to be filed within 28 days of the issuance of a final order. I. C. § 67-
ORDER & NOTICE OF HEARING 
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5273. This time limit is jurisdictional. However, the Respondent did issue supplemental 
orders which may affect the deadline for filing the petition. 
Therefore, this Court gives notice that it will hear the oral arguments of the parties 
on the above-discussed issue on the October 3, 2005, 10:00 a.m., at the Madison County 
Courthouse. Should the parties desire, they may appear telephonically after making the 
necessary arrangements with the Clerk of Court's office. 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Should the parties wish to submit briefs to the Court on this issue, they are invited 
to do so in accord with the following briefing schedule: 
Petitioner and Respondent may file their respective briefs with this Court and 
have served their brief upon the opposing party ~-11or before September 21, 2005. 
Petitioner and Respondent may respond to each other's brief via a reply brief 
which must be filed with the Court and served upon the opposing party on or before 
September 29, 2005. 
i 
The briefs shall only address the issue of subject matter j:'urisdiction as discussed 
above and shall not address any of the substantive issues of the, appeal. 
SO ORDERED. 
ORDER & NOTICE OF HEARING 
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District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 
) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was this /, day of :½;,-Ja,,1,.,,...-, 2005 served upon the following 
individual via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Brian J. Oakley 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Department of Ag. 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701-0790 
By: ~6~ 
~~le:tk ofComt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 









) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF LODGING 








The Court hereby gives notice that a certified copy of the administrative record and . . 
transcript in the matter of Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Rex Rammell & Lynda 
Rammell, doing business as Elk Country Trophy Bulls, Case No., M03-02-04-l 130DC, has been 
lodged with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to IRCP 84(k). 
Briefing shall occur pursuant ttii the Court's Order Governing Procedure on Review, 
dated June 15, 2005. 
DATED this -IJ:=_ day of September 2005. 
By: 
Marilyn R. Rasmussen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF LODGING ADMINISTRATIVE 
RECORD i - Page I of2 
PAGE2l 
' ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF LODGING 
ADMINISTRATNE RECORD was this j_}_ day of September, 2005, served upon the 
following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Deparhnent of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
DATED this _}_3z_ day of September 2005. 
By: 
Marilyn R. Rasmussen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF LODGING ADMINISTRATIVE 
RECORD 




LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
BRIAN J. OAKEY (ISB # 6838) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
2270 Old Penitentiary Road 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone: (208) 332-8509 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4623 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 









) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) BRIEF IN RES,PONSE TO THE 
) COURT'S ORDER REGARDING 




Respondent. '' ) 
----------''----------
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Agriculture, (hereinafter "ISDA'') by 
and through the Attorney General, and pursuant to this Court's Order and Notice of Hearing 
issued on September 6, 2005, submits this Brief in Response to the Court's Order Regarding 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
REGARDING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
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) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In July of 2004, the ISDA filed an Administrative Complaint alleging Rex Rammell and 
Lynda Rammell, dba Elk Country Trophy Bulls (hereinafter "Petitioners") violated certain 
provisions of the Domestic Cervidae Farms Act and the accompanying Rules Governing 
Domestic Cervidae. The ISDA conducted an administrative hearing over the course of three 
days in December 2004. Ms. Jean R. Uranga, Esq., presided over the administrative hearing, 
serving as the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer subsequently issued the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order ("Preliminary Order"), which was filed by the ISDA 
on March 3, 2005. See Administrative Record at tab 66. The Preliminary Order was 
accompanied by a Schedule for Review, which was served on the parties and filed by the ISDA, 
also on March 3, 2005. See id. at tab 67. Petitioners timely filed a petition seeking review by 
the Director of the ISDA of the Preliminary Order issued by the Hearing Officer. See id. at tab 
53. The parties came on for hearing before Deputy Director Michael Everett on April 29, 2005, 
for the purpose of addressing those issues raised by the Petitioners in their petition seeking 
review of the Preliminary Order. The ISDA then issued its Finali Order of the Deputy Director 
("Final Order") on May 12, 2005. See id. at tab 68. The Final Order advised the parties of their 
right to file a motion for recons.ideration ~ithin fourteen (14) da)ls of the service date of the Final 
Order. See id. at tab 68, page 14. Ndither party elected to file a motion for reconsideration. 
Twenty-nine (29) days following the issuance and service of the Final Order, Petitioners filed 
with this Court a Petition for Judicial review seeking review of the contested case proceeding. 
The Final Order affirmed the Preliminary Order in all regards, including the award of 
costs and attorney fees. See id. at tab 68. The ISDA issued a Notice of Hearing on May 26, 
2005, and the parties came on for hearing before the Hearing Officer on June 21, 2005, for the 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
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) 
limited purpose of determining the appropriate amount of costs and attorney's fees to be awarded 
to the ISDA. See id. at tab 59. On July 7, 2005, the Hearing Officer issued a Supplemental 
Recommended Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees ("Supplemental Recommended Order") 
recor!):mending that the ISDA issue a Supplemental Final Order assessing costs and attorney's 
fees against Petitioners in the amount requested by the ISDA. See id. at tab 69, page 4. On 
August 12, 2005, Petitioners filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Supplemental Costs with the 
ISDA. See Exhibit A. The ISDA issued a Supplemental Final Order of the Deputy Director 
("Supplemental Final Order") on Costs and Attorney Fees on August 26, 2005, adopting those 
costs and attorney fees recommended by the Hearing Officer in the Supplemental Recommended 
Order. See Exhibit B. 
"·--
ARGUMENT 
The sole issue presently before the Court is that of subject matter jurisdiction with respect 
to the timeliness of Petitioners filing their Petition for Judicial Review. The right to judicial 
review of an administrative matter is not inherent, rather it is statutory. See Daw v. School 
District 91 Board of Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 807, 41 P.3d 234, ~35 (2001) (citing Striebeck v. 
Employment Sec .. Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961); Miller v. Gooding Highway 
Dist., 54 Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934). A statutory right tb appeal arises only after strict 
compliance with the provisions of the 1statute. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 405 
(2005) ( citations omitted). Noncompliance with the statute governing judicial review deprives 
the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. See~' Farmers Equipment Co., Inc. v. Clinger et al., 
70 Idaho 501, 504222 P.2d 1077, 1078-79 (1950) ("Where a[] [bond] on appeal is not filed 
within five days after notice of appeal, and the undertaking was not waived, and there was no 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
REGARDING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
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deposit of money, the Supreme Court will dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, the 
statutory requirements being mandatory." (emphasis added)). 
The right of judicial review of a contested case proceeding before the ISDA is outlined in 
Idaho Code§ 67-5270(3), as follows: 
A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency other 
than the industrial commission or the public utilities commission is entitled to 
judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements of 
sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code. 
Emphasis Added. 
Section 67-5273(2) provides the proper time frame for a party aggrieved by a final order issued 
by the ISDA to file a petition for judicial review. 
A petition for judicial review of a final order or a preliminary order that has 
become final when it was not reviewed by the agency head or preliminary, 
procedural or intermediate agency action under section 67-5271(2), Idaho Code, 
must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issuance of the final order, the 
date when the preliminary order became final, or the issuance of a preliminary, 
procedural or intermediate agency order, or, if reconsideration is sought, within, 
twenty-eight (28) days after the decision thereon .... 
Idaho Code§ 67-5273(2) (emphasis added). 
Petitioners filed their Petition for Judicial Review with this court on June 10, 2005, 
twenty-nine (29) days following the service date of the Final or4er. The Hearing Officer, in the 
Schedule for Review filed on March 3, 2005, advised the patties of the applicable statutes 
., 
governing judicial review and, citing Idaho Code § 67-5273, informed the parties that a petition 
must be filed with the district court within twenty-eight (28) days of the Preliminary Order 
becoming final. See Administrative Record at tab 67, page 3. The ISDA, in its Final Order, 
again citing Idaho Code § 67-5273, advised Petitioners of the requirement to file a petition for 
review with the district court within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of the Final Order. 
See Administrative Record at tab 68, page at 14. Additionally, the Final Order informed the 
-BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
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parties that the subsequent Supplemental Final Order to be issued by the ISDA with respect to 
costs and attorney fees was not interlocutory. The Deputy Director stated that "the issuance of 
th[ e] Supplemental Final Order does not delay the time for reconsideration of or judicial review 
of this Final Order." Id., page 13. Petitioners acknowledged this fact in their Petition for 
Judicial Review when they stated the following: "Having exhausted all administrative remedies, 
Elk Country is now entitled to a review of this matter by the District Court." Petition for Judicial 
Review at 2. 
The time for filing a petition for judicial review may only be extended by the timely 
filing of a motion which could affect the findings of fact and conclusions of law, in this case a 
motion for reconsideration. See State v. Lawson, 105 Idaho 164,165,667 P.2d 267,268 (1983) 
(quoting I.AR. 14). Idaho Appellate Rule 14 specifically provides that motions regarding costs 
and attorney fees before the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission do not 
extend the time for filing a petition for judicial review. See id. ( citing Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 
Idaho 286, 290, 596 P.2d 798, 802 (1979)). The fact that a hearing was held and a subsequent 
order was issued by the ISDA with respect to costs and attorney fees after the Final Order was 
filed on May 12, 2005, did not toll the time that Petitioners had to file their Petition for Judicial 
Review. See id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, havirig had occasion to address the issue of untimely filing of 
a petition for judicial review, has settled the matter with respect to subject matter jurisdiction 
now before this Court. See Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 617 (2000). In 
Arthur, the petitioner sought judicial review of the Shoshone County Planning and Zoning 
Commission's ("P&Z Commission") denial of a conditional use permit to operate a towing 
business. See id. at 855, 618. The petition for review was filed in the appropriate district court 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
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thirty (30) days following the P&Z Commission's denial of the application. See id. A motion 
for reconsideration was timely filed before the P &Z Commission. See id. After determining that 
the P &Z Commission did not have the statutory authority to take up the motion for 
reconsideration and that the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for filing 
a petition for judicial review, the district court held that the petition for review was untimely 
filed and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 856, 619. The Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the lower courts decision, concluding that "Arthur's petition for judicial review of the 
Board's order denying his application for a conditional use permit was untimely." Id. at 862, 
625. 
The fact that Petitioners in the administrative case below elected not to file a motion for 
reconsideration before the ISDA simplifies the analysis. Issues related solely to costs and 
attorney fees do not affect the time for filing a petition for judicial review. See Wheeler v. 
McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 290, 596 P.2d 798, 802 (1979). Therefore, the Final Order became 
ripe for appeal on May 12, 2005, and expired on June 9, 2005. Petitioners' failure to timely file 
their Petition for Judicial Review deprived this Court of jurisdi¢tion and requires "automatic 
dismissal .... " Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of subject matter jurisl.liction with respect to the timeliness of filing a petition 
for judicial review is not a matter of discretion for the courts, rather it is outlined statutorily in 
clear and unambiguous terms. Petitioners right to judicial review only arises after compliance 
with the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 67-5271 through 67-5279. See Idaho Code § 67-
5270(3). Petitioners have failed to comply with the twenty-eight (28) day time frame for filing 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
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) 
their Petition ror Judicial Review. Accordingly, this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to 
review the Final Order and has no other choice but to dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review. 
. 10.+"-DATED this _7_.....-day of September 2005. 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG, Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Natural Resources 
General 
,,. J 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of September, 2005. 
~' . '. ~ o 
Residing at: Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires: / 2--3(1-/CJ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION was served on the following as indicated below: 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
490 Pioneer Road, Apt 6105 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
~ United States Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D United States Certified Mail, Return 
Receipt, Postage Prepaid 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER 
REGARDING SUBJECT MA TIER JURISDICTION , SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION - Page 8 
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Li AUG 1 2 2005 l!:!J 
LEGAL BUREAU 
Idaho State Department of Agrlculwra 
BEFORE THE IDAHO .STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 










REX RAMMELL & LYNDARAMMELL ) 
. DBA ELK COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS ) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. M03-02-04-1 l 30DC 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO SUPPLEMENTAL COSTS 
NOW COMES the Respondent, Rex Rammell, proceeding in pro per, and for his 
appeal respectfully r<>presents unto The Jdaho State Department of Agriculture as 
follows: 
Any further award of fees is inappropriate. No attorney fees were appropriate 
from the beginning. Respondents believe they did,aot with a reasonable basis in fact and 
law as has argued in the_ record. Furthermore, respondent's axgnments on all counts 
have not been heard and to state that they acted without a reaspnable basis in fact and or 
law is mere opinion. A differ-0:nce of opinion is not grounds for an unreasonable award of 
fees. Therefore, respondent renews all their previous objections found throughout the 
administrative process with emphasis· on the fact that there b,as been no basis on which to 
rule that supplemental fees are appropriate . 
. i 
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LEGAL BUREAU 
u 1~ 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
BEFORE THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 




REX RAMMELL & LYNDA 
RAMMELL, doing business as ELK 
COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS, 
Respondents. 
~ Case No. M03-02-04-l 130DC 
) 
) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL ORDER 
) OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR ON 




This matter came before the Director's designee Deputy Director Michael Everett 
upon the review of the Hearing Officer's Supplemental Recommended Order on Costs 
and Attorney's Fees. The Hearing Officer awarded the Department its costs and fees 
pursuant to my Final Order of the Deputy Director, which affirmed the Hearing Officer's 
Findings and Conclusions that the Department was entitled to, an award under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117(1) of reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees and expenses against the Respon-
dents and which directed "the Department [to] issue a Supplemental Final Order for 
' . 
Allowable Costs and Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-117(1) after receiving all parties' 
submissions." The Hearing Officeis Supplemental Recommended Order on Costs and 
Attorney's Fees quantified the Department's award at $29,372.96. By this Supplemental 
Final Order of the Deputy Director on Costs and Attorney's Fees I affirm the Hearing 
Officer's award of $29,373.96 against the Respondents. 
EXHIBIT 
~ 
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The Supplemental Recommended Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees quantified its 













The attorney's fees for the Department were based upon a modest, perhaps even 
unreasonably low rate of $7 5/hour. 1 They are not unreasonably high, and I accept them. 
The remaining costs are based upon objectively ascertainable third party billings. I 
accept all of them. The Respondents' liability for costs and fees is settled and will not be 
reviewed again in this Order. I fully accept the Hearing Officer's rationale for the quanti-
fication of costs and fees in her Supplemental Recommended Order. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINALORDER ON COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hearing Officer's Recommended Supple-
mental Final Order on Costs and Attorney's of $29,372.96 be affirmed . 
..,,_--l.l.. . 
Dated thisL-t,_uay of August, 2005 
For example, the District Court in Madison County has awarded the Department fees at a rate 
of $95/hour. See Memorandum Decision of July 1, 2005, in Rammell v. Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture, Case No. CV-05-199. 
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This Supplemental Final Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees is a Final Order of the 
Deputy Director of the Idaho Department of Agriculture. Any party may file a motion 
for reconsideration of this Supplemental Final Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees within 
fourteen (14) days of the service date of this Final Order. The Deputy Director will 
dispose of the motion for reconsideration within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, or 
the motion will be considered denied by operation oflaw. See Section 67-5246(4), Idaho 
Code. 
Pursuant to Sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho Code, any party aggrieved by this 
Supplemental Final Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees may petition for judicial review 
of this Final Order by filing a petition for judicial review in the district court of a county 
in which: 
1. A hearing was held, 
11. The fmal agency action was'taken, 
iii. The party seeking review of the order resides, or operates its 
principal place of business in Idaho, or 
1v, The real property or personal property fuat was the subject of the 
agency action is located. 
A petition for judicial review must be filed within twerity-eight (28) days (a) of the 
service date of this Supplemental Final Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees, (b) of an 
Order denying a motion for reconsideration, or ( c) the failurb within twenty-one (21) days 
to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration, whichever is later. See Section 67-5273, 
Idaho Code. The filing of a petition for judicial review to the district court does not itself 
stay the effectiveness or enforcement of this Supplemental Final Order on Costs and 
Attorney's Fees. 
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Certificate of Service 
-ti---' 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of August, 2005, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to 
the following: 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
2270 Old Penitentiary Road 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
q:\agriclrammell\o5236lga.doc 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt, 
#7003 0500 0003 1880 0454 
Statehouse Mail 
KATHY KIL EN 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
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Bron M. Rammell, Esq. 
DIAL, MAY & RAMMELL, CHARTERED 
216 W. Whitman/P,O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: {208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 4389 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL, d/b/a ELK COUNTRY 
TROPHY BULLS; Case No. CV-2005-438 
vs. 
Petitioner, BRIEF RE: TIMELINESS OF 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Respondent. 
Pursuant to the Court's Order dated September 6, 2005, Petitioner Rex Rammell, 
through counsel, submits the following briefing in support of the fact that his Petition for 
Judicial Review was filed in a timely manner. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Agriculture issued a document titled "Final Order of the 
Deputy Director" on May 12, 2005. The certificate of servi¢e indicates that the document 
was mailed the same day tc petitioner, Rex Rammell. One of the major issues that was 
I 
addressed in the Order was an aVl'.ard of attorney's fees. This issue was and has been 
contested in the Petition for Judicial Review. 
After the Order dated May 12, 2005, the Administrative Hearing Officer 
submitted a Supplemental Recommended Order on attorney's fees. On August 26, 2005, 
the Idaho . Department of Agric~ture hdopted the hearing officer's Supplemental 
Recommended Order and issued a document titled Supplemental Final Order of the 
Deputy Director. Rex Rammell timely objected to, and sought additional review of the 
attorney's fees issue in compliance with administrative procedure. 
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The two issues identified below demonstrate that the Petition for Judicial Review 
was filed in a timely manner. 
II. THE SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL ORDER EXTENDJJ;D ANY TIME PERIODS 
FOR FILING A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Unlike .an Appeal from a District Court decision, filing a Petition for Judicial 
· Review is governed by I.R.C.P 84(b) arid I.C. §67-5273. I.R.C.P. 84(b) states that a 
Petition for Judicial Review must be filed within 28 days "after the agency action is ripe 
for Judicial Review ... " la. (Emphasis Added). The time period is further extended upon 
a timely motion that affects the judgment. Id. The Supplemental Order affected the 
judgment. 
The whole concept of "exhaustion" in administrative review is to ei:isUre that an 
Administrative Agency has completed every part of its case, and has made a final and • 
concluding decision. Unlike a District Court, an Administrative Agency is not a neutral 
party. The doctrines of "exhaustion" and "ripeness" have an important and critical place 
ii:i Petitions for Review. Allowing an Admini;;ative Agency to issue subsequent Orders, 
without extending the time limits to seek review of any such Orders defeats the very 
purpose of the doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness; The result would cause litigants to 
deal with administrative issues in a "piece-meal" fashion. 
Even in an Appellate context, when an amendment to a judgment is made, the 
seasonableness of an appeal is generally determined based on the date of the amendment 
rather than the date of the original order. Dahlstrom v. Portland Mining Company, 12 
Idaho 87 (S. Ct. 1906). 
In Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Sourhfork Lumber Company, 123 
Idaho 146 (S. Ct. 1993) the Idah~iSupreme CoUrt dealt with the timeliness of an appeal 
(as opposed to a Petition for Revi~w) as 'affected by a request for attorney's fees. The 
Court adopted the language in I.AR Rule 14, explaining that an Appeal is tolled by the 
filing of a timely motion "which, if granted, could effect any findings of facts, 
conclusions of law, and judgment in the action .... " Since a motion for fees was filed in 
the case in a timely manner, and the issue was addressed after the previous order, the 
Court of Appeals dismissal of the appeal was reversed. The issue of attorney's fees in 
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this case has been a significant issue. The Department's titling the subsequent order, 
"Supplemental Final Order" recognizes this. fact 
In the case at hand, the Department of Agriculture sent Rex a "Supplemental Final 
Order" that materially affected their previous order. Dahlstrom explains that the 
statutorily prescribed period of limitations of judicial review should take. effect from the 
filing of any Supplemental Final Order. Under that standard the Petition for Judicial 
Review was timely. 
III. THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED UNDER 
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
As previously discussed, an Administrative Agency is not a District Court. The 
rules do not treat Petitions for Judicial Review the same as an appeal. For example, 
Appellate Rule 14, requires filing an appeal within 42 days "from the date evidenced by 
the filing stamp of the Clerk of the Court" Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 84(b) on the 
other hand, prescribes a 28-day time period f<>r filing a petition, from the time Agency 
action is "ripe" for judicial review. LC. §67-5273 talks about filing a petition within 28 
days of"agency action, except as provided by other provisions of the law." 
In this case, Rex was still responding to the Agency's Motions, and exhausting his 
administrative remedies in August 2005. The Agency w~s clearly still engaged in 
"action" aoo all issues were not "ripe" until the Final Supplemental Order was served. 
In this particular case, it is also critical that the Court view the Final Order from 
the eyes of a reasonable person receiving the Order. 
The Order specifically instructed Rex that the Petition for Judicial Review was 
required to be filed "within 28 days '(a) of the service date'ofthis Order .... "' A person 
reading this information would logically refer to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for 
guidance. In particular, LR.C,P. 6(e)(l) explains that a person who has been "served" a 
document by mail, enjoys a three-day · grace period in addition to any prescribed 
limitations. LR.C.P. Rule 6(e){J). Rex's Petition for Judicial Review was submitted on 
June 10, 2005, which was 29 days after the Department of AgTiculture signed its first 
Order. It was two days before the time lapsed applying I.R.C,P. 6(e)(l). 
Unlike an appeal from a decision of a District Court, in which the rule specifically 
directs a person to file an appeal within 42 days of the filing stamp, a Petition for Judicial 
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Review affords 28 days from the vague date of "ripeness''. 1 Rex obviously did not 
receive the original "final order" on May 12, 2005. Fairness requires that he be given au 
additional three days to file his Petition per reasonable reliance on I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l). 
It is again hoped that this Court will remember that Administrative Agencies are not the 
same as a Court. They are adverse parties with the capability ( which the laws 
traditionally indicates should be carefully scrutinized) of acting in a legislative, executive 
and judicial capacity. Without a specific rule telling a petitioner he must file his petition 
within 28 days of the date of an order as opposed to service plus three days as set forth in 
the Idaho Rules, a Petitioner should not be held to a rigid rule that ls purely a "stumbHng 
block" and only benefits an adverse party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Fundamental and traditional fairness and Due Process suggest that Rex was 
entitled to rely on I.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) and file his petition within 28 days plus three days 
from mailing. This is especially true when tht:_Order referred to "service" and he did not 
receive the Order until a few days after it was signed. 
Rex timely objected to the Agency's attorney's fees request and a Supplemental 
Order was issued l,y the Department of Agriculture. Without the Supplemental Final 
Order, a primary issue of the case, the award, reasonableness, and amount of attorney's 
fees, would not be able to be addressed, and the doctrine of exhaustion would be rendered 
moot. A decision finding that Rex was required to address or appeal the attorney's fee 
issue multiple times creates an Unreasonable burden on any litigant, and any reasonable 
litigant would conclude that they had three days I,eyond the date of mailing of the first 
Order of the Deputy director in any event. i 
DATED this 21" day ofSeptembe~,'2005. 
DIAL, MAY & llAMMELL, CH1D. 
1 Compare l.A.R. 14 to l.R.C.P. 84(\>). 
_
2 See Final Order of the Deputy Director, Page 14. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing was served on the following 
named persons at the address shown and in the manner indicated. 
Brian Oakey 
2270 Old Penitentiary Rd 
Boise, ID 83 712 
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2005. 
(.}{:($.Mail . 
( ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
BRIAN J. OAKEY (ISB # 6838) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
2270 Old Penitentiary Road 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone: (208) 332-8509 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4623 
Attorneys for Respondent 
i . -- . . 
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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioners assert that the issuance of the Supplemental Final Order of the Deputy 
Director on Costs and Attorney's Fees ("Supplemental Order") by the ISDA in the 
administrative proceeding below has tolled the time in which Petitioners are required to file their 
Petition for Judicial Review. In support of this assertion, Petitioners claim that the award of 
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attorney fees is a major issue addressed in the Final Order of the Deputy Director ("Final Order") 
and has been contested in the Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioners argue further that the 
issuance of the Supplemental Order by the ISDA materially affected the previously filed Final 
Order thereby tolling the time limit for filing a Petition for Judicial Review as prescribed by 
Idaho Code§ 67-5273. 
Additionally, Petitioners rely on l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l), arguing that the twenty-eight (28) day 
time limit for filing the Petition for Judicial Review was extended by three (3) days. Petitioners 
state that "[f]airness requires that [Petitioners] be given an additional three days to file [the] 
Petition per reasonable reliance on l.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l)." Brief Re: Timeliness of Petition for 
Judicial Review at 4. 
Petitioners' arguments are without merit. First, the time period for filing a petition for 
judicial review is clearly outlined in Idaho Code § 67-5273 and in the instant case only the filing 
of a motion for reconsideration could have extended the filing deadline for the Petition for 
Judicial Review. Petitioners did not file a motion seeking reconsideration of the Final Order 
with the ISDA below. Accordingly, the time to file a petition fol' judicial review has not been 
tolled. Second, the three day grace period contemplated by l.R.,C.P. 6(e)(l) has no application 
with respect to the timeliness of Petitioners filing the Petition fort Judicial Review now before the 
Court. The issue of subject matter juris/Jiction is not a matter of fairness for the courts to decide 
within their discretion as Petitioners suggest. Rather, a court either has jurisdiction or it does 
not. In this case, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the Petitioners' case because the 
Petition for Judicial Review was not timely filed and the Court must dismiss Petitioners' case on 
those grounds. 
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of their Petition for Judicial Review that all administrative remedies had been exhausted. See 
Petition for Judicial Review at 2. Additionally, the untimely filing of their Petition for Judicial 
Review came after the issuance of the Final Order and before the issuance of the Supplemental 
Order. If Petitioners, as they now contend, did not believe the Final Order was ripe for review, 
logic would dictate that the Petition for Judicial Review would have come some time after the 
issuance of the Supplemental Order, not before it. 
II. IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6(e)(l) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
TIME LIMITS SET BY IDAHO CODE § 67-5273 
Petitioners contend that they should not be held to a rigid rule with respect to the time 
limits set by Idaho Code§ 67-5273. See Brief Re: Timeliness of Petition for Judicial Review at 
4. In doing so, Petitioners argue that the three day grace period contemplated in l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) 
should allow Petitioners an additional three days to file their Petition for Judicial Review. 
Petitioners reliance on l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) to extend the time requirements for filing their Petition 
for Judicial Review ignores the plain language of the governing statute and is without merit. 
It appears that this is an issue yet to be addressed by Idaho courts, however, cases in other 
jurisdictions support the conclusion that l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) does not extend the time for filing a 
Petition for Judicial Review. See~, Carter-McMahon v. McMahon, 815 N.E.2d 170 (2004) 
(Indiana rule does not extend the time limit for filing a motion to correct error because the 
--i 
procedural rule is only activated by the service of a notice rather than the entry of a final 
judgment or an appealable final order). The McMahon case, although not binding precedent, is 
on point with the issue now before this Court. The McMahon Court, in construing the 
procedw-al rule looked to its express terms to resolve the issue before it. See id. at 175. The 
Indiana rule of procedure at issue in McHahon is identical to l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l). Compare Indiana 
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Trial Rule 6(E) with l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l). The procedural rule at issue in McMahon and now before 
this Court provides: 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper 
upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) (emphasis added). The McMahon Court concluded that the rule granting an 
additional three days was only triggered by the service of a notice and not the filing of a final 
judgment or an appealable final order. See McMahon, 815 N.E.2d at 175. The Court also 
observed that neither rule before it cited the other and stated that "we are unconvinced that Rule 
6(E) is related to Rule 59(C), let alone applies to extend the thirty-day period that begins upon 
entry of judgment." Id. The Court cited a number of federal circuit decisions that bolstered its - ····--.. 
conclusion that the time deadline at issue was unaffected by the three day grace period. See id. 
at 175-76 (citing, among others, Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("Rule 6(e) does not add three days to Rule 54's five-day period that starts with entry of 
the clerk's order"); accord Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239,241 (7th Cir. 1996) ("'when 
judicial action is complete on filing, Rule 6(e) does not apply'"); cf. Bailey v. Sharp, 782 F.2d 
1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Rule 6 makes it clear that conrts have 
: 
no authority to enlarge the filing period"). 
l 
In the case now before the Court, as in McMahon, there has not been the service of a 
notice that would trigger the application of I.R.C.P. 6(e)(l). Rather, a Final Order was issued 
which is a final judgment of the ISDA. Furthe1more, Idaho Code§ 67-5273 and I.R.C.P. 84(b) 
do not cross-reference with I.R.C.P. 6(e)(l). Idaho Code§ 67-5273 and l.R.C.P. 84(b) establish 
the time frames for filing a petition for judicial review and once an order from an agency 
becomes final, only a motion for reconsideration may extend the time for filing a petition for 
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judicial review. l.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) is unrelated to Idaho Code § 67-5273 and l.R.C.P. 84(b) and 
does not provide the courts the necessary authority to enlarge the filing period for a petition for 
judicial review. See id. at 176. 
CONCLUSION 
The resolution of a jurisdictional question cannot be resolved by entertaining the fairness 
of the outcome of a decision. Rather, the Court is required to make a determination regarding 
Petitioners compliance with the applicable statutes. A statutory right to appeal arises only after 
strict compliance with the provisions of the statute. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law§ 405 
(2005) ( citations omitted). Petitioners have failed to comply with the filing requirements of 
Idaho Code§ 67-5273 and I.R.C.P. 84(b) and as a result have left this Court without jurisdiction 
to take their case. This Court must dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
DATED this 2$3-t-~ay of September 2005. 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG, Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Natural Resources 
~ ............... ,: +J 
SU~~~~r.~ SWORN to before me this~ day of September, 2005 . 
..... ~ ..... ... i;ill'fl: 
~ ~ •• .I\"~~ 
f:J/,i.oTAit,-.\<t-\ ,) . / .. § : ··· __ .;.. l ~ ""4Ct.41<.b,.., D. ~..J 
\ \ 1>p9i;\C I j Notary Public for Idaho 
,:,,:, <l',1-••... • ••• •:,,..o l Residing at: Boise, Idaho 
•, 'I .. ••••• ~y •• L/ .., I ;i.o t I '•,,,''/!OF\~,,,•' Commission Expires: ·"' • ,,, ........... ,,, 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _a__fday of September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW was served on the following as indicated below: 
Bro.n M. Rammell 
DIAL, MAY & RAMMELL, chtd. 
216 W. Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
/\ 
IB4Jnited States Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D United States Certified Mail, Return 
Receipt, Postage Prepaid 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
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Case No. CV-05-438 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
This court raised, sue.sponte, the issue of whether it has the requisite subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear this review. The parties briefed the court on the issue and 
presented oral argument on October 3, 2005. The court concludes that it lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction and the petition in the above captioned matter is, therefore, 
DISMISSED. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review on June I 0, 2005, in which he seeks 
review of a "Final Order of the Deputy Director and the underlying Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and regulatory and ·statutory authority of t)ie matter previously heard 
before the Idaho Department of Agriculture and more particularly identified as Case No. 
M03-02-04-l 130DC."1 After receipt ~fthe petition, this court issued an Order 
Governing Procedure on Review in which the governmental agency was ordered to 
prepare the administrative record and lodge it with the court. After receiving the record, 
the court observed that the Final Order from which Petitioner sought review was entered 
and served on May 12, 2005. Twenty-nine (29) days had elapsed between the time 
Petitioner had filed his Petitioner for Judicial review and the time the final order was 
issued. The court, being aware that LC.§ 67-5273 and I.R.C.P, 84(b) require the filing of 
1 c.,,,,. o.,.,..",.;i PP.titinn for Judicial Review. p. l_. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION ,. J 
PAGE48 
) 
the petition within twenty-eight (28) days after the agency action was ripe for judicial 
review, questioned whether it had jurisdiction over this case and presented the issue to 
the parties. The parties briefed the issue and presented oral argument on October 3, 2005. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that a petition for judicial 
review of a final order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issuance of the 
final order or, if reconsideration is sought, within twenty-eight (28) days after the 
decision thereon. LC. § 67-5273. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Petitioner proffers two reasons why this court has subject matter jurisdiction in 
this case: (!) the Respondent's issuance of supplemental orders addressing the amount 
of attorney's fees awarded extended or tolled the time to file the petition for review and 
(2) I.R.C.P. rule 6(e)(l) operates to extend the twenty-eight (28) day deadline by three 
days. 
A. The Effect of Supplemental Orders 
In the May 12, 2005, Final Order of The Deputy Director, Respondent was 
awarded costs and fees and was given fourteen days from the service date of the final 
order to provide a memorandum of costs and fees. The Respondent was further ordered 
to "issue a Supplemental Final Order for Allowable Costs and Fees Under Idaho Code § 
12-117(1) after receiving all parties submissions." The same pai'agraph ordering the 
issuance of a supplemental final order for costs and.fees also st;.ted that "the future 
issuance of the Supplemental Final Order does not delay the thne for reconsideration of 
or judicial review of this Final Order.''.2 Immediately preceding the certificate of service 
on the final order are instructions as t6 when a motion to reconsider or a petition for 
judicial review must be filed. 3 
In reviewing the language ofI.C. § 67-5273 and noting that other jurisdictional 
time limits are not extended or tolled by filing motions regarding costs and attorneys fees, 
see State v. Lawson, l05 Idaho 164,165,667 P.2d 267,268 (1983); I.A.R. rule 14, this 
court is forced to conclude that the supplemental orders issued by the Respondent which 
2 Final Order of the Deputy Director, p. 13. 
3 p;..,,,11,,..,-t.-.- ,...c .. t...- r.-····'-· r,., .. · 
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solely addressed the amount of costs and attorneys fees already awarded in the final order 
did not affect any findings of fact, conclusions of!aw or any judgment in the action 
below. See State v. Lawson, supra. Therefore, review of the final order needed to be 
sought within twenty-eight (28) days ofits issuance. 
B. The Effect ofl.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) 
The analysis of this issue is straight forward. The plain meaning interpretation of 
I.R.C.P. 6(e)(l) and I.C. § 67-5273(2) yields the conclusion that the court may not 
extend Petitioner's filing time by three days for mail service, see I.R.C.P. 6(e)(l), 
because the twenty-eight day filing period prescribed in I.C. § 67-5273(2) and I.R.C.P. 
84(b) runs from the issuance of the final order, rather than its service upon the parties. 4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of the foregoing reasons, this court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear this review. Accordingly, the Petition for Judicial Review filed in this matter is 
DISMISSED. 
Dated this ~ day of October, 2005. 
District Judge 
.\ 
4 The court understands Petitioner's argument concerning the confusion that the language in the agency's 
final order may cause "a reasonable person" when the agency states that review must be sought within 28 
days after the "service" of its order. However, the statutory provisions are clear that the twenty-eight day 
time frame begins to run upon issuance of the final order and it's the statute that confers jurisdiction upon 
this court. l.R.C.P. rule 6(e)(I) clearly does not apply in this case because it does not operate to extend a 
.J~ ... ,m .... .,. ,....,1,,.,,., ,;i nt'P(!("_rihP.rl nerio'd be2:ins to run from the "service" ofa notice or other paper. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was this c;· day of October, 2005, served upon the following individuals 
vi~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Bron M. Rarnrnell, Esq. 
DIAL, MAY & RAMMELL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
Clerk of the Court 
By: )/~ 
/'taw Clerk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTYi ffr:J 8 li, ic· ,-Sl IIP'--··-·--· Ji.1 ni1 
iiJ --s• ),1! REX RAMMELL and LYNDA ) f VIII ! ..... I 
RAMMELL, d/b/a ELK COUNTRY ) j _ _ _ _ _, r 
TROPHY BULLS, ) ',,c:-.:,c ... :·,1,:-., · 
Petitioner, 
V, 












Case No. CV-05-438 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
WHEREAS, this Court issues its MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: SUBJECT 
MA TIER JURISDICTION, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review is 
DISMISSED. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this £" day of October, 200~. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
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j .~) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
this '?' day of October, 2005, served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
Bron M. Rarnmell, Esq. 
DIAL, MAY & RAMMELL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
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Dr. Rex Rammell 
490 Pioneer Rd Apt. 6105 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
208-356-3690 
NOV I 6. 2005 
MAOISON COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT C::OURT OF THE 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON IN THE STATE OF IDAHO 
REX RAMMELL and 
LYNDA RAMMELL, d/b/a 















NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, THE IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, MR. BRIAN OAKEY, DEPUTY 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 2270 Old Penitentiary Road, Boise, Idalio 83712, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, REX AND LYNDA RAMMELL, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Stlpreme Court from the Order dismissing appellant's 
Petition for Judicial Review entered in the above-entitled action on the 5th day of October, 
Honorable Judge Moss presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders 
described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule (1 l(a)(2) I.AR. 
3. Preliminarily, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal, the issues for which REX AND LYNDA RAMMELL 
seeks appeal are: 




a) the final order by the State ofidaho correctly stated that the date of issuance 
of the final order to the defendant was the date of service in accordance with 
I.R.CP. 6 (e)(l) and therefore the petition for judicial review was filed timely 
giving the above court jurisdiction and/or 
b) the supplemental final orders did toll the time to file a petition for judicial 
reyiew and/or 
c) the Deputy Director failed to hold a hearing on review of attorney's cost and 
fees denying the appellant due process and making the case unripe for judicial 
review. 
4. The appellants request the preparation of the entire reporter's transcript including the 
party's briefs, oral arguments, pre and post orders. In addition, the appellants requests all 
documents and exhibits lodged with the 7th District Court in the above entitled case as well as all 
documents and exhibits not lodged with the Court that were part of administrative case # M03-
02-04- l l 30DC to be included. 
5. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) that the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) that the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( d) that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to§ 67-1401(1), Idaho Code. 
DATED THIS 16th day of November, 2005. 









£ e_oc. L W' u(,,( , being sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements in this 
notice of appeal are true and correct to the be f his or he owle e an lief. 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this I lo day of No\J, , 20 O'? 
(SEAL) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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A.FFIDA VIT OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day ofNovember, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was served on the following as indicated below: 
PERSON SERVED 
Mr. Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box790 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0790 
Mr. David Marlow 
159 E. Main 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Office of Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
COUNTY OF l'{\1){1f@f\ ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me 
:\ 
SERVICE 
Hand Delivery ( ) 
Facsimile Transmission ( ) 
Mailing - United States Mail 
Postage Prepaid ( X ) 
Hand Delivery (x) 
Facsimile Transmission ( ) 
. .Mailing - United States Mail ( ) 
Hand Delivery ( ) 
Facsimile Transmission ( ) 
Mailing - Unit~d States Mail 'I"""' ( X)
This 16th day of November 2005, at '120,xVJllua-= , Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA ) 
RAMMELL, d/bla ELK ) 





SUPREME COURT NO. 














APPEAL FROM: 7th Judicial District Madison County 
HONORABLE Brent J Moss PRESIDING 
CASE NO. FROM COURT: Cv-2005-438 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Order Dismissing Appellant's Petition for 
Judicial Review, Dated October 5th, 2005 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Pro Se 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Brian J Oakey, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho 
State Department of Agriculture, PO Box 790, Boise, ID 83701-0790 
APPEALED BY: Rex Rammell . 
APPEALED AGAINST: Idaho State Department of Agricultur~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: November 16, 2005 . 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: NIA 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: NIA 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS~APPEAL FILED: NIA 
APPELLATEFEEPAID:Yes , 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST F0R ADDITIONAL RECORD: 
NIA 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED?: Yes 
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: David Marlow 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
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Dated this3Zl:lay of Nov , 2005 




STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEALS 
Stephen W Kenyon 
Clerk of the Court 
Lois Dawson 
Chief Deputy Clerk 
December 6, 2005 
Dr. Rex Rammell 
490 Pioneer Rd Apt 6105 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
RE: Supreme Court No. 32538 
RAMMELL v. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE 
Dear Mr. Rammell; 
Supreme Court Building 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
/208) 334-2210 
A Notice of Appeal was filed in thif Court December 2, 2005. The Notice 
of Appeal title lists you as appearing for yourself, Lynda Rammell and Elk Country 
Trophy Bulls. The Secretary of State advised this Court that you and Lynda are sole 
owners of Elk Country Trophy Bulls. Since you are not an atiorney admitted to the Bar 
of this Court, you may represent yourself and your business, but not Lynda Rammell. 
However, you can present oral argument on behalf of the business, as it relates to the 
inclusion of Lynda Rammell in the business. 
If Lynda Ramm ell intends to participate in this appeal in any manner, it 
will be necessary that an Amended Notice of Appeal is filed V',fhich bears her signature 
• I : 
along with your signature. Likewise, all subsequent documents or briefs filed in this 
Court will need to bear both signature~. Otherwise, Lynda will not be able to participate 
in briefing and may not appear further in this appeal, including oral argument. However, 
her name will remain in the title of the appeal. 
If an Amended Notice of Appeal, bearing your signature and Lynda 
Rammell's signature, is not filed within the next fourteen (14) days, this Court will 
assume that Lynda Rammell will not be participating in the appeal process, however, her 
name will remain in the title. 
SUPREME COURT LETTER 
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) 
An Amended Notice of Appeal should be filed in the District Court, but no 
additional filing fee is required. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
District Court Reporter 




Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
· -Page 2 of2 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDARAMMELL 
cl/b/a ELK COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
v. 















Supreme Court No. 32538 
A letter was sent to Petitioners on December 2, 2005 advising that an Amended 
Notice of Appeal should be filed, within fourteen (14) days from the date of the letter, bearing 
Lynda Rammell's signature if she intended to participate in this appeal regarding briefing and 
oral argument. This Court having been advised that an Amended Notice of Appeal has not been 
filed; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDER that Lynda Rannnell may not participate in any briefing 
and may not appear further in this appeal, including oral argument( however, Lynda Ramm.ell's 
name will remain in the title as an Appellant. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Rex Rammell may represent himself and Elk 
Country Trophy Bulls, but may not represent Lynda Ranunell exc;ept as it relates to the inclusion 
of Lynda Rammell in the business. - ____ · _ 
DATED this 9th day ofJanuary ·· :. · · 
~ 0;:;, , For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
District Court Reporter 
:--; 
Clerk of the Courts 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
) 
REX RAMMELL, LYNDA RAMMELL ) 




SUPREME COURT NO. 32538 
CASE NO. CV-2005-438 
) 
VS ) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
) 





I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been· lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION 
1 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECO~ 
DATED DECEMBER 15, 2004 
2 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
DATED DECEMBER16, 2004 
3 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECEbRD 
DATED DECEMBER 30, 2004 
4 TRANSCRIPT FROM APMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
DATED APRIL 29, 2005 
5 TRANSRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
DATED JUNE 21,205 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
(4 FOLDING FILES) 









·""· ''. :, '
' IN WI.™;S~REOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
:;;,1 dayoo ,2006 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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MAR1L YN R. RASMUSSEN 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
) 
REX RAMMELL, LYNDA RAMMELL ) 










CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CASE NO. CV-05-438 
SUPREME COURT NO. 32538 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to.each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
PRO-SE 
DR. REX RAMMELL 
490 PIONEER RD. APT 6105 
REXBURG, ID 83440 
BRIAN J. OAKEY 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT 
1 OF AGRICULTURE 
POBOX790 
.' BOISE, ID 83701-0790 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
AT'I'.ORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set iny hand and affixed the 
sear of the said Court t~isc::?,1 day of ~- , 2006 · 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL, LYNDA RAMMELL ) 











SUPREME COURT NO. 32538 
CASE NO. CV-05-438 
I, Marilyn R. Rasmussen, Clerk of the District Court of the 7th Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers 
designated to be included under Rule 28, !AR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross 
Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits in the above entitled cause,· if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for 
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 
of the Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHE1lJB~I have hereunto set my h.·and and affixed the seal of 






In the Supreme Court of the State f Id§3b:<9 2007 :;.; 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA RAMMELL 
d/b/a ELK COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
V. 















ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO VACATE HEARING 
(ORAL ARGUMENT) 
NO. 32538 
Ref. No. 07S-25 
This appeal is scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, February 7, 2007 at 10:00 
a.m. in Boise. A MOTION TO VACATE HEARING (ORAL ARGUMENT) was filed by 
Respondent February 5, 2007. The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO VACATE HEARING 
(ORAL ARGUMENT) be, and hereby is, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the 
district court for consideration of the merits. 
DATEDthis (of.;:- dayofFebruary2007. 
cc: Dr. Rex Rannnell, pro se 
Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO VA CATE 
HEARING (ORAL ARGUMENT) 
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By Order of the Supreme Court 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO VACATE HEARING (ORAL ARGUMENT) Docket No. 32538 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUN 
~ IL ~ 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 





f MAR - 5 2007 
Petitioner, 
V. 
) Case No. CV-05-43 MADISON COUNTY 
) 
) 
) ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE 
) ON APPEAL 






The Idaho Supreme Court remanded this case 6 February 2007. The Court has 
before it a petition for judicial review of a decision by the above-named governmental 
entity. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that: 
1. This appeal shall be determined on the record; 
2. The above-named governmental entity shall prepare the record and lodge it with the 
District Court. Upon such lodging, the Clerk of the Court shall mail to counsel for 
the parties ,notice of that the record has been lodged. The fee for preparing the agency 
record shall be paid according to statute and/or rule; 
3. A transcript of the proceedings before the agency shall be prepared at the petitioner's 
expense; 
4. Briefing shall occur according to the following schedule: 
a. Petitioner's brief shall be filed with this Court within 35 days of the date on 
which notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this Court is 
served; 
b. Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's 
brief; 
c. Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of 
Respondents' brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
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~ 
5. One original brief shall be filed with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 
134 E. Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. 
6. When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall schedule 
a hearing for oral argument in Rexburg on the next convenient law and motion day 
following the expiration of the time limit for Petitioner's reply brief. Notice of the 
hearing date shall be served upon this Court and counsel for Respondents. In the 
event that no hearing is scheduled, this Court will assume that the matter has been 
submitted for resolution without oral argument. 
So ordered. 
DATED this _~[;=--_day 0=2007. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
c-- I\A.,..~i... 
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL was this -~J_ day ofFebn,a,ry, 2007, 
served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Rex and Lynda Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Pro se Appellant 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Respondent 
Clerk of the Court 




In the Supreme Court of the State iq"lll~bn 1g fnl 
If MAR 2 I 2007 lid) 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA RAMMELL 
d/b/a ELK COUNTRY TROPHY BULLS, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
V. 

















AW ARD LEGAL FEES 
NO. 32538 
Ref. No. 07S-043 
A MEMORANDUM TO AW ARD LEGAL FEES with attachment was filed by 
Appellants February 12, 2007. An OBJECTION TO PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS' MOTION 
TO AW ARD LEGAL FEES was filed by counsel for Respondent February 23, 2007. The Court 
is fully advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' MEMORANDUM TO AWARD LEGAL 
FEES be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
DATED this l(p day of March 2007. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER DENYING MEMORANDUM TO A WARD 
LEGAL FEES 
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) lL 
MAR 2 3 2007 
MADISON COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 










) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) 






NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a certified transcript of proceedings from the 
Magistrate Division in the above-captioned matter and the court's record have been 
lodged with the District Court. 
The parties in this matter have twenty-one (21) days from the date on which this 
notice is served in which to file with the District Court, in writing, any objections related 
to the contents of the transcript or record. Should there be no objections to the contents 
of the transcript or record, the transcript and record shall be deemed settled at the 
expiration of the aforementioned twenty-one.(21) day period, and the transcript and 
record shall be filed within the District Court within seven (7) days of settlement of the 
transcript and record and the briefing schedule as contained in the Order Governing 
Procedure on Appeal shall go into effect. 




In the event that one of the parties has not received a copy of the transcript or 
wish to further review the record, a copy may be obtained from the District Court Clerk's 
Office located at the Madison County courthouse in Rexburg, Idaho. 
DATED this Z..') day of March, 2007. 
CLERK OF COURT 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
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Law Clerk to Judge Moss 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL was this "2-3 day of March, 2007, served 
upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Rex and Lynda Rammell 
1365 West 5500 South 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Pro se Appellant 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box 790 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney.for Respondent 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
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Clerk of the Court 
By~~ 
,\ 
JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
APR -6 2001 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 · 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kjrunft@runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL and LYNDA 











) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) 






COME NOW, KARL J.F. RUNFT, Esq. and enter his formal appearance herein as 
counsel for the Petitioner, Rex and Lynda Rammell. Counsel request that a copy of all further 
pleadings or papers filed herein be sent to him, at the above address, as attorney of record for 
Petitioner. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
PAGE 74 ORIGINAL 
.. ~ 
DATED this~ day of April 2007. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this l..\+'fl day of April 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O.Box790 
Boise, ID 83701 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
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~USMail 




LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
Clive J. Strong 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
Steven W. Strack ISB # 3906 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone No. (208) 334-4126 
Fax No. (208) 854-8072 
' 
f } ~ a, IE MAY 2 9 2001 
MADISON COUN1Y 
o· ); 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
REX RAMMELL AND LYNDA 









) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) 






) ______________ ) 
~ 
NOTICE is hereby given to the Court and to all parties that Steven W. Strack, 
Deputy Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID, 83720-0010, is hereby substituted 
as counsel of record for Respondent IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, in place of Brian Oakey, Deputy Attorney General. 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
PAGE77 ,EL- 1 
' ) 
DATED this 25th day of May 2007. 
Steven W. Strack 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 25th day of May 2007, served a copy of 
the foregoing document, NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL, upon the 
persons listed below by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
JOHN L. RUMFT 
JON M. STEELE 
KARL J.F. RUNFT 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. MAIN STREET, SUTIE 400 
BOISE ID 83702 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
PAGE 78 
, - 2 
Steven W. Strack 
Deputy Attorney General 
., 





l i,,J: ,., , 
RUNFT & STEELE LA OF't,:IElE&,;Ptffi--LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
Clive J. Strong 
John L. RunftISB # 10591.:;M;;c'AiJ~T::::i'C:!,;..N;;;;Cc::;;:'L;;:.:'ff:.:..''====:J 
Karl J. Runft ISB # 6640 · 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
Steven W. Strack ISB # 3906 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone No. (208) 334-4126 
Fax No. (208) 854-8072 
1020 W/Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise,/ID 83 702 
Telephone No. (208) 333-1403 
Fax No. (208) 343-3246 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON ' 
REXRAMMELLANDLYNDA 









) Case No. CV-05-438 
) 
) 






) ______________ ) 
This Court's Order Governing Procedure on Appeal required the Petitioners' Brief 
to be filed within 35 days of service of the Notice of Lodging of the transcript and record, 
with Respondent's brief to be filed 28 days after service of the Petitioners' brief, and 
Petitioners' reply brief, if any, to be filed 21 days after service of the Respondent's brief. 
STIPULATION RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
PAGE79 - 1 ORIGINAL 
The Notice of Lodging was filed by the Clerk of the Court on March 23, 2007. 
On April 24, 2007, however, Petitioners' attorney John Runft, after consultation with 
counsel for the Department of Agriculture, informed the Court by letter that before 
proceeding with briefing, the parties had agreed to meet and discuss the possibility of a 
settlement. Mr. Runft also informed the Court that the deputy attorney general assigned 
to handle the appeal for the Department of Agriculture had recently departed the 
employment of the Office of the Attorney General and that a replacement had not yet 
been assigned to the appeal, and that upon such assignment the parties would attempt to 
agree upon a schedule for moving forward with the appeal, if settlement discussions were 
unsuccessful. 
While the parties did attempt to meet and discuss terms of settlement, such 
discussions did not result in settlement. Further, the Attorney General has appointed a 
deputy attorney general to assume responsibility for litigation ofthis appeal. Therefore, 
the parties stipulate to the following briefing schedule: 
Petitioners shall file their opening brief on or before July 6, 2007; 
Respondent's brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of the Petitioners' 
brief; 
Petitioners' reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of 
Respondent's brief. 
Thereafter, Petitioners shall schedule a hearing for oral argument in Rexburg, 
Idaho, at the next convenient law and motion day, and serve such notice upon the Court 
and counsel for Respondent. 




DATED this j_ day of June 2007. 
K 
R W OFFICES, PLLC A;;~tiw 
Steven W. Strack 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this J-\-{I\, day of June 2007, served a copy 
of the foregoing document, STIPULATION RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE, upon the 
persons listed below by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
STEVEN W. STRACK 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NATURAL RESOURCES DNISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
STIPULATION RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
PAGE 81 
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1 O~O W. Main Street, Suite 400 ' 
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PHone: (208) 333-8506 
Fa}c (208) 343-3246 
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STATEMElNT OF CASE 
a. ; The Nature of the Case 
I 
I 
! This is a Petition For Judicial Review pf the Final Order of the Deputy Director of the 
I • 
C.,;~..;tment of Agriculture (the "Final Order") entered on May 5, 2005, against Petitioners Rex 
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R1*umell and Lynda Rammell, doing busines,~ as Elk Country Tr.ophy Bulls. The Final Order 
I , 
wt a result of a contested case and admi4astrative hearing brought by the Department of 
AJricullure (the "Department") against P.;t;:;qj, . .-c.t Rex Rammell (Dr. Rammell) under the TAJ> A 
an} the IDAPA Rules of the Department. In its Administrative Complaint, the Department 
" 
as~erted that Dr. Rammell vi.olated an Id~110 statute and several Department regulations 
I . 
I L 
corceming the containment, 1mmagement and _reporting requirements for domestic cervidae (elk) 
ratlchers. In defense, Dr. Rammell attempt~d to assert at the administrative hearing before 
heiring officer, Jean Uranga (the "Hearing ottcer"), and on review before the Deputy Director, 
'I. 
K~hy Ki.lien (the "Deputy Director"), that th~i Department relegations Dr. Ramm ell purportedly 
I . 
vi9lated were invalid by reason they were ~utside the scope of the Department's statutory 
aulhority and unreasonable. The Hearing Ofijicer and the Deputy Director refused to consider 
I .: 
Drj Rai:11.1.nell's arguments. Dr. Rammell asseJs that this was a denial of h.is due process rights 
'I 
un~"'- the lDAP A and Department Rules and ;eeks to have the case disrnissed or remanded for 
i 




b. I Course of Pn,ceedings Below 
' I 
I 
The Department filed i.ts Administtatjvc Complaint on June 6, 2004. Dr. Rammell 
,,, 
responded with an Answer and then an Am$1ded Answer. Both parties engaged in pretrial 
I , 
di5rovery and entered into a Pretrial Stipulati4, filed on October 8, 2004. See Agency Record, 
doJument No. 74. This Stipulation establish,d various facts and stipulated that Dr. Rmmnell 
I !. 
world only be able to raise constitutional issu~s on appeal. See Id. Pursuant to thi.s Stipulation, 
. I 
the!Department filed an extensive Motion in Umine on November 23, 2004, seeking to exclude 
e, If ~ii Ce and witnesses that Dr. Ram me II iished to present concerning the validity and 
I 
I 
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re~sonablencss of the relevant Department rules. See Agency Record, document No. 34. Dr. 
' ,1 
R~mmell also filed a Motion fo, Disqualiiidtion to disqualify the Hearing Officer for lack of 
·> 
sufficient expertise in the area of cervidae. This Motion was denied. 
I . 
I The matter was set for au evidentiaryiheadng on December 15, 16 and 30, 2004. The 
I i 
D~art1nent appeared through various represe~tatives and its Deputy Attorney General, Brian .T. 
I 
O~key. Respondents appeared pro sit thro~gh Dr. Rm:nmcll. Before the parties subniitted 
I 1/ 
tcijtimony and evidence, the Hearing Officer ~ook up the matter of the Department's Motion in 
I 
Li~ine. The Hearing Officer ruled as a matt,r of law that "I don't have authority to invalidate 
I I 
an I agency rule as being unreasonabk." See ~earing Transcript, p. 29, lines 2-3. The Hearing 
O~ficer decided she would allow Dr. Rammell to present some evidence concerning the scope 
I f; 
ru1~ reasonableness of the relevant niles to make a record for appeal, but nonetheless excluded or 
! ' 
E'.+~ed extensive evidence Dr. Rammell attemlted to present on those issues. 
I 
I Following the close of the hearing, t!,e parties submitted written Closing Briefs. The 
I , 
fin~! Closing Brief was received by the Hearing Officer on February 7, 2005. The Hearing 
' ,1 
Officer issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusidh and Preliminary Order on March 3, 2007. This 
I : 
Pr1liminary Order was reviewed by the Depud Director who i.ssued her Final Order on April 12, 
I 
20©5, affirming the Preliminary Order in all -regards. The administrative proceeding was I ' I • 
retjlanded to the H<::aring Officer fo, an awar<j, of costs and attorney's fees for the Department, 
I 
wh~ch in tum was affirmed by the Deputy Direbtor. 
I 




Dr. Rammell is a licensed. Idaho veterii;farian. He and his wife, Lynda Rammell, used to 
opf ate a dom.estic cervidae ranch doing busi.dess as Elk Country Trophy Bulls. As a result of 
'!1 
i 
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When the Rammell's did operate their/business, they maintained their elk at two separate 
faf iii ties. J>art of the year, the elk were at f hat was called the Green Canyon facility. The 
rdnainder of the year, the elk were returned t~ the Rammell's home ranch located at 1365 West 
I , 
sspo South, Rexb.irg, Idal10 83440. . 
I In December of 2003, Kelly Mortensen; an inspector with the Department of Agriculture, 
! ' 
coftacted Dr. Rammell to conduct an annual ~lk inventory of the elk located on the Rammetl's 
I ' 
pr~perty in Rexburg. Dr. Ramm ell declined .~he invitation to allow the Department to conduct 
I : 
a111i11ventory because it would require the Dep~rtmeut to "work the elk", i.e. run tile elk through a 
ch~te for counti1Jg purposes. When th.;:; ;;;;~cdure was done in the past, i.t resulted in .,. 
I t 
cofsiderable damage to Dr. Rammel.l's elk, (ncluding the loss of a bull elk's antlers., greatly 
I , 
dirhinishing that animal's worth. See Hearin~ Transcnpt, pp. 641-642, li11es 18-16. Believing 
I ' th* "working the elk" constituted a seizurca_:of property without due pwcess, Dr. Rrunmell 
adtised Kelly Mortensen he wanted to go to ad~ini.st:rntive hearing as soon as possible to contest 
I .,· 
th~ infringement of Dr. Rammell's consH~1tional rights a11d the reasonableness of the 
I 
D7artment' s rules in thi.s regard. 'i. 
( By letter dated December 24, 2003, th9:Dcpartment asked Dr. Ramrnell to reconsider his 
po~ition. That letter is signed by Dr. Dan CrctWel!, DVM, Chief, Bureau of Animal Health and 
I ., 
Li~cstock. See Agency Record, doc-iment 78,J: That letter cites the applicable rules and statutes 
I 
an1. requested Dr. Rammell to cooperate by sufnitting his annual domestic cervidae inventory t() 
thel Depa1tment no later than December 31, 20~2, and requesting Dr. Rammell to cooperate with 
I 
the[Department to complete its in.ventory. 
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I In response, Dr. Rammell sent a letter to Dr. Crowell dated December 31, 2002. See 
Age11cy Record, document No. 76. Dr. RFmell rei.terated his concern that to allow the 
I , 
intentory would violate the Fourth AmendmJnt to the Constitution. Also Dr. Rammell argued 
! 1 
th¢ sole purpose of the monitorini program ,1.,as to control Chronic Wasting Disease, which is 
! 
nof a threat in Idaho, making the pervas,ye regulation of e\k ranching unnecessary and 
I 
unk-easonable. That letter contends there shoi1ld be a voluntary certificati011 program similar to 
I ; . 










... included in my protest in the mle wNch allows the State to run my elk through 
the chute for mandatory identification: walidation, the ruk requiring a mandatory 
submission of my records, the rule ,?7:\:-lng the mandatory submission of brains 
within 24 hours of an elk's death, and,the mandatory payment of $5.00 per head 
per year (if the State is going to charge:; the breeders by the head each year then a 
similar fee must be placed on all other \ivestock). I also plan to protest the import 
rules, specifically the brain worm r~gulations and the unreasonable11ess a.nd 
interference wi.th our right to interstateicommcrce imposed by the five year CWD 
'de facto' moratorium. 
I am not protesting or challenging the'(State's authority to inspect my facility or 
elk on a routine annual bas.is for facilhy adequacy and general elk health. Any 
other non routine .inspection through 0~1t the year will, however, require a search 
warrant showing probable cause for tJ·fo search and or seizure of my animals or 
records (see OSHA v. Barlow). Monday, December 29t1•, I invited KeUy 
Mortensen and Mark Hyndman to coniiplete an animal inspection of my facility 
and elk herd, including a head count if; desired. lf the Department has probable 
cause to run a particular elk through the chute, the necessary Warrant will need to 
be provided for my cooperation. 'i . 
seJ Agency Record, document No. 76. 
I 
I 
i An Administrative Warrant for Entry aha Inspection was signed by the Hon.orable Brent 
r , 
M~ss on January 15., 2004. An Amended Ad~inistrative Warrant for Entry and Inspection was 
I 
issiµed by Honorable Brent Moss on January z& 2004. 
I , • 
I 
I 
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Ou January 22, 2004, Dr. Dan CroweW called the Rammell residence and was informed 
i 
I 
D~. Rummell was in Reno, Nevada. Mrs. :!Rammell agreed to allow the inspectors on the 
pr~perty. Dr. Crowell, Kelly Mortensen and lj)eputy Dusty Davidson, with the Madison County 
i I ·_,. 
SllJeriffs Office, conducted an inspe10tion of the facility. They observed the exterior fence in the 
I I 
wJrking alley leading to the resti:aint facility ~as cut and in need ofrepair. They also observed a 
I 
I ·' 
ga\e in the south exterior fence had a gap betfreen the gate and the adjacent post, which would 
i ' 
allbw ingress and egress for small cervidae. tliey further observed one post where the fence was 
I ; 
not attached to the post. A pole was down ~F the west side of the old restraint facility in the 
sof th west comer of the bull pen. A long gap Jn the fence was also noted at another point in the 
~ ;,: 
fe~cc. An official head count was made a~:d indicated approximately fifty bulls, eighty to 
I ·; 
eiJ1ty-five cows and twenty-five or thirty c~lves. There was only one visible lD tag. Dr. 
I . 
Cr{iwe!l advised both Dr. Ran1mell and Mrs. Rammell the Department would still need to do 
' 11 
i ,\. 
im!entory validation process which would require working the animals. 
I 
: The Department obtained an extension '~f the Adm.i.nistrative Warrant and appeared at the 
Ralnmell i:esidence on January 26, 2004, to ¢ontinue the inventory veri6.cation. Dr. Crowell 
I ; 
• I 
adtised Dr. Rammell it would be impossibl1 to complete the inventory verification without 
I • 
in1ividually working the animals given the maJ?city of the animab did not have identifiable tags 
on !them. Dr. Rammell stated he had n.ot pljl9ed USDA ID tags on the elk because he had 
I 
pl3f11ed to use tattoos. He folt the use oftag0 ~y-:·!ted a negative impact on his hunting operation. 
! The Department then proceeded to r~ove snow in the area of the restraint facility and 
I , 
,epfircd the break in the cast exterior fence of the working alley. Elk boxes were constructed 
I ' 
an<I the Department officials and Deputy Davidl;on left the Ra1umell premises. 
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On January 27, 2004, Dr. Cmwell and:Mr. Mortensen, among other Department officials, ,, 
refurned to the Rammell residence with Dcpl!ity Dusty Davidson. They gathered the calves to 
i 'I , 
inyentory thei:n. The calves were worked thr9ugh the ,estramt systems. Department employees 
deiennined the sex of the calves and recorded identification for each of the calves. One cow was I . . 
fotnd in the same pasture as the calves and ~id have an USDA official ear tag identification. 
I 
I \ 
'fh:e Department counted twenty-four calves and one cow that day. 
I I 
The Department employees returned Jjinuary 28, 2004, to inventory the elk cows. The 
' ' 
D~partmcnt brought snow machines to gather the cows. When the cows were gathered, two 
ad{l.itional calves were found with the cows. 
The Department officials again rett1m~d January 29, 2004, to invtntory the bulls. The 
Deparhnent's inventory found the number of e,lk that day, including fifty-two bulls, six cows and 
I 
tw~ calves. 
Department officials videotaped the eljk to document the con.dition of the elk after the 
I 
in~cntory was completed. .A few of the b~:Us were stiff and had abrasions on their sides 
foll.owing the inventory. Dr. Rammell did nt:>tify Dr. Crowell that an antler with three small 
I 
I ,i. 
{mints had been knocked off one elk during theiproeess. 
' ' 
On January 30, 2004, Dr. Crowell arpved at the Rammdl residence to do a records 
!. 
in\-\entory. Dr. Crowell brought a copy m::;;!-.i::;;, paper and other equipment with him. When 
~ ' 
I 
co1hpadng the 2004 inventory numbers with the inventory done in 2003, the Department 
,, 
det"'unined that twenty-eight head of elk were ipissing. 
By August, 2004, Dr. Rammell corrected the fencing problems and paid the $5.00 per 
1., 
he~d fee in order to purchase and transport furt1/,er domestic cervidae to bJs ranch. 
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Nonetheless, the Department filed it~ Administrative Complaint citil)g a violation of 
Idiho Code § 25-3708 (Five (5) dollars per bJk adni.inistrative fee) and eight (8) violations of 
I ,;, 
.oilpartrm:nt rules regarding fencing, inventdrying, and movement of elk. Specifically, the 
' I 
D,rartmcnt cited: 
1. Failure to remi.t the five (f) dollar per head administrative fee for 2004, 
pursuant to l.C. § 25-3708; 












posts pursuant to the require~ents ofIDAPA 02.04.19.102.03(b); 
\ 
Violation of ID APA 02.04.19.102.04 for having an excessive gap between 
fence posts; I. 
Violation of ID APA 02.04.1~.!02.05 for having a gate with au excessive gap; 
;•. 
Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.102.06 for having a cut perimeter fonce and a 
·.! 
' fence with a pole down, creati~g a gap; 
,p . 
Violation of lDAP A 02.04,:19.200 and 201 for not submitting an annual 
domestic cervidae report ao.4 violation of TDAPA 02.04.19.200 and 250 for 
·i· 
having twenty-eight (28) he~d of domestic ccrvidae unaccounted for and for 
' 
moving domestic cervidae fo 2003 from one premises to another without 
,!, 
submitting an Interstate Movqment Certificate; 
8. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.141.202 for not gathering and restraining domestic 
cervidae for inventory verific*)ion; and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AL REVIEW - Page 8 
PAGE89 
f' 7 /~G/2,07 
I 
15: lG 208343324& RUNFT LAW OFFICES PL PAGE 10/21 
9. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.i'~.250 for moving in 2004 domestic cervidae fi:om 
one premise to another with9{11 submitting an Interstate Movement Certificate. 
After the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the Heari.ng Officer found that 
"1espondents have admitted to viJ:tually all of the facts alleged in the Complaint" and found Dr. 
R~mmell liable on all nine (9) counts, resultl~g in a fine of $29,000 plus costs and attorney's 
' foes. See Agency Record, document No. 66,•1 p. 14. As stated, the Bearing Officer refused to 
I _· 
<:vfisider Dr. Rammell's challenge to the constitutionality of the rules he allegedly violated or 
I :j 
wijethcr the rules where unreasonable or beyo6d authority of the Departi:n.ent to promulgate. See 
\ . . 
: ' '1• 
Id.I at pp. 14-\ 7. The Hearing Officer claims ~s a matter oflaw she had no authority to consider 
I 
sueh challenges. Id. 
I 
On review, the Deputy Director afftnned the Preliminary Order in all regards. See 
·1 
A~cncy Record, document No. 68, p. 13. Tpe Deputy Director emi,hasized that all evidence 
l f. 
ab,put the reasonableness of the Departmen~ rules should have been excluded, that such a , 
defermination is entirely an issue of law and tll.at a party to an administrative hearing before the 
I L: . 
Department can only raise such a challenge in Jront of the Department Director upon review of a 
I 





ISSUES (?N APPEAL 
I. Whether it was error for the Deputy Di.rector to rule as a matter of Jaw that the issue 
\· 
of the validity of an Administrative ~~ile is solely a question oflaw? 
2. Whether it was error for the Bearing Office, to exclude evidence of the 
reasonable11ess of the relevant Depa;tment Rules? 
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'") 
3. Whether it was an error for the Hearing Officer not to disqualify herselt'? 
I. 




1 STANDARD OF REVl£W 
I ~ 
l The standard of judicial revi.ew of an ;agency action is dictated by statute. An agency's 
or~er m.ust be upheld by the reviewing coµrt unless its decision (a) violates statutory or 
I ,.; . ·'. 
cohstitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the ageniy's statutory authority; ( c) is made upon. unlawful 
I ' I :, 
pr~cedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, 
. ! •j .. 
ca~ricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The court defers to the agency's 
r , 
! ,11 
fil1f1ings of fact unless they are clearly errone(!\is and does not substitute its judgm.ent for that of 
' I . . 
the ageJJcy as to the weight of the evidence. I.{:;. § 67-5279(1); Cooper v. Bd. of Prof Discipline 
I : 





: THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE IS A MIXED 
I 
I ,:i 
QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT 
•I 
(' 
lo. his Amended Answer to the Admi~istrativc Complaint, Dr. Rammell challenged as 
' '\, 
uruteasonable and invalid each Department Rure he was cited for violating. See Agency Record, 
I 
document No. 6. The basi.s for Dr. Ram#:)ell's challenge was that the Department was 
i 
empowered with making rules and regulations ~ursuant to l.C. § 25-3704 for the sole {)Urposes of 
' . 
re~steri.ng domestic cervidae and prevention 6f Chronic Wasting Disease. See J.C. § 25-3704; 
l 'I, 
seelalso Agency Record, document No. 51 audiifoaring Transcript, pp. 465-468, lines 24-16. Dr. i . . . 
' 
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/"'" 
' 
R*mmell contends that the regulations he W9f cited for violating had no relation to preventing 
C~onic Wasting Disease an.d are thus unxeas~nable and beyond the scope of the Department's 
l '! 
rule making authority. See Agency Record, pocument No. 51. Dr. Rammell also argued that 
' I • 
tb.fe is no Chroni.c Wasting Disease in Idaho):aud that there is no likely threat of the spread of 
1ii,I, ciisease do to domestic cervidae operations4 further making the regulations unreasonable, Id. 
' I As stated above, the Hearing Officer concluded she had no authority to rule whether a 
I 
D~partment Administrative Rule was unreasobable. See Agency Record, document No. 66, p. 
i . 
1 or 17. The Hearing Officer provided no aut1ority for this conclusion. Despite that fact, the 
' 
Ddi,uty Director upheld the Hearing Officer's l~gal conclusion, stating that the reasonableness of 
I 
an 1Administrative Rule is not evidentiary, that .such a challenge is an issue of law and thus 1.1.ot a 
' j 
m~tter for a hearing officer. See Agency Record, document No. 68, pp. 8, 10. The Deputy 
i 
! 1: ' 
Difector cited LC § 67-5225(3) aud I.C. § 67-5279(2) as authority supporting this con.clusion. 
Thb Deputy Director went furthe, and declared that in the future any such challenge was to be 
I ; 
ma'de directly to the Director of the Departme\1t or his designee, despite the Attorney General's 
, I , -t 
Rutes of Administrative Procedure to the co)i.t,ary. Id. at p. 9. The Deputy Director's legal 
I :1 
co1clusions in this regard are in error. 
First, LC. § 67-5225(3) and LC. '~ 67-5279(2) state nothing about whether a 
"rehsonableness" challenge to an Administrative Rule is to be confined to merely q\1estions of 
' " ' 
la'1 or whether a Hearing Officer in an admiiihtrative hearing can take in evidence on such an 
iss111e. Dr. Rarnrnell has no understanding of h;w either statutory section has any bearing on this 
I 
iss~e on appeal. I . 
Second, tbe [daho Attorney General's ~uks of Administrative Procedure explicitly state 
' 
that the issue of whether an Adrninistrative Ru{e is withio an agencies rule making power can be 
I , 
I 
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d1ennined by a hearing officer. See IDAPAj04.ll.Ol.416. LC.§ 67-5206(5)(b) states that the 
A~omey General's Rules of Administrative P~ocedure will control administrative proceedings of 
I ; 
ldjtlio agencie~ unless a11 agency adopts its ''?wn procedures ... [with) a finding that states the 
' ii 
rct:sons why the relevant portion of the atto;~y general's rul.es were inapplicable to the agency 
unrer the circumstances." LC. § 67-5206~5)(b). A review of the Idaho Department of 
Arculture's Administrative Rules shows tharhe secti.on of those rules concerning the scope of 
authority of hearing officers is ahnost exactl:Y: similar as that of the Attorney General's, except 
th't the Department's Rule in no way addressts the issues of challenges to statutes or review of 
' ~'. 
Aqministrative Rules. See IDAPA 02.01.0IJ0l0.05, compare IDAPA 04.11.01.413, 415 and 
i . 
4lf· Given that the Department's Administfative Rules fail to address the crucial issues of 
. ,·, 
review of statutes or rules, the "relevant po~ion" of the Attorney General's rules would then 
l \· 
apflY to the Department under l.C. § 67-520/;(S)(b), namely IDAPA 04.11.01.416 would thus 
apply to the Department. The Hearing Offtcerlin this case should have been able to consider the 
1 ' . 
iss1e of the reasonableness of the Der>artment t11es being enforced against Dr. Ran:nnell.
1 
Further, the Hearing Officer should have allowed Dr. Rammell to present evidence as to 
' I ,! 
th9 reasonableness of the Department Rules being enforced against him. Idaho case law is clear 
thalt challenges to Administrative Rules does iwolve evidcntiary questions and is not solely an 
I .·• 
issye oflaw. ''[A]dministrative rules are invajid which do not carry into effect the legislature's 
intfnt as revealed by existing statutory law, any which arc not reasonably related to the purposes 
1. '· 
of fhe enabling legislation." Holly Care Center v. State, Dept. o.f Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78, . ,, 
711 P.2d 45, 47 (1986) (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has established a four-
' 
prorg test for determining the appropriate '!;eve! of deference to be given to an agency 
1 T~e Deputy Director's declaratioa that from hence ru,i any challenge to the Department rules would be under the 
so;Jpurview of the Director of the Department is l'rospc¢tive Qt best and not controlling of this issue in this appeal. 
See IA11ency Record, document No. 68. p. S. . 
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,i· 
cdnstruction and implementation of a statute. ;/.R. Simplot Co. v. Tax Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 
I , 
P"fd 1206 (1991). F.irst, a court must determine if the agency has been entrusted with the 
.,. 
~'.:'t;:::::nsibility to administer the statute at is~ue. Id. at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. Second, the 
I ' 
a~ncy's statuto,y construction must be reasonable. Id. Third, a determination must be n:i.ade 
. I 
whether the statutory language <1t issue does nbt expressly treat the precise question at issue. id. 
I . 
Fifally, the court must ask whether any of t~e rationales underlying the rule of deference are 
\ 
prbent. id. If the four-prong test is met, tl$n courts must give "considerable weight" to the 
I .i 
agf!ncy's interpretation and implementation of !he statute. Id. 
' 'I 
' The ldaho Supreme Court has articulated five reasons considered in the fourth prong of 
'I· 
th~ test which justify the rule of judicial deftence. The first rationale i.s that the mle ensures 
l 
I 
r1ose when important interests have "grown ti)'" in reliance on an interpretation in existem:e for ''. 
a ii.umber of years. Id. at 858, 820 P.2d af 1215. The second rationale is that an <1gency 
l 
int~rpretation represents a "practical" interpr~tation, which "apparen.tly refers to the fact that 
'/. 
st~utory language is often of necessity genei/ill and therefore cannot address all of the details 
nef essary for its effective implementation." fd. The third rationale is that the legislature is 
' ' 
chai:ged with knowledge of how its statutes ar~jntcrpreted; thi1s by not altering the statutory text 
th~ legislature is presumed to have sanctioned:'the agency \ntcri:,,retation. Id. at 859, 820 P.2d at 
. 1 . 
1216. "TI1e fourth rationale is that an agency ciin.struction is entitled to additional weight when it 
I , 
is fomrnlated contemporaneous!.y with the p~sage of the statute in question." Id. The fifth 
rationale artici11ated in J.R. Simplot Co. is t~at when an <1gency, "as a coordinate branch of 
I . 
goyernment," construes a statute under its administrntive area of responsibility courts should 
' 'I 
rec~gnize and defer to the expertise developed~y the agency "f,b]ecause the judiciary in Idaho is 
! .• , 
intinded to apply a general backgro1.md to thC:l; law ... [and] the expertise of an agency is often 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW. 
PAGE94 
TAL REVIEW--Page 13 
07/05/2~07 15:15 2083433245 
} 






Usfful in technical areas of the law where the fisk of failing to understand all of the implications 
'I, 
of\a decision are great." Id. + 
I 
I Jt is clear from rules of judicial defe+:nce that dctennining whether an Administrative 
RJie is valid is n.ot entirely legal but a mixed qµestion of law and fact. Under the fom:th prong of 
I .1 
th~ test, a co\1rt must consider whether the mle)s "practical" and within, the "expertise developed 
byj the agency" - clearly considerations thal· would require the presentation of evidence of' 
I ' 
wl1ether the agency has in fact expertise in t~e area it seeks to regulate and whether the rule 
·, 
acfually is effective in addressing an area the s~tutory language docs not. 
I : 
Also, the second prong of the rule of j~dicial deferenco: invites a court to take in factual 
ir· 
fin~ings as to whetl1er an. Administrative Ru1J' is reasonable. In Mason v. Donnelly Club, \35 
I r· 
Id~ho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001), the Idaho Supr.pne Court considered the validity of an Industrial 
I ~ 
Cvf,.inission Administrative Rule conccr11ing1,wben an unemployed person is first entitk:d to 
un~ployrnent benefits. Id. at 584, 21 P.3d{at 906. The Court stated when evaluating the 
ln~ustrial Commission Rule against the second:;'reasonableness" prong: 
l • 
:; 
Although IDAPA 09.0l.30.476;l)3 and this case present a situation where 
the employee resigned and was :ured based on that resignation, what the 
Commission calls the "rev~e" of McCammon, the rationale of 
McCammon is clearly applicaJ:,Je. McCammon recognized that the 
purposes of the Employ,:nent SefUrity Law "to promote economic security 
and to provide benefits during p!i.riods of economic unemployment" would 
be frustrated by ignoring the distinction between the period of involuntary 
and voluntary unemployment. ~imilarly, the purposes of' the Ernphlytnent 
Security Law would be frustrated in this case by ignoring the periods of 
voluntary aud involuntary unetJ).ploy,.n.ent and allowing over-burdensome 
claims such as this one, where eycn though Mason quit her job voluntarily, 
and had only a two-week period of involuntary unemployment, the 
Commission would nevertheles,; provide indefinite benefits. The tules 
ptomulgated by the Departmtnt strike a better balance of the gQals 
u.nderlying the Employment Security Law. These mles are a reasonable 
intCl"\'retation of l.C. §§ 72-1~;02 and 72-1366(5) by analyzing botl, 
periods of volrn1tary and itwoluntary unemployment, therefore providing 
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benefits detecrninations based 
relationshir,, not j11st the last ad: · T I 
on the entirety of the employtnent 
I ' 
Idt at 585, 21 P.3d at 907 (emphasis added) ; 
I ' 
' ! It is clear that in the Mason case, t~e Court was evaluatlng the actual effect of the 
I I· 
A1ministrative Rule in question - a deterti)'ination that wo11ld require observations of fact 
pr~sented through an cvidcntiary record. AgJ;n, the rule of judicial deference does not involve I , 
oiy questions of law but also concerns isstjes of fact. It was an error then. for the Deputy 
I ' 
Directo, to rule that as a matter of law tl:J!~t a party to an administrative hearing that is 
I i 
I 
chtillenging Department rules is prevented from presenting evidence on the issue of the validity 
' I;. 
off l1e rules in qiiestion. 
I 
I 
r- .,, i 
j 1;1/. 
I 
I i THE HEARlNG OFFICER IN APPR<:f PRIATEL Y EXCLUDED IMPORT ANT 





It is clear from the Reporter's Transcr~pt of the administrative hearing, that the Hearing 
i 
Officer indeed prevented Dr. Rammell from ~resenting important and crucial evidence 011 the 
iss~e of the reasonable1,ess of the Admlnistrat!ve Rules he was cited for violating. This was an 
: 
At the administrative hearing, Dr. Ramiuell called Dr. Clarence Siroky, the then 
I ' ,, 
Adlninistrator of the Department of Aniir,.:.1 ~ .. .:lustries and State Veterinarian. See Hearing 
.;.. •, 
Tr~nscript at pp. 448-488, lines 18-10. His testi;nony was excl11ded on the grounds of relevance 
! ' 
an9 foundation. TI1e relevance objection \'A/ls merely that there was no aUegation in the 
I 
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+ 
A~min.i$trative Complaint concerning disease): T11at objectic>n was sustained. See Id. at p. 462, 
1s7-20; p. 464, lines 9-14; and p. 465, lines 12,21. 
i I 
Dr. Ramrnell made an offer of proof/stating that Dr. Siroky's testimony would, as the 
enlrorcer and promulgator of the Department /Rules, show that the Department's Rules at issue 
I :, 
hive no or minute preventative effect with re~rrd to the dissernination of disease among elk a11.d 
thlt there i.s little or no risk of Chronic Wasting Disease in ldaho. See Id., pp. 465-466, Jines 24-
1 j• 
24: Clearly, such testimony is relevant, nece~sary and cwcial to Dr. Rammell's contention that 
' 




The Foundation objection was made when he was asked ab~rnt the reasonableo.ess on the 
I ., 
gr'und that Dr. Siroky was not wi.th the Deparl~ent at the time the Rules were promulgated. See 
Id.I at pp. 474-479, lines 2-25. Dr. Siroky wa~/charged with implementation and enforcement of 
otartment Rules then in existence, whicJ:i:'i included the Rules at issue. He clearly has 
' 1\ 
knpwlcdge at t,1 whether the Rules are in any way effecti.ve in preventing disease and thus have 
I ; ant nexus t{) the purposes of the statute under o/'hich they were created. 
! Toe exclusion of tbis crucial and ;l)l'Cessary testimony prejudiced Dr. Rammell's 
ar~ment in this regard and prevented him frd~. mounting a defense - a violati.on of LC. § 67-
, ,\, 
. . ' 




i- THE HEARING OFFICERSHOU~)) HAVE DISQUALIFIED HERSELF 
I ,; •. 
Dr. Rammell made a pre-hearing Motlbn to Disqualify the Heari,,g Officer purs\Jant to 
,, 
I.Ct § 67-5252. See Agency Record, docurne~t No. 49. LC. § 67-5252 states that a party can 
I 
disqualify a presiding officer for bias and lac~ of expert knowledge. See LC. § 67-5252. The 
I . 
' 
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Mption wa.s based upon the fact that Dr. Rai-µmcll wished to contest the reasonableness of the 
I . 
' . 
applicable rules which would requite that t~e Hearing Officer have some knowledge of the 
.in~ustry so as to better be able to make rulin&s and dete.rminations on the record with regard to 
I ; 
ob;ections and the i.ssue of reasonableness. S~ Id. The H<::aring; Ot:Ucer did not deny she lacked 
cx~ert knowledge of the cervidae industry, ~owever, she denied this Motion. See Agen.cy 
I .. 
R~cord, document No. 65; Hearing Transcript,jpp. 488-490, lines 17-16. If reasonableness of the 
Rclles were an issue before the Hearing Offic~r, which as argued above i.t properly should have 
I !a 
betn, then the Hearing Officer should have h~d rescued herself for lack of expertise in the field 
' ~ 




ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULI) NOT FIA VE BEEN AW ARD ED 
'i: 
Attorney's fees and costs in the amourjt of $29,372.96 were awarded to the Department 
' un~er I.C. § 12-117(1) on the grounds that Dr. Rarnmell's contest to the Adi:ninistrative 
I ... 
Corplaint was without basis in law or fact. S1 Agency Record, do1;umcnt No. 69 and 70. If on 
ap;eal, the Final Order is reversed on any of Qi'. Rarnmell's issues raised on appeal, then clearly 
. . ! . 
he ~ad a basis in law and in fact to justify his <:pntest and the award of attorney's fees should be 
: 
revhsed. 
If Dr. Ra1m.nell docs not prevail on any)of his issues he has appealed, he i.s still entitled to 
a reversal of the award of attorney's fees. c~i11:1t 7 of the Administrative Complaint contends 
I 
thal Dr. Ramm.ell lost twenty-eight (28) elk in violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.200 and 250. 
I _. 
Duting the hearing Dr. Ram1.uell challenged this unstipulated factual contention, which resulted 
! ' 
in tpe Kearing Officer finding that in fact onlyJ.twenty-three (23) dk we,e unaccounted for. See 
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Hfl aring Transcript, pp. 651-653, lines 7-20; /4gency Record, documents No. 66. Dr. Rammell's 
'i 
ca~e was riot without a factual basis. The faql;s show that he did not fail to account for twenty-
I , 
eirt (28) elk and that the Department was infonect on that p\1int. Thus Dr. Rammell's contest 





I It is a fact of the regulatory universe !lk.'. once promulgated, an Admini.strativc Rule will 
' " + 
no( come under judicial scrutiny until chall~nged. When ai1 individual is brought into an 
' 1! 
I.· 
adrinistrative hearing on an Administrative Complaint, it is entirely logical that the Defendant 
' 1: 
sh~uld be able, as a defense, to challenge thf validity of the rule for which he is accused of 
vidlating. This is directly supported by the IDAPA and the Administrative Rules of the Attorney 
!. . . ;l i 
G<jneral, which apply in relevant part to the 9i:,partment. Dr. Rmumell sought to challenge the 
rul~s at issue, but was prevented from obtainin1 a competent Kearing Officer and prevented from 
• I 
introducing relevant and crucial evidence fn his defe1.1.se. Dr. Ramrnell asked that the 
. I .: 
adtinistrativc case before him be dismissed 'fithout further action. See Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. 
Bohner Counry, 133 Idaho 7, 981 P. 2d. 242 ~1999). In the alternative, Dr. Rammell asks that 
I . :: 
thef case be remanded so that he may mount a cJ1.aUenge to the validity of the relevant rules as 
-r t: 
shduld have been done in the first hearing. 
I 
' 
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I The undersigned hereby certitfos that oh this /t,J),J day of July 2007, a troc and corre<::t 
cofY of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT Of PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, was 
sered upon opposing counsel as follows: I 
BJan J. Oakey 
Dtuty Attorney General 
ld~ho Department of Agriculture 
P.(!). Box 790 
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) _______________ ) 
INTRODUCTION 
Idaho statutes regulate the ownership, raising, and marketing of domestic cervidae. 
Domestic cervidae are defined to include deer, elk, and reindeer. Idaho Code§ 25-3701. 
Because domestic cervidae are biologically identical to wild deer and elk, the domestic 
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,, 
cervidae altogether to avoid the risk of diseases being transmitted from domestic cervidae to 
wild elk and deer populations. 
Management of the domestic cervidae industry was transferred from the Idaho Fish 
and Grune Department to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA) in 1994. 1994 
Sess. Laws 151 (codified at Idaho Code§ 25-3702 (2007 Supp.)). The ISDA was directed to 
regulate domestic cervidae in a manner that addressed the "reasonable concerns of the 
department of fish and game respecting the domestic farming of cervidae," and the ISDA was 
authorized and empowered to "make, promulgate, and enforce general and reasonable rules 
not inconsistent with law, for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of diseases 
runong domestic cervidae of this state, and to otherwise effectuate enforcement of the 
provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, title 25, Idaho Code, applicable to domestic cervidae." 
Idaho Code§§ 25-3702 and 25-3704 (2000). 
In accordance with the legislative directive, the ISDA promulgated rules that regulate 
all aspects of domestic cervidae farming and ranching. Among other things, the rules require 
each domestic cervidae to be identified by an ear tag, tattoo, or other device, require an annual 
inventory report of all domestic cervidae, specify perimeter fencing standards, require owners 
to submit brain samples upon the death of a domestic cervidae for testing for the presence of 
chronic wasting disease (CWD), provide for tuberculosis testing, and adopt standards for the 
control ofbrucellosis. IDAPA 02.04.19.000 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Rex and Lynda Rammell, doing business as Elk Country Trophy Bulls, maintained a 
herd of domestic elk. The Rammells raised the elk primarily to support their "shooter bull" 
operation; i.e., they would raise trophy bulls, then let them loose in a large enclosed area. 
RESPONSE BRlEF OF IDAHO STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRJCULTURE 
PAGE 103 
ARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - 2 
Hunters would then pay a fee for the opportunity to shoot the trophy bulls. In December 
2003, an ISDA inspector contacted Dr. Rammell to arrange for the annual inventory of the 
Rammells' domestic elk, as required by ISDA's Domestic Cervidae Rules 201 and 202. 1 The 
Rules require each owner to submit an annual inventory of all domestic elk. ISDA then 
verifies the identity of each elk by visual inspection of the herd. By rule, every elk must be 
individually identified by an eartag, tattoo, or microchip. Domestic Cervidae Rule 022. If the 
animals are identified by bangle tags,2 the inventory is accomplished by simple visual 
inspection of the herd. Rule 202.01. If the animals do not have bangle tags, then it is the 
responsibility of the owner to gather and restrain the elk so that inspectors can verify each 
elk's identify. Rule 202.02. 
The Rammells did not use bangle tags because they believed that it made the elk Jess 
desirable to hunters. Therefore, an inventory of the Rammells' elk required the elk to be 
restrained by running them through a chute, so that ISDA inspectors could determine the 
identify of each elk by examining their ear tags or tattoos. 
When contacted in December 2003 to make arrangements for the inventory, Dr. 
Rammell sent a letter to the ISDA indicating that he would not cooperate with the inspectors 
because he was "protesting" a number of the Department's rules: 
... included in my protest is the rule which allows the State to run my elk 
through the chute for mandatory identification validation, the rule requiring a 
mandatory submission of my records, the rule requiring the mandatory 
submission of brains within 24 hours of an elk's death, and the mandatory 
payment of$5.00 per head per year .... 
1 ISDA Rules Governing Domestic Cervidae, IDAPA 02.04.19.201; IDAPA 02.04.19.202. For 
brevity's sake, the Rules will be hereinafter cited as the "Domestic Cervidae Rules." 
2 "Bangle tags" are plastic ear tags with unique identification numbers large enough to be read from a 
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AR 66 at 4 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order).3 Dr. Ranunell also 
sent an e-mail to ISDA staff stating that "there would be no mandatory inventory validation 
ever again." AR 14 at 3 (Stipulation). 
As a result, the Department was forced to seek and obtain an administrative search 
warrant from District Judge Brent Moss on January 15, 2003. An amended warrant was 
issued by Judge Moss on January 26, 2004. AR 66 at 4. 
Pursuant to the warrant, ISDA inspectors carried out an inventory of the elk over the 
course of several days, with Dr. Rammell refusing to cooperate in the gathering and 
restraining of the elk. AR 66 at 5. Dr. Ranunell also refused to provide any paperwork or 
records relating to the inventory verification. AR 66 at 6. The Department was forced to do 
its own inventory of Dr. Ranunell's records pursuant to the warrant. As a result of the 
inventory and the record search, the Department determined that 28 elk were missing ( after 
further review of the records the number of missing elk was reduced to 23). AR 66 at 12. 
The inventory also revealed 26 calves and one cow that had no official form of identification. 
AR66at 10. 
Inspection of Dr. Ranunell's facilities also revealed a number of fencing violations, 
including a gate with a gap that allowed the escape of an elk calf and a downed pole that 
allowed the escape of another calf. AR 66 at 10-11. 
On June 4, 2004, the ISDA filed a nine-count Administrative Complaint against the 
Ranunells. Count 1 alleged failure to pay the five dollar per head administrative fee required 
by Idaho Code § 25-3708. Count 2 alleged that 26 elk calves and one elk cow lacked official 
identification, a violation of Domestic Cervidae Rule 021. Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 alleged 
3 "AR" is used to refer to the Administrative Record. Document numbers are as described in the 
rs~-""c::~-..... ,.,...r: A A ........ ; ..... ;..,+.,...,,..:.,,.. o.,...,,..,...,.:J ..... ~ f"""<>...h.i.."'.',..fo of Amended Administrative Record. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF IDAHO STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
PAGE 105 
~PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-4 
various fencing violations. Count 7 alleged that 28 domestic elk were not accounted for, 
either because they were moved to another facility without submitting the required Intrastate 
Movement Certificate or because they had died and notice of death was not provided to the 
ISDA. Count 8 alleged that Dr. Rammell refused to gather and restrain the elk for purposes of 
inventory, a violation of Domestic Cervidae Rule 202. Count 9 alleged that an unknown 
number of elk were transported from another domestic cervidae farm to Dr. Rammell's 
facility without submitting Intrastate Movement Certificates, a violation of Domestic 
Cervidae Rule 250. 
During preliminary proceedings in the contested case, it soon became apparent that 
Dr. Rammell had deliberately violated the inventory rules in order to provoke the filing of a 
contested case, which Dr. Rannnell could use as a forum for presenting evidence that the 
domestic cervidae rules were unreasonable. As he later told the Deputy Director: 
I was perfectly within my right to protest these rules. It wasn't the venue [the 
Department] favored. They'd rather have me try to sue the state and win. I 
felt like my position was greater as a defendant. They have been walking on 
my property violating my rights for several years. I am perfectly in my right to 
contest the rules that way. 
Tr. of 4/29/2005 at p. 30, II. 4-11.4 Thus, Dr. Rannnell did not contest that he had violated the 
rules, and in fact entered into a Stipulation with the ISDA in which Dr. Rammell "admitted to 
virtually all of the facts alleged in the Complaint." AR 66 at 14. Instead, his planued defense 
was to develop a factual record to support his contention that the domestic cervidae rules were 
unreasonable. Asked in discovery to identify his witnesses, Dr. Rannnell identified several 
witnesses who would "testify as to the reasonableness of the rules and statutes regarding the 
4 "Tr." is used to refer to the transcripts of the proceedings before the hearing officer and deputy 
director. For the Court's convenience, copies of the relevant portions of the transcript of proceedings before the 
deputy director on April 29, 2005, are attached hereto as Exhibit A. The relevant portions of the transcripts of 
-:-,,.,...,.,,.,:i.;..,,":'" .. 1-...,,,r,...,..,=,. th.,, t,,,.!lrino o.fTic.er are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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elk, sheep, buffalo and cattle industries in Idaho." AR 29 at 3 (Responses to Complainant's 
First Set of Interrogatories, Admissions and Request for Production of Documents). Other 
witnesses were to testify about the "family of diseases known as Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies" and "the origination of CWD [Chronic Wasting Disease] and its 
relationship to Scapie." AR 29 at 3. 
In response, the ISDA filed a Motion in Limine that asked the hearing officer to 
exclude any evidence and testimony offered for the purpose of challenging the reasonableness 
of the domestic cervidae rules and statutes. AR 34 & 35 (Motion in Limine and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine). The motion in Limine was argued at the 
beginning of the contested case hearing. Dr. Ramm ell argued that: 
This whole case is about the statutes and the rules. If the statutes are 
unconstitutional, then there is no violation. If the rules are unreasonable based 
on the statute, there are no rules. Therefore my opening statement is that I am 
not in violation of anything. 
If you allow this motion to limit my witnesses and my exhibits, you're 
effectively eliminating my argument. And my argument is, again, that the 
rules are unreasonable. And if they are unreasonable, ifI can prove that, which 
is what I intend to do with my evidence and my witnesses, prove that the rules 
are unreasonable, then I am in violation of nothing. 
Tr. p. 16, 11. 13-25; p. 17, I. 1. 
The hearing officer ruled that she had not been delegated the authority to determine 
the validity of the Department's rules, and so would not make any determination as to the 
validity of the domestic cervidae rules. Tr. p. 32, 11. 1-23. She did allow Dr. Rammell to 
make a record, Tr. p. 33. 11. 3-4, although certain testimony was excluded on grounds of 
relevance or admissibility, in which case offers of proof were made. 
The testimony and offers of proof submitted by Dr. Rammell were based, among other 
things, on the assertion that the rules were intended primarily to prevent chronic wasting 
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disease (CWD), which Dr. Rammell asserted was not a threat within Idaho. Tr. p. 465-469. 
Dr. Rammell intended to present evidence to prove his assertion that the low risk of CWD did 
not justify the identification and mandatory inventory requirements of the domestic cervidae 
rules. See Tr. p. 469, 11. 14-15 ("''the entire argument I have is about CWD"); Tr. 635, II. 19-
21 ("[t]he center ofmy contention with the rules governing domestic cervidae is the rules that 
deal with the mandatory CWD surveillance program"). 
Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and a Preliminary Order (AR 66), which found the Rammells in violation of all nine 
counts in the Administrative Complaint. Dr. Rammell filed a petition for review of the 
preliminary order. In it, he argued that the hearing officer erred when she ruled that she had 
not been delegated the authority to determine the reasonableness of the domestic cervidae 
rules. AR 53 at 7 (Petition for the ISDA to Review the Preliminary Order). Dr. Rammell did 
not offer any argument that the rules were unreasonable as a matter of law. AR 53 at 7. 
Upon review of the petition, Deputy Director Michael Everett, acting as the director's 
designee, affirmed the Preliminary Order. As to Dr. Rammell's argument that the hearing 
officer should have accepted and considered evidence relating to the issue of the 
reasonableness of the rules, the Deputy Director ruled as follows: 
Until there is a binding court ruling to the contrary, the issue of consistency of rules 
with governing statutes or the constitution and the reasonableness of rules under 
governing statutes is not an evidentiary issue, and no testimony will be taken by the 
Hearing Officer or by the Director or his designee. Consistency of rules with statute 
and reasonableness of rules are issues oflaw, and if they are to be presented in the 
future in a case in which the Department uses a Hearing Officer, they must be 
presented to the Director or his designee as a legal argument in a petition for review of 
a preliminary order or of a recommended order. 
AR 68 at 8 (Final Order of Deputy Director). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The validity of an agency rule is purely a question of law. 
The Rammells argue that the validity of an administrative rule is a mixed question of 
law and fact, and therefore the Deputy Director erred in "stating that the reasonableness of an 
Administrative Rule is not evidentiary, that such a challenge is an issue of law and thus not a 
matter for a hearing officer." Rammell Opening Brief at 11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has held that the validity of an administrative rule 
is a question oflaw, not fact. In Grayot v. Summers, 75 Idaho 125, 269 P.2d 765 (1954), a 
licensed electrical contractor brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain 
rules of the Department of Law Enforcement were "null and void and as in excess of the 
powers of the respondent to make." Id. at 127-28; 269 P.2d at 765. The district court's 
decision was reversed due to its error in sustaining the general demurrer despite the presence 
of a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court then had to determine whether it was 
appropriate for it to express its "views as to the validity of the regulation in question," given 
that the district court had not reached the issue. Id. at 130, 269. P.2d at 767. Framing the 
issue as "whether the legislature has expressly or impliedly authorized the issuance of the 
regulation in issue," the Court held that "the decisive question to be determined in this action 
is not one of fact but is purely one of law, that is, as to the validity of the regulation in 
question." Id. 
Grayot confirms that the determination of whether a regulation falls within the scope 
of an agency's rule-making authority is a pure question oflaw. Thus, the Department's 
refusal to allow and consider evidence as to whether the Department's rules were necessary to 
achieve the stated legislative goals was not error. 
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The cases cited by the Rammells are not to the contrary. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Tax 
Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991), confirmed the concept of judicial deference to 
agency rules interpreting and implementing statutes. The Court specified a four prong test 
(hereinafter the "deference test"), each prong of which poses a purely legal question: (1) 
whether the agency has been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at 
issue; (2) whether the agency's construction of the statute is reasonable; (3) whether the 
statutory language at issue does not expressly treat the precise question at issue; and ( 4) 
whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. Id. at 862, 820 
P.2d at 1219. 
While it is apparent that the first three prongs are all answered through principles of 
statutory construction, and are thus purely legal questions, Dr. Rammell nonetheless argues 
that fact-finding is necessary to determine whether an agency's rule is "reasonable." Such is 
not the case. In Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960), the Court was asked 
to determine whether a rule of the Board of Trustees ofidaho State College establishing 
residency requirements was a reasonable exercise of the rule-making authorities granted by 
statute. There, the pertinent statute granted the trustees the power to "ordain such rules and 
regulations for the admission of students to said Idaho State College as it shall deem 
necessary and proper." Id. at 93-94, 349 P.2d at 718. The Court held that "[t]he 
reasonableness of such regulations is a question of law for the courts." Id. at 94, 349 P.2d at 
718. 
Likewise, in O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949), the 
Court was asked to determine the validity of a city zoning ordinance. The Court stated the 
general principle that "where the power to legislate on a given subject is conferred, and the 
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mode of its exercise is not prescribed, then an ordinance passed in pursuance thereof must be 
a reasonable exercise of the power." 69 Idaho at 44, 202 P.2d at 405. The Conrt noted that 
while it would take into account "existing circumstances or contemporaneous conditions," 
and the "necessity or lack thereof' for the ordinance's adoption, the question of"whether or 
not an ordinance is reasonable" is ultimately "a question of law for the Court." Id. 
Together, Newman and O'Connor dispose of Dr. Rammell's contention that the 
"second prong of the rule of judicial deference invites a conrt to take in factual findings as to 
whether an Administrative Rule is reasonable." Rammell Opening Brief at 14.5 
As is true of the first three prongs of the deference test, the five rationales that form 
the fourth prong of the deference test require legal, not factual, inquiries. The five rationales 
justifying deference are: 
1) situations when the agency's interpretation has been relied upon for a 
number of years; 2) when the agency's interpretation represents a practical 
interpretation; 3) when the statutory test has not been altered by the legislature 
in light of the interpretation; 4) when the interpretation is formulated 
contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute; and 5) when the 
interpretation involves an area of expertise developed by the agency. 
Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 573, 21 P.3d 890, 895 
(2001 ). The five rationales are alternatives and are not cumulative. The presence of even one 
rationale is sufficient to justify deference. See Mason, 135 Idaho at 584, 21 P.3d at 906 
( according rule deference even though there was no history oflegislative acquiescence and 
rule was "not particularly a result of agency expertise" because rule was a practical 
interpretation). 
5 The Rammells cite Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001) as an 
example of determining reasonableness through "observations of facts presented through an 
evidentiary record" (Rammell Opening Brief at 14). The Court, however, cited no evidentiary facts in 
support of its decision. Rather, its determination that the rules were reasonable was based on the fact 
that they "based directly on precedent of this Court" and thus were a "reasonable construction of the 
• '··c'--" J.J---~· 1'lC T.A..,.t-.,,... ,;,+ "QA ')l l) ~d._at906, 
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The Ramm ells assert that the determinations of "whether a rule is 'practical' and 
within the 'expertise developed by the agency' [are] clearly considerations that would require 
the presentation of evidence of whether the agency has in fact expertise in the area it seeks to 
regulate and whether the rule is actually effective in addressing an area the statutory language 
does not." Rammell Opening Brief at 14. 
Once again, the Court's decisions do not support the Rammells' argument. Courts do 
not engage in fact-finding to determine whether an agency interpretation is "practical." As 
the Court explained in J.R. Simplot Co., this rationale "refers to the fact that statutory 
language is often of necessity general and therefore cannot address all of the details necessary 
for its effective implementation." 120 Idaho at 858, 820 P.2d at 1215. Ju J.R. Simplot Co., 
the Court did not engage in fact-finding to determine the Tax Commission's regulation was a 
"strained and harsh interpretation of a series of statutes that otherwise have a plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning." Id. at 864, 820 P.2d at 1221. It simply compared the language of the 
rule to the language of the statute. Likewise, other cases applying the "practical" rationale to 
agency rules have not engaged in fact-finding, but have rather applied standard principles of 
statutory interpretation to determine whether the rule falls within a practical interpretation of 
the statute. See, e.g., Preston v. State Tax Com 'n, 131 Idaho 502,960 P.2d 185 (1998) 
(finding that agency rule was consistent with "a practical reading of these statutes"). 
Likewise, there is no support for the proposition that fact-finding is necessary to 
determine whether a rule falls within an agency's expertise. Jndeed, the opposite is true. This 
rationale is simply a corollary to the long-standing principle that courts should not substitute 
their judgments for those of agencies regarding technical or scientific issues within the 
agency's expertise. The determination of whether a rule falls within agency expertise does 
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not require an evidentiary hearing; the rationale is fulfilled if the rule involves scientific or 
technical issues within the agency's designated realm ofresponsibilities. See, e.g., Canty v. 
Idaho State Tax Com'n, 138 Idaho 178, 184, 59 P.3d 983,989 (2002) (finding rationale 
fulfilled since tax commission "has expertise in the field of state tax laws"); Pearl v. Board of 
Professional Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 114, 44 P.3d 1162, 
1169 (2002) (finding rationale fulfilled because "medicine is a technical discipline, and the 
Board of Medicine is an expert at it"); Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 573, 21 P.3d 
at 895 (finding rationale fulfilled because "interpreting worker's compensation statutes is an 
area of expertise belonging to the Industrial Commission, thus indicating that another policy 
reason supporting judicial deference has been met"). 
In short, in any adjudicatory challenge to administrative rules, the validity of those 
rules is a question of!aw. Thus, the ISDA properly excluded the factual evidence that Dr. 
Rammell offered for the purpose of demonstrating that the domestic cervidae rules were 
unreasonable. 
B. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize agencies to hear 
factual challenges to agency rules in the context of a contested case. 
The Rammells contend that Dr. Rammell should have been allowed, in the context of 
a contested case proceeding, to present detailed factual evidence demonstrating that the 
domestic cervidae rules "had no relation to preventing Chronic Wasting Disease and are thns 
unreasonable and beyond the scope of the Department's rule making authority." Rammell 
Opening Brief at 11. The Ramm ells' argument fails at an elementary level, for it fails to 
distinguish between legislative and adjudicative facts. "An agency engaging in rule-making is 
not required to make specific and detailed findings and conclusions of the kind customarily 
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associated with a formal proceeding." 1 Charles H. Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 
4.41[2] (1997). 
The principle that an agency need not engage in formal fact-finding is a core principle 
of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). Idaho Code§ 67-5220 provides that the 
preferred format for rule-making is "negotiated rule-making, a process in which all interested 
parties and the agency seek consensus on the content of a rule." The domestic cervidae rules 
were the result of a negotiated rule-making process involving the ISDA, the Department of 
Fish and Game, The Wildlife Federation, and the Idaho Elk Breeders Association. Tr. p. 578, 
II. 19-25 .. Dr. Rammell also participated in the negotiated rule-making. Tr. pp. 511-14. 
If a party asserts that a rule is invalid because it exceeds the agency's delegated 
authority or otherwise is an unreasonable interpretation of the authorizing statute, the AP A 
provides that such party may challenge the rule in a declaratory judgment proceedings action. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5278. Indeed, the Idaho Courts have repeatedly affirmed that the validity of 
agency rules is a question for the judiciary. See, e.g., Holly Care Center v. Dept. of 
Employment, 110 Idaho 76 at 82, 714 P.2d at 51 ("it is this Court's duty to interpret the law 
[ and within] that duty is the responsibility of deciding whether an administrative rule 
contradicts the wording of a statute"). 6 
Parties contesting that a rule is not justified by the scientific or technical evidence also 
have another remedy available to them: they can petition the agency to enter into a new-rule-
making process in order to repeal or amend the rule. See Idaho Code§ 67-5230(1) ("[a]ny 
person may petition an agency requesting the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule"). 
6 While the AP A also authorizes agencies to make declaratory rulings as to the "applicability 
of any statutory provision or of any rule administered by the agency," Idaho Code § 67-5232, it does 
not explicitly authorize agencies to make declaratory rulings as to the "validity" of agency rules. The 
only place that the A PA •-'-'··· 1e substantive validity of a rule is in § 67-5278 
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Denial of such a petition is a final agency action subject to judicial review. Idaho Code§ 67-
5230(2). In fact, the rule-making process is the exclusive process recognized in the AP A for 
the repeal of a rule by an agency. Idaho Code § 67-5224(1 ). Federal courts, interpreting 
analogous provisions in the federal AP A, have concluded that federal agencies cannot 
overrule agency regulations through adjudication before the agency, but instead must initiate a 
new rule-making. Tunik v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
In short, parties contending that a rule is unreasonable because the agency failed to 
consider certain facts may bring an action for declaratory judgment or petition for a new rule-
making. Here, the Rammells, rather than using the statutory remedies available to them, 
sought to use the contested case as a forum to introduce evidence for the purpose of 
supporting the argument that the inventory and identification rules were not a reasonable 
response to the threat of CWD. Since the AP A does not authorize agencies to adjudicate the 
reasonableness of agency rules, the hearing officer properly excluded such evidence pursuant 
to the terms ofidaho Code§ 67-5251, which provides that evidence irrelevant to the 
contested case allegations may be excluded. 
C. While an agency head may determine the broad question of whether a rule falls 
within the agency's substantive authority or was promulgated pursuant to 
improper procedure, the APA does not authorize agency heads to determine 
whether a rule is a reasonable implementation of a statute. 
Contested cases, by their nature, are not a proper forum for determining the factual 
validity of agency rules. Contested cases are evidentiary hearings to determine the outcome 
required by applicable statutes and rules in the context of particular factual findings. A 
contested case must result in an "order," which is defined by statute to mean an "agency 
action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, 
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immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." Idaho Code§ 67-
5201. In determining the rights of parties to the contested case, the agency must apply its 
existing rules, for, as a general matter, agencies are bound by their own rules. See, e.g., 
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 759, 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("unless and until it amends or repeals a valid legislative rule or regulation, 
an agency is bound by such a rule or regulation").7 
As the Rammells note in their opening brief, the Attorney General has interpreted the 
AP A to authorize agency heads to consider and decide, in the context of a contested case, 
"whether a rule of that agency is within the agency's substantive rulemaking authority or 
whether the rule has been promulgated according to proper procedure." IDAP A 04.11.01.416 
(AG Rule 416) Such authority, however, is discretionary, not mandatory. Id. Moreover, AG 
Rule 416 does not contemplate a detailed inquiry into whether a rule reasonably implements 
legislative directives. The issue of whether a rule is within the agency's substantive 
rulemaking authority is a very broad issue of law ( e.g., does the ISDA have authority to 
promulgate rules regulating the domestic cervidae industry) and does not ask the narrower 
questions of reasonableness on which validity may sometimes turn. See, e.g., Holly Care 
Center v. Idaho Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho at 78, 714 P.2d at 47 (court may declare 
agency rules invalid if such rules "are not reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation"). As discussed above, parties asserting that a rule is unreasonable must initiate a 
declaratory judgment action in the district court. 
7 If anything, the principle that agencies are bound by their own rules until amended or 
repealed applies with special force in Idaho, which provides for legislative review of all rules. Idaho 
Code § 67-5291. Rules may be approved, rejected, amended, or modified by concurrent resolution. 
Id. While legislative review is not binding on the courts, it does have the "legal effect of an advisory 
opinion" that the rule complies wi.th statutory law. Holly Care Center v. Idaho Dep 't of Employment, 
Hf',T..:1_1 __ "7..t,'. 01") '71AD'>,·L1'- .r::;1 (1QR61. 
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Moreover, even assuming for purposes of argument that AG Rule 416 contemplates a 
detailed inquiry into the substantive validity of agency rules, such an inquiry would not 
involve an evidentiary hearing. An agency head considering a substantive challenge to an 
agency rule in the context of a contested case would have to apply the standards developed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court for determining the validity of agency rules. As described 
previously in this brief, such standards require the determination to be made as a matter of 
law. 8 
Here, the Deputy Director correctly held that"[ c ]onsistency of rules with statute and 
reasonableness of rules are issues oflaw, and ... must be presented to the Director or his 
designee as a legal argument in a petition for review of a preliminary order or of a 
recommended order." Id. Dr. Rammell failed to present any legal argument to the deputy 
director, and instead argued, as he does before this Court, that the validity of the rules was a 
factual issue upon which he should have been allowed to present evidence before the hearing 
officer. Having failed to adequately present legal argument addressing the issue of the rules' 
validity before the deputy director, Dr. Ramrnell cannot now complain that the director failed 
to rule on the issue. 
Because the final order below is consistent with the terms of AG Rule 416, it is 
unnecessary to decide the related issue raised by Ramrnells, namely, whether AG Rule 416 
applies to the ISDA. If the Court reaches this issue, however, it should be noted that while the 
AP A contemplated that the Attorney General would "promulgate rules of procedure 
appropriate for use by as many agencies as possible," Idaho Code§ 67-5206(2), it also 
8 The fact that an agency head "may delegate to a hearing officer the authority to recommend a 
decision on issues of whether a rule is within the agency's substantive rulemaking authority" does not imply a 
factual hearing, since hearing officers are empowered to determine legal issues and make conclusions oflaw. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF IDAHO STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
PAGE 117 . . 
>ARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-16 
authorized agencies to promulgate their own rules of practice and procedure. Idaho Code 
§ 67-5206(5)(a). Moreover, the Legislature, in authorizing agencies to adopt their own rules 
of practice and procedure, did not require the agencies to adopt a counterpart to every rule in 
the Attorney General rules. Idaho Code§ 67-5206(5)(b) contemplates that agencies may find 
certain portions of the Attorney General rules inapplicable to the agency.9 
In short, the rules promulgated by the Attorney General apply only to those "agencies 
that do not affirmatively promulgate alternative procedures after the promulgation of the rules 
by the attorney general." The ISDA rules of practice and procedure were adopted on January 
3, 1994 (IDAP A 02.01.01.000 et seq.), approximately six months after the adoption of the 
Attorney General's rules on July 1, 1993 (IDAPA 04.11.01.000 et seq.). Because of the 
subsequent adoption of procedural rules by the ISDA, the Attorney General's rules do not 
apply to contested cases before the ISDA. However, as occurred in the proceedings below, 
the Attorney General rules remain available to the agency as appropriate guidance for 
handling situations not explicitly covered by the ISDA Rules d{Practice and Procedure. 
\ 
D. The hearing officer was not required to di~9ualify herself. 
\ .. 
Dr. Rammell filed a motion to disqualify the hearing officer"cin December 10, 2004. 
\ 
\ 
As noted in the Ranunells' opening brief, the motion "was based upon'the fact that the 
Rammells wished to contest the reasonableness of the applicable rules which would require 
the Hearing Officer [to] have some knowledge of the industry so as to better be able to make 
rulings and determinations on the record with regard to objections and the issue of 
reasonableness." Ramm ell Opening Brief at 17. 
9 Idaho Code§ 67-5206(5)(b) states that agencies should include a finding in their rules stating why the 
relevant portions of the Attorney General rules were inapplicable to the agency under the circumstances. The 
record herein does not indicate whether such a finding was made, but the ISDA Rules of Practice and Procedure 
were submitted to the Legislature for review. Presumably, the Legislature found the departure from the Attorney 
<1P:r1P:rJ;1 l rnlP.~ ~nnronr-i~tP: 
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As demonstrated above, however, the hearing officer lacked authority to determine the 
reasonableness and validity of the domestic cervidae rules, since such authority had not been 
explicitly delegated to her by the Director. Moreover, as demonstrated above, even if the 
hearing officer had such authority, the reasonableness of the rules was a question oflaw, and 
therefore required no special expertise regarding the domestic cervidae industry. Thus, the 
stated basis of Dr. Rammell's motion, even if taken at face value, did not require the 
disqualification of the hearing officer. 
Moreover, Dr. Rammell's motion did not comply with the filing requirements for 
motions to disqualify hearing officers. The AP A requires that such motions be filed "within 
fourteen (14) days after receipt of notice indicating that the person will preside at the 
contested case." Idaho Code§ 67-5252(2)(a). Alternatively, such motions may be filed 
"promptly upon discovering facts establishing ground for disqualification." Idaho Code§ 67-
5252(2)(b ). 
Dr. Rammell did not move to disqualify the hearing officer until December 10, 2004. 
He had known that Ms. Uranga was assigned to hear the case since at least August 12, 2004, 
the date that Ms. Uranga issued a Notice of Hearing. AR 5. Thus, Dr. Rammell failed to file 
the motion to disqualify within the required ten days. Dr. Rammell' s motion was also 
untimely under the second criteria, discovery of facts establishing a ground for 
disqualification. Nowhere in his motion before the ISDA did Dr. Rammell allege that he had 
only recently discovered Ms. Uranga's lack of specific knowledge of the domestic cervidae 
industry. Indeed, as noted in Dr. Rammell's Memorandum in Support of Motion of 
Disqualification (AR 5), Ms. Uranga had presided over an earlier contested case involving Dr. 
Rammell, so that Dr. Ramm ell was well aware of her background. 
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Given that the motion to disqualify Ms. Uranga was untimely, Dr. Rammell's 
argument that Ms. Uranga should have disqualified herself has no merit. 
E. The award of attorney fees should be upheld. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 authorizes agencies to award attorney fees to the prevailing party 
in administrative proceedings when the other party acts without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact. See, e.g., Stewart v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 115 Idaho 820,822, 771 P.2d 41, 43 
(1989) (Idaho Personnel Commission has authority under 12-117 to award attorney fees "for 
proceedings at the administrative agency level"); Ockerman v. Ada County Bd. ofCom'rs, 130 
Idaho 265,267,939 P.2d 584,586 (Ct. App. 1997) (hearing officer in contested case has 
authority to award attorney fees and costs). Attorney's fees may be awarded to the agency as 
well as to private parties. See, e.g., Fuhriman v. State Dept. ofTransp., __ Idaho __ , 153 
P .3d 480, 486 (2007) ( citing section 12-117 and finding that "[a] prevailing state agency must 
be awarded "reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law"). 
Here, the hearing officer concluded that Rammell acted "without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law," and concluded that the Department was "entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees, and reasonable expenses as the prevailing party." AR 66 at 21. 
The Deputy Director confirmed the award in his Final Order. AR 68 at 8. At a separate 
hearing, the hearing officer recommended the award of attorney fees to the Department in the 
amount of$19,143.00 and costs and expenses in the amount of$10,229.96. AR 69 at 4 
(Supplementary Recommended Order on Costs and Attorney's Fees). The Deputy Director 
affirmed the award of costs and attorney's fees in the amounts recommended by the hearing 
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officer. AR 140 (Supplemental Final Order of the Deputy Director on Costs and Attorney's 
Fees). 
Rammell asserts that should the Court uphold the Department's order regarding the 
reasonableness of the domestic cervidae rules, that it should nonetheless overturn the award of 
costs and attorney's fees based on the single fact that the hearing officer concluded that 23 elk 
were unaccounted for while Count 7 of the Administrative Complaint alleged that 28 elk were 
unaccounted for. Rammell contends that his alleged success in demonstrating the lesser 
number demonstrates that his defense was not without a factual basis. 
The record does not support Dr. Rammell's contention. The reduction in the number 
of missing elk from 28 to 23 was not the result of any evidence or testimony submitted by Dr. 
Rammell. Rather, it was the result of the Department reviewing the records prior to the 
hearing and comparing them to CWD forms submitted by Dr. Rammell during the prior year 
(CWD forms and brain samples are submitted by the owner upon the death of an elk). As a 
result of the review, the Department prepared and submitted Exhibit 32, which updated the 
count of missing elk to exclude those for which there were CWD submission death 
certificates on file. Tr. p 316, 11. 4-25; p. 317, 11. 1-10. 
Moreover, the number of missing elk is simply irrelevant to the disposition of Count 7 
of the Administrative Complaint. Count 7 alleged, in part, violation of Domestic Cervidae 
Rule 201, which requires the owner to submit an annual domestic cervidae inventory report 
by December 31 of each year. It is undisputed that Dr. Rammell did not submit the inventory 
report to ISDA. Thus, a clear violation occurred regardless of whether the number of missing 
elk was 28 or 23. In other words, the number of missing elk was irrelevant to the issue of 
whether Dr. Rammell violated the rule requiring submission of an inventory report. 
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Dr. Rammell's defense to Count 7 was to insist on presenting factual evidence that the 
inventory rule was "unreasonable." As demonstrated earlier in this brief, such defense, 
presented in the context of the contested case, was meritless. 
Here, the hearing officer, in awarding fees. properly examined whether Dr. Rammell's 
defense lacked any factual or legal basis by examining Dr. Rammell's conduct during the 
entire course oflitigation. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 685, 778 P.2d 804, 807 (1989) 
("[ t ]he frivolity and unreasonableness of a defense is not to be examined only in the context 
of trial proceedings. The entire course of the litigation will be taken into account"). Here, 
Dr. Rammell initiated the litigation by purposefully violating the domestic cervidae rules 
because he believed the odds of successfully contesting the rules was "greater as a defendant." 
Tr. of 4/29/2005 at p. 30, II. 4-11. As the Deputy Director concluded: "Refusing to abide by 
statutes and rules that are still on the books simply because Respondents believed that they 
were unconstitutional is not reasonable. If respondents wanted to challenge the rules, they 
could have done so in District Court rather than refusing to abide by them." AR 68 at 8. 
In short, Dr. Rammell sought to provoke the Department into filing the Administrative 
Complaint so that Dr. Rammell could use the contested case proceedings as a vehicle for 
attacking the reasonableness of the domestic cervidae rules. Dr. Rammell then proceeded to 
insist, without legal foundation, that he was entitled to present factual evidence demonstrating 
that the domestic cervidae rules had an inadequate factual basis. Such an action had no 
reasonable basis in law or fact, since it ignored the fact that Idaho law does not authorize 
evidentiary challenges to agency rules in the context of a contested case hearing. Thus, the 
award of attorney fees and expenses to the ISDA was authorized by Idaho Code § 12-117 and 
should be upheld. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF IDAHO STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
PAGE 122 
TMENT OF AGRICULTURE - 21 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Order of the Deputy Director and the Supplemental Final Order of the 
Deputy Director on Costs and Attorney's Fees should be upheld. 
DATED this~ day of August 2007. 
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1 was to evaluate the evidence gathered in support of 
2 the department's allegations that the respondents 
3 have violated the domestic cervidae farms law and 
4 the rules governing the domestic cervidae. 
5 I think you will also find, in addition 
6 to this, the record clearly supports that these 
7 violations were committed by the respondents 
8 intentionally and in bad faith. 
9 In light of the fact the statutes and 
10 rules are presumed valid and the proper forum is 
ll available, and always has been available, to the 
12 respondents to bring their challenge with respect 
13 to the constitutionality and the reasonableness of 
14 the statute and rules, the only conclusion that can 
15 be drawn from the record is that the respondents 
16 have simply acted without a reasonable basis in 
17 fact and Jaw. Simply stated, the respondents were 
18 not required to violate the law to bring their 
19 questions of constitutionality and reasonableness. 
20 The record is adequate, the reCOrd is 
21 fair, and I urge you to adopt the final order based 
22 on the record as it now exists. 
23 Thanks. 
24 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thank you very much. 
25 Dr. Rammell? By my record, you have 14 
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1 minutes. 
2 DR. RAMMELL: Are you sure that's right? 
3 TilE DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Yes. 
4 DR. RAMMELL: I was perfectly within my right 
5 to protest these rules. It wasn't the venue they 
6 favored. They'd rather have me try to sue the 
7 state and win. I felt like my position was greater 
B as a defendant. They have been walking on my 
9 property violating my rights for several years. I 
10 am perfectly in my right to contest the rules that 
11 way. 
12 As far as me getting in the way, why 
13 didn't the sheriff have me removed if! was in the 
14 way? The deputy AG has a problem, No. I, he 
15 wasn't there; and No. 2, he stretched the truth on 
16 a whole bunch of issues. He says that I submitted 
17 the motion to disqualify in an untimely manner. He 
1B submitted his motion in limine three weeks before 
19 the hearing date. Tell me that's a whole bunch of 
20 time to respond to. He says that the agency 
21 doesn't necessarily have to review the rules, but 
22 how ·- I mean, that was the argument I had. That 
23 was my argument. And he says the constitutionality 
24 and review of the rules is the same thing, or at 
25 least that's the way he sounds. They are 
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1 absolutely two different things. and I did 
2 stipulate that the constitutionality of statute, 
3 No. I, couldn't be argued. But all of the rest of 
4 the issues, including the reasonableness or the 
5 reasonableness of them all, is clearly a legitimate 
6 argument because 3704 in the domestic cervidae code 
7 states that the director, or the agency, has 
8 authority to make, promulgate, and enforce general 
9 and reasonable rules not inconsistent with Jaw. 
10 They have to be general, No. I, which a 
11 number of them are not. You can't tell me that 
12 staples every 12 inches is a general rule. That 
13 rule is out. Reasonable rules? staples every 12 
14 inches; that's a reasonable rule? It loses on both 
15 general and reasonable. And then inconsistent with 
16 Jaw, they have to have statutory authority. 
17 He says that the state has statutory 
18 authority to come and run my elk through the chute. 
19 There is nowhere in the statutes that they have 
20 authority to come in and run my elk through the 
21 chute just to do an inventory. They can argue it's 
22 because of disease, but they won't make that 
23 argument it's because of disease because, whenever 
24 I brought up the issue of disease, they said it 
25 wasn't relevant to the case, that CWD had no place 
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1 in this. That's why the rules were written. 
2 This was a sham hearing. He got what he 
3 wanted; he denied me my argument. Due process 
4 allows me the right to a fair hearing. There is no 
5 question I have grounds for appeal to the district 
6 court. I mean, it's a no brainer, But I'll tell 
7 you what I think will happen. It will go to the 
8 district court, and it will get sent right back 
9 down. He's going to say, "You didn't give him a 
10 fair hearing." He needs to hear this stuff all 
11 over again. He doesn't have enough on record. You 
12 don't have enough on record to make a decision, Jet 
13 alone the district judge. 
14 He talked about my motion to disqualify 
15 the judge was improper. It says that she has to 
16 have professional knowledge on the subject matter, 
17 not the Jaw. I mean, you'd think that every one of 
18 the hearing officers would have some know ledge on 
19 the Jaw, but they have to have knowledge of the 
20 subject matter. She knows nothing about animals or 
21 diseases. Zero. And she was asked to fairly 
22 adjudicate this thing? I mean, you talk about a 
23 poor hearing, this has got to be the biggest 
24 mockery of our judicial system. What it does is, 
25 it speaks to the unfairness of administrative 
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1 procedure, and there is no parallel in the 
2 department's rules of procedure. 
3 The third issue that I would like to 
4 briefly touch on is that evidence in this case 
5 should only be admitted if it will help the trier 
6 of fact determine a remaining issue. The 
7 department's position really is that the essence of 
8 this case has been stipulated to and admitted to 
9 with the exception of the fencing violations and 
10 maybe that one count of the unaccounted for 28 head 
11 of elk. 
12 So that provides a framework for the 
13 admission of evidence and the remainder of this 
14 proceeding. 
15 Mr. Siddoway's testimony about how 
16 livestock, other than domestic cervidae, simply 
1 7 can't be said to have provided you the groundwork 
18 to determine whether or not respondent has refused 
19 to pay the $5 per head fee. Representative 
2 0 Loertscher's testimony regarding the rules review 
21 process in the legislature really has no bearing or 
2 2 tie-in with these fencing violations that have been 
2 3 alleged. Same could be said for Dr. Marie Bulgin's 
2 4 testimony about scrapie. You just simply won't 
2 5 find an alle ation of a scra ie violation in our 
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1 complaint. And finally Mr. Schoonveld's testimony 
2 regarding the genesis of chronic wasting disease 
3 just does not have any bearing on the facts that 
4 have been alleged by the state. 
5 One final point I guess I'd like to make 
6 is that I think the respondent is fearful that he 
7 will be unfairly prejudiced by ruling in favor of 
8 the state on this matter. That is simply not the 
9 case. The doors of justice won't be slammed shut 
10 on respondent -- simply won't be slammed shut on 
11 the respondent. The proper forum has been, and 
12 still is, available to Dr. Rammell to bring these 
13 questions of law if you would rule in our favor. 
14 So a couple points on that issue. The 
15 courts will certainly exercise free review. We are 
16 not required to have questions of law confined to 
1 7 the record, only those questions of fact. You 
18 simply won't be prejudiced. The courts will 
19 provide that square hole for the square peg that 
2 0 respondent seeks to argue. 
21 So the state asks you to exclude this 
2 2 evidence in the hearing related to the 
2 3 reasonableness of the statutes and the 
2 4 constitutional arguments that are sought to be 
2 5 introduced here today. 
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1 And with that, we ask that you would 
2 uphold the motion for the state. Thank you. 
3 nm HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. 
4 Dr. Rammell, your response? And I should note for 
5 the record, I didn't receive any written briefing 
6 or anything on this issue. You didn't submit any, 
7 did you? 
8 DR. RAMMELL: Yes, I did. 
9 nm HEARING OFFICER: When did you file that? 
10 DR.RAMMELL: 7thofDecember. Itwasmy14 
11 days, and I did receive it -- or I did send it. 
12 Excuse me. 
13 THE HEARING OFFICER: Did you receive any? 
14 MR. OAKEY: Madam Hearing Officer, we 
15 received an unsigned and undated memorandum in 
16 opposition. We did file it in that state. We'd be 
1 7 glad to provide you a copy if you don't have one 
18 available. 
19 THE HEARING OFFICER: Let me double check. 
2 0 It may just be that I missed it. Yeah. I 
21 apologize. Here it is. Okay. 
2 2 DR. RAMMELL: Did I sign it? 
2 3 THE HEARING OFFICER: Yeah, the original. 
2 4 DR. RAMMELL: Okay. Sorry about that, Brian. 
2 5 MR. OAKEY: That's all ri ht. 
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1 DR. RAMMELL: Ms. Uranga, I find it 
2 interesting that the deputy attorney general saying 
3 that the attorney general's rules do not apply, but 
4 yet he quoted them in his motion to provide limine. 
5 I think that they do apply. IDAPA rules procedure 
6 does not talk about a hearing officer's 
7 responsibility when it comes to decisions on the 
8 rules. Therefore you have to refer to rules 
9 outside of it. The Rule 416 clearly gives the 
10 agency, and if it's delegated -- the agency can't 
11 delegate authority to the hearing officer to make a 
12 decision on the rules. 
13 This whole case is about the statutes 
14 and the rules. If the statutes are 
15 unconstitutional, then there is no violation. If 
16 the rules are unreasonable based on the statute, 
1 7 there are no rules. Therefore my opening statement 
18 is that I am not in violation of anything. 
19 If you allow this motion to limit my 
2 0 witnesses and my exhibits, you're effectively 
21 eliminating my argument. And my argument is, 
2 2 again, that the rules are unreasonable. And if 
2 3 they are unreasonable, if I can prove that, which 
2 4 is what I intend to do with my evidence and my 
2 5 witnesses, prove that the rules are unreasonable, 
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1 then I am in violation of nothing. 
2 I have already agreed and note that you 
3 cannot rule on count 1, fees. It's a complaint 
4 against a statute. And it's clear the deputy 
5 attorney general cited it in his motion referring 
6 to the attorney general's code of rules that a 
7 hearing officer cannot rule on the 
8 constitutionality of a statute. That one is not a 
9 question. I would like to present evidence, 
10 however, that a district judge who has authority to 
11 rule on the constitutionality of a statute will 
12 have a record to review. Other than that, I'm not 
13 asking you to make a ruling. 
14 On the rest of the counts, however, it's 
15 clearly within the authority of the department, the 
16 agency, that you can make a decision whether the 
1 7 rules fall within the substantive rule-making 
18 authority of the agency. 
19 Mr. Siddoway is an expert. He also 
2 0 raises elk. He raises other animals also; sheep, 
21 buffalo, and horses. When you make a decision 
2 2 whether the rule is reasonable or not, or 
2 3 unreasonable, you have to give comparisons. 
2 4 Otherwise how could you ever decide whether it's 
2 5 reasonable or not. I have no other wa to ar ue 
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1 do to anybody else, then they violate their own 
2 statutory duties. 
3 Dr. Bulgin is a scrapie expert. She's 
4 the Idaho scrapie expert employed by the University 
5 of Idaho. She is also very familiar with chronic 
6 wasting disease. They both fall into the same 
7 family of diseases. She's personally been 
8 responsible and assisted with the testing of brains 
9 that we submit from the elk. She has been to 
10 numerous meetings all over the country where the 
11 topics are when scrapie and CWD are talked about at 
12 the same time because they have a lot of 
13 similarities. And they have been compared, not 
14 just by me, but a lot of other people. 
15 This case is about the chronic wasting 
16 disease program .. Does it need to be mandatory or 
1 7 could it be a voluntary program? ls there enough 
18 risk that the state can compel or violate a 
19 person's private property rights? Dr. Marie Bulgin 
2 0 will be able to testify about how the scrapie 
21 program is regulated so we could compare it to how 
2 2 the elk industry is regulated. They are very 
2 3 similar, and she has a lot of evidence that she can 
2 4 present and give the trier of fact, yourself, the 
2 5 information ou need to make a decision whether the 
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1 this case other than to draw comparisons of what 1 rules are reasonable or not. 
2 "reasonable" would be. Mr. Siddoway will be able 2 Mr. Schoonveld was employed by the 
3 to testify about his own operation, also. It 3 Department of Wildlife in Colorado. He was present 
4 wasn't just about his sheep operation or the 4 at the time the first cases of chronic wasting 
5 buffalo that he owns or the horses that he owns. 5 disease were discovered. He also has evidence, 
6 He has an elk ranch. And part of the counts that 6 circumstantial evidence, that there were 
7 are claimed against me have to do with facilities. 7 scrapie-infected sheep present when the first cases 
8 And my argument is that the ISDA, Idaho State 8 of chronic wasting disease were discovered. His 
9 Department of Agricultural, is not following its 9 testimony would simply be to draw the connection, 
10 customs and practices that are established with 10 show that it is extremely possible that the disease 
11 other elk ranches. They are selectively enforcing 11 scrapie is responsible for the disease CWD. We 
12 the rules and discriminating against myself, that 12 know that BSE, mad cow disease, the most prevalent 
13 if these would have been a different rancher, these 13 theory by far is that it originated from 
14 would have never been brought up on count. 14 scrapie-infected sheep. 
15 Therefore, I have to establish through 15 So the state doesn't want me to present 
16 my witnesses -- and Mr. Wood, Mr. Jamie Wood is 16 any evidence that there is any relationship between 
1 7 also an elk rancher -- I have to establish what the 1 7 the two. But the truth is there is a great deal of 
18 customs and practices of ISDA is when they deal 18 evidence. And I need to be given the opportunity 
19 with inspections other than my own facility to give 19 to present that evidence. Mr. Schoonveld will do 
2 0 you some basis to make a decision to establish 2 0 that. Dr. Bulgin, will do that. When we do that, 
21 whether the rules are reasonable or not, to 21 then it will allow the hearing officer to make a 
2 2 establish whether the inspection that was conducted 2 2 ruling on the reasonableness of the rules. And if 
2 3 was reasonable. The ISDA should be expected to 2 3 you can -- I don't know how you could make this 
2 4 conform to their own rules. And if they single out 2 4 decision whether these rules are reasonable or not 
2 5 one person and annlv thPm :mu ,Hff0 .,..,,,.,~,u .i.i...,,, ... .i.t--ey 2 5 without some evidence that the are unreasonable. -'--...l....------------~--------
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1 So it's my ruling that I don't have 
2 authority to invalidate an agency rule as being 
3 unreasonable. And I don't think I was granted a 
4 scope of authority to do that. I do think, though, 
5 however, Dr. Ramrnell has some ability to create a 
6 record for purposes of a district court review 
7 where -- or also by the agency head because the 
8 agency head would first review my decision before 
9 it might get to the district court in any event. 
10 So I will grant the motion in part and 
11 deny it in part. With respect to Mr. Loertscher, I 
12 am going to deny the ability to provide testimony 
13 on the rule-making process within the legislature. 
14 My understanding of case law would support that you 
15 can't call legislators to testify about contested 
16 legislation or what the process was. 
1 7 With respect to the other witnesses, I 
18 don't feel like I can rule them out without hearing 
19 what their background is or what the purpose of 
2 0 their testimony is. 
21 Dr. Rammell, I will have to have you be 
2 2 real specific with respect to each witness. Any 
2 3 testimony can relate only to the specific rules in 
2 4 question here, not just a general attack or shotgun 
2 5 approach to any rule that the de artment has 
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1 adopted that relates to elk. We have got some very 
2 limited rules that are the subject here, and I 
3 think it's basically the fencing violations. The 
4 other violations are generally statutory. 
5 So the testimony will be limited for the 
6 purpose of you creating enough of a record to 
7 support your issues on appeal and your arguments on 
8 appeal and will be specifically restricted to the 
9 specific statutes or rules in question. And in 
10 order for expert testimony to come in, it's got to 
11 be somebody that has special expertise that would 
12 provide information that might be helpful to the 
13 finder of fact or the trier of fact. 
14 So I'm going to probably reserve, as 
15 each witness is called, ruling more specifically on 
16 each witness as to whether their testimony is 
1 7 relevant to the specific rules involved in this 
18 case. But I don't feel comfortable doing that 
19 without knowing what their potential testimony 
2 0 might b.e. So those issues will be addressed as 
21 those witnesses are called. 
22 MR. OAKEY: Sure. 
2 3 THE HEARING OFFICER: Did you wish to make an 
2 4 opening statement? 
25 MR.OAKEY: !did. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF IDAHO STATE 
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1 DR. RAMMELL: Excuse me. Ms. Uranga, 
2 Mr. Loertscher is en route from Idaho Falls. And I 
3 need to call him and turn him around. 
4 THE HEARING OFFICER: I understood that you 
5 were going to call him on a factual issue related 
6 to the inspection. 
7 DR. RAMMELL: He was present at the 
8 inspection. But what I really wanted to do was 
9 have him discuss the rules reviewed - I wish you'd 
10 give him a chance and reconsider. I think he could 
11 help on this. No. 1, I talked to Mike Gilmore. He 
12 works, I don't know, with the administrative 
13 attorney gel)eral rules, And he unequivocally said, 
14 if the agency gave you authority, you could rule 
15 the rule unreasonable. 416 applies. I Wish that 
16 you would pursue it, because I think what's going 
1 7 to happen is, you're going to find out you do have 
18 authority. It's going to go up on appeal and we 
19 will come right back. You say you believe you 
2 0 don't have authority, but I'd wish you'd check it. 
21 THE HEARING OFFICER: I read the attorney 
2 2 generals rules. First of all, agencies are allowed 
2 3 to opt out of the AG's rules. They don't have to 
2 4 follow the AG's rules; they can adopt their own, 
2 5 which the a en did in this case. The ado ted 
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1 their own rules and procedures. So the attorney 
2 general's rules and practices and procedures are 
3 not applicable. But even under the AG's rules, 
4 what it says is the hearing officer may be 
5 delegated the authority. I'm not hearing that the 
6 department's granted me the authority. But it says 
7 when an order is issued by the agency head in a 
8 contested case. So the agency head could make that 
9 ruling, but I'm not the one that makes the final 
10 decision in this case. The agency head would make 
11 that decision. And it also says you can determine 
12 whether it's within the agency's substantive 
13 rule-making authority and promulgated in accordance 
14 with proper procedure. There is a procedural 
15 argument being raised, and the statute does give 
16 the agency substantive rule-making authority to 
1 7 adopt and promulgate rules related to the 
18 regulation of domestic cervidae under enforcement 
19 of the provisions of the various chapters of 
2 0 statute. 
21 You may convince me later, but at this 
2 2 point I'm going to let you create your record, and 
2 3 maybe the agency head --
2 4 DR. RAMMELL: Let's say the agency head does 
2 5 not delegate or has not delegated that authority to 
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1 you and it's confirmed, the agency head will still 
2 want a record. 
3 1HE HEARING OFFICER: I just said you could 
4 make a record. 
5 DR. RAMMELL: Mr. Loertscher's testimony may 
6 provide facts that would help solve this case. I 
7 meat\, the whole case is, if these rules are 
8 unreasonable, they violate - there is no statutory 
9 authority for them and they don't exist . 
10 1HE HEARING OFFICER: I understand that, 
11 Dr. Rammell, but the legislature approved the 
12 rules. So one legislator that may disagree with 
13 that decision can't change the decision of the 
14 legislature, 
15 DR. RAMMELL: Mr. Loertscher's testimony will 
16 be about the rules review process. I know the 
1 7 deputy AG has cited that, yes, the legislature 
18 reviewed the rules and they have been stamped. But 
19 Mr. Loertscher has expert testimony -- he's been in 
2 0 the legislature for over ten years --
21 1HE HEARING OFFICER: I'm familiar with him. 
2 2 DR. RAMMELL: -- that the rules review policy 
2 3 is very fallible, that rules get passed all the 
2 4 time that are unreasonable because the legislators 
2 5 have no wa to determine whether a rule is 
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1 reasonable or not until it's been in effect for a 
2 while. People can get up and argue in the rules 
3 review, but deference is always given to the 
4 agencies. It's nearly impossible to delete a 
5 proposed rule or a pending rule. His testimony 
6 will give expert testimony that many rules get 
7 passed that are unreasonable which will give the 
8 base for the case. 
9 I really need him to testify, and I 
10 wish -- he's halfway here. The substance of his 
11 testimony regarding the inspection, he was present, 
12 but he wasn't out there. He's not going to give 
13 anything substantive that way. I wish -- he will 
14 be here in two hours. If you feel like his 
15 testimony is irrelevant, we can stop him. Do the 
16 same thing you're doing with the other witnesses. 
1 7 He's almost here. 
18 MR. OAKEY: Madam Hearing Officer, your 
19 ruling is on the record. I think it's consistent 
2 0 with what the law is in Idaho. And Dr. Rammell 
21 simply hasn't given you any reason to overturn or 
2 2 overrule what the law is in regards to statutory 
2 3 authority to bring this type of evidence. 
2 4 THE HEARING OFFICER: Because now what you're 
2 5 trying to chaJJern;ri;:, is:: tho AP t:.. ..... 1,,._"."""'-1~:--
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1 provisions and whether that's reasonably adopted 
2 and whether rules that go through this process are 
3 reasonably taken care of. There is a procedure 
4 clearly within the AP A to raise questions in the 
5 legislature. And I don't think one legislator's 
6 opinion whether that is a good process or bad 
7 process is relevant and admissible. 
8 I'm not going to allow you to go and 
9 challenge the APA procedures and rule-making. 
10 MR. OAKEY: If there is any case law that 
11 suppor\s that, we may be able to have this 
12 discussion and come to a conclusion. But there 
13 simply is none. There is no grounds to reconsider 
14 the motion or ruling. 
15 THE HEARING OFFICER: Because that's what 
16 you're asking me to do is to rule that the APA 
17 rule-making provisions are also unreasonable. 
18 DR. RAMMELL: No, I'm not. I'm simply asking 
19 you to grant me my right. I don't disagree that 
2 0 there are other processes to change the rules to 
21 review the rules, and I pursued those. But I also 
2 2 have a right to pursue a change of the rules 
2 3 through the courts. 
2 4 THE HEARING OFFICER: Right. 
2 5 DR. RAMMELL: udicial review. You told me 
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1 that. 
2 THE HEARING OFFICER: Right. I'm giving you 
3 the right to create a record for that purpose. But 
4 Mr. Loertscher's proposed testimony is to testify 
5 that the APA legislative review of rules is not a 
6 good process. 
7 DR. RAMMELL: Wouldn't that be informative 
8 for the record if we could establish that agencies 
9 have a number of unreasonable rules? 
10 Mr. Loertscher was directly involved with a major 
11 case many years ago where the department of health 
12 and welfare challenged the legislature's authority 
13 to review the rules, to overturn rules. I mean, he 
14 has incredible experience and understanding of the 
15 procedure. 
16 1HE HEARING OFFICER: Dr. Rammell, how does 
1 7 that relate to the elk rules; that's the problem. 
18 You're getting far afield. You're trying to 
19 challenge whether the legislature is acting 
2 0 appropriately when it reviews rules or whether the 
21 APA rule-review procedure is appropriate or 
2 2 unreasonable. 
2 3 DR. RAMMELL: I am simply trying to establish 
2 4 a base, a presumption, that rules very frequently 
2 5 have the opportunity to be written that are 
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1 Correct me if I am wrong, your testimony was that 
2 that did not account for the elk that were 
3 unaccounted for as a result of the inventory? 
4 A. That is correct. The animals on the 
5 cervidae - on the CWD submission form that I had 
6 in front of me did not account for the number of 
7 animals missing. 
8 Q. Do you have a record that accounts for 
9 those animals that appear on the CWD sample 
10 submission form? 
11 A. Those animals are on our inventory that 
12 we keep. We keep a number of animals that are 
13 there. We also have the animals that have been 
14 removed and/or dead or missing. 
15 Q. Is this the record that accounts for 
16 those animals that appear on the CWD sample? 
1 7 THE HEARING OFFICER: Which exhibit? 
18 MR.OAKEY: *-032. 
19 DR. RAMMELL: Has that been entered? 
2 0 MR. OAKEY: I'm asking him to identify it 
21 DR. RAMMELL: Oh, sorry. 
2 2 THE WITNESS: This is the removal sheet for 
2 3 Idaho Mountain Elk Ranch, the inventory removal 
24 sheet. 
2 5 BY MR. OAKEY: Does this account for 
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1 these animals? 
2 A. Without going on each one, yes, I 
3 believe it does. 
4 MR. OAKEY: Okay. Madam Hearing Officer, the 
5 ISDA offers Exhibit *-032 into evidence. 
6 THE HEARING OFFICER: Any objection? 
7 DR. RAMMELL: Yeah, I'd like to object. I 
8 don't have an opportunity to cross-examine him on 
9 this. He should have entered this exhibit when he 
10 was on direct. 
11 THE HEARING OFFICER: I will allow you to 
12 question him on the exhibit. 
13 DR. RAMMELL: Thank you. 
14 THE HEARING OFFICER: The exhibit will be 
15 admitted. 
16 MR. OAKEY: Okay. 
1 7 (Exhibit *-032 admitted.) 
18 Q. BY MR. OAKEY: I notice, Dr. Crowell, 
19 there are some colors on this particular inventory 
2 0 record sheet. Could you identify what these colors 
21 indicate? 
2 2 A. The animals in black, we have 
2 3 documentation to account for their disposition, 
2 4 i.e., death ·certificates or intrastate movement 
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1 accounts for what happened to that animal. The 
2 blue are the animals that are found on death 
3 certificate -- CWD submission death certificate 
4 numbers, which, for the ones that are blue were 
5 entered in the tattoo column. And the animals in 
6 red are the animals we were unable to account for 
7 during our inventory verification process completed 
8 in January of 2004. 
9 Q. The animals that appear in red on this 
10 report, have they been accounted for? 
11 A. No, they have not. 
12 Q. Thank you, Dr. Crowell .. One last 
13 question. Are there alternative ways for 
14 respondent to inventory or identify his domestic 
15 cervidae without having to put these animals into a 
16 chute or working facility? 
1 7 A. Yes, there is. 
18 Q. What are those alternatives? 
19 A. It's outlined - there is a provision in 
2 0 the rules governing domestic cervidae that allow 
2 1 for an inventory verification to be completed using 
2 2 visual identification tags or visual bangle tags. 
2 3 They are a plastic tag that has a number on it. 
2 4 That number is then correlated with the two forms 
2 5 of official identification. ' 
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1 It is possible to complete that 
2 inventory verification process using that. It is 
3 up to the decision of each owner whether or not to 
4 use that or to -- there is a number of 
5 identification that is allowable. It is up to them 
6 to decide which one works best for their facility. 
7 Q. If respondent was to choose this 
8 alternative to identify his animals~ would you be 
9 able to complete your responsibilities without 
10 having to handle these animals at all? 
11 A. We should be able to, yes. 
12 MR. OAKEY: No further questions. 
13 THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Dr. Rammell if, 
14 you would like to ask any questions regarding this 




DR. RAMMELL: May I take a quick peek? 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Sure. 
19 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
2 0 BY DR. RAMMELL: 
21 Q. Dr. Crowell, you testified that the 28, 
2 2 or actually 32, animals that were reported on the 
2 3 CWD sample submission form were accounted for in 
2 4 this inventory; is that correct? 
2 5 A. Yes. Without looking at each individual 
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1 keep his Exhibit *-00A? 
2 THE HEARING OFFICER: I've got it here. 
3 DR RAMMELL: Turn to page 42, please. 
4 MR.OAKEY: 42, 
5 THE HEARING OFFICER: I see it. 
6 DR. RAMMELL: If you look down on line 15. 
7 THE HEARING OFFICER: I'm looking at Exl:ubit 
8 *-O0A, my page 42 of the deposition, line 15 which 
9 talks about gathering. 
10 DR RAMMELL: Yeah, that's one of the counts 
11 that refers to the rule at .1-- .01. Do you see 
12 that? 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 DR. RAMMELL: If you will -- the argument 
15 goes on about why we need to gather and -- why the 
16 owner has to gather and restrain elk. 
1 7 On page 45 starting with the question 
18 that says, "Do you enforce that?" 
19 "If it's necessary, if there is a 
2 0 disease that's high enough concern, yes, we would 
21 enforce that." 
2 2 The question was the CWD, would that 
2 3 require gathering and restraining. 
2 4 Answer: "CWD, yes." 
2 5 It's obvious! one of the reasons that 
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1 they want to gather - the inventory validation 
2 inspection is to account for animals that may have 
3 died from CWD. They want to make sure that the 
4 producer is not hiding dead animals. That's why 
5 they have you submit the brains or notify them of 
6 death within five days, submit the sample for CWD 
7 testing. In this case, the reason they want to 
8 gather and restrain them is to check them for CWD. 
9 THE HEARING OFFICER: There is no evidence, 
10 information, or allegation that that's why your elk 
11 were inspected that CWD is relevant to this 
12 complaint. The issue here is that you refused to 
13 allow an inspection, not why an inspection was 
14 conducted. 
15 DR. RAMMELL: Maybe we could -- maybe I could 
16 ask Dr. Siroky if there is another reason why the 
1 7 inventory validation inspection was necessary --
18 MR. OAKEY: As far as -
19 DR. RAMMELL: -- if it wasn't for CWD. 
2 0 MR. OAKEY: As far as the deposition goes, I 
21 have got several ongoing objections as to relevancy 
2 2 for this very same purpose. If there is any 
2 3 discussion in here, it's because we didn't have the 
2 4 presence of Your Honor to make the ruling at the 
. 2 5 time of deposition. 
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1 THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. On Exhibit 
2 *-001, I am going to deny admission for lack of 
3 foundation and irrelevant. 
4 DR. RAMMELL: I don't think you have heard 
5 the rest of my argument. 
6 THE HEARING OFFICER: You're free to make an 
7 offer of proof which means you state what you think 
8 you would otherwise prove. 
9 DR. RAMMELL: Page 88. 
10 THE HEARING OFFICER: You can make an offer 
11 of proof. 
12 DR. RAMMELL: So you won't reconsider with a 
13 little more argument? 
14 THE HEARING OFFICER: No. There is nothing 
15 in the complaint about chronic wasting disease 
16 and/or the rules that are applicable to the counts. 
1 7 DR. RAMMELL: Then you simply have no 
18 professional knowledge about this subject which is 
19 why I tried to disqualify you. You cannot see the 
2 0 relationship between the disease program and the 
21 rules. 
2 2 THE HEARING OFFICER: Dr. Rammell, if you 
2 3 want to make an offer of proof, you may do so. 
2 4 DR. RAMMELL: I will make an offer of proof 
2 5 that I would have had I been allowed to ar e 
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1 that the reason all of these rules are in place is 
2 because the CWD program. Every one of these rules 
3 has some connection to that program. CWD is the 
4 heart and soul of the rules. And it is the reason 
5 I protested. It's the reason that I have to run my 
6 elk through the chute every year. Ifs the reason 
7 my elk get injured. There is other diseases --
8 brucellosis, tuberculosis, other things -- but they 
9 don't necessarily require a mandatory inventory 
10 validation every year. That was all because of 
11 CWD. To not admit CWD into this hearing, or any 
12 evidence about it -- risks, level of disease, 
13 programs -- is simply denying my right to an 
14 argument. 
15 I have evidence in Dr. Siroky's 
16 deposition that the reason that -- the main reason 
1 7 that elk are required to be gathered and restrained 
18 at any time of the year is in case they have a 
19 serious disease like CWD. l have evidence in 
2 0 Dr. Siroky's deposition, which has also not been 
21 allowed to be admitted into evidence, that the 
22 reason the calves have to be I.D.-ed by December 
23 31--quoting from page 89 of Dr. Siroky's 
24 deposition, line 7, referencing the inventory of 
2 5 and tagging, why is it necessary, inventory is a 
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1 necessary requirement for the chronic wasting 
2 disease program, the CWD program. 
3 Rule 205 states that a notice of death 
4 is required of domestic cervidae, and it reads, 
5 "The death of domestic cervidae over one year of 
6 age shall be reported by the owner or operator to 
7 the division by telephone, electronic mail, or 
8 facsimile transmission of a CWD sample submission 
9 form death certificate." 
10 It's apparent from that, which is also 
11 in one of the counts I have been alleged, that I 
12 haven't reported them in a timely manner, that the 
13 reason that that is required is to provide a CWD 
14 sample. 
15 I have evidence provided from a USDA 
16 website that documents the risk level of CWD. It 
1 7 gives a history of CWD, when it originated, what 
18 states it's been found in, it talks about the herd 
19 certification program,, how much surveillance has 
2 0 been conducted throughout the United States, it 
21 gives a current and past distribution of CWD among 
2 2 captive cervids. It shows that there are only 
2 3 three elk herds in the United States that may have 
2 4 at least one case of CWD. It also shows that there 
25 is one ca tive deer herd in Wisconsin that ma have 
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1 at least one case of CWD. It has provided current 
2 distribution of free-ranging cervids that may have 
3 CWD. 
4 This evidence could be used -- I would 
5 have used it to document the risk level, that it's 
6 simply a very low risk that we could import CWD 
7 from a domestic herd when there is only three of 
8 them that have it in the whole United States. Only 
9 three herds in Colorado. 
10 I would have offered as an exhibit the 
11 chronic wasting disease herd certification program 
12 and intrastate movement of captive dear and elk 
13 provided by the USDA. It's the proposed rule. It 
14 establishes what the disease is. It gives an 
15 economic analysis, the number of deer and elk herds 
16 that have died. 
1 7 THE HEARJNG OFFICER: What exhibit number is 
18 that? 
19 DR. RAMMELL: It is Exhibit *-DOK. Largely 
2 0 states because there is no way to track deaths. It 
21 states for farmed animals the number of deaths to 
2 2 date have been relatively low. It's estimated that 
2 3 fewer than 100 farmed elk and no fanned deer have 
2 4 died as a result of contracting CWD. The number of 
2 5 farmed elk that have died is equivalent to less 
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1 than one-tenth of one percent of the current U.S. 
2 farmed elk population estimated at 150,000. 
3 It has other details. I was going to 
4 use this to establish the risk level and if it was 
5 necessary to mandate a CWD program. The CWD 
6 program requires, among other things, that an 
7 inventory validation inspection be conducted, that 
8 records be submitted of all deaths, a notification 
9 of all deaths is required, that the animals be 
10 gathered and restrained for purposes of checking 
11 for inventory validation. An intrastate movement 
12 certificate is part of the CWD program to keep 
13 track of the animals in case of trace-backs, 
14 trace-forwards if they find CWD. In fact, the 
15 entire argument that I have is about CWD, and the 
16 hearing officer has denied me the opportunity to 
1 7 make an argument. 
18 THE HEARJNG OFFICER: Okay. Do you want to 
19 submit Exhibit *-DOK? We will include it as part 
2 0 of the record even though I am gathering there is a 
21 relevancy objection. I will have the same ruling 
2 2 on that. These will be submitted for your record 
2 3 for preserving your record on appeal, if we should 
24 go there. 
2 5 DR. RAMMELL: I would also like to have m 
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1 annual cervidae assessment with my CWD status. I'd 
2 like to offer it. 
3 THE HEARJNG OFFICER: Exhibit *-OOL? 
4 MR. OAKEY: Same objection. 
5 DR. RAMMELL: As an offer of proof. 
6 THE HEARJNG OFFICER: Do you want to look at 
7 that? 
8 MR. OAKEY: There is really no relation to 
9 any of the --
10 THE HEARING OFFICER: Same objection? 
11 MR.OAKEY: Yeah. 
12 DR. RAMMELL: I'd like to offer all these 
13 items, too. 
14 THE HEARING OFFICER: Just a minute I want to 
15 finish reviewing this. 
16 Exhibit *-OOL seems to relate to the 
1 7 number of animals that were inventoried which does 
18 seem to be relevant to this proceeding. States an 
19 annual inspection inventory has been completed. 
2 0 MR. OAKEY: The state would stipulate to the 
21 extent that it offers those numbers there, but 
2 2 renews its objection as it relates to CWD status or 
2 3 anything relating to chronic wasting disease. 
2 4 THE HEARJNG OFFICER: Well, I can't separate 
2 5 it. The document does talk about numbers and that 
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1 them into 02.04.19 which would be their own 
2 chapter. And I believe that was one of the 
3 sections that was in the original rules that were 
4 written by the Department of Agriculture and the 
5 cervidae industry when the initial statute was 
6 passed that transferred the functions concerning 
7 domestic cervidae from the Department of 
8 Agriculture to - or from the Department of Fish 
9 and Grune to the Department of Agriculture. And I 
10 did not participate in that initial rule-making. 
11 Q, Are you positive that that rule was put 
12 into place prior to your involvement with the 
13 domestic cervidae industry? 
14 A. I am fairly certain that that was part 
15 of the existing rules that we took the basics from 
16 to develop 02.04.19. 
1 7 Q, So when you developed the new set of 
18 rules, you surely looked at the old set; is that 
19 correct? 
2 0 A. Yes, we did. 
21 Q. And analyzed them, deleted ihe ones you 
2 2 didn't think were necessary, modified the ones you 
2 3 wanted to keep; is that correct? 
2 4 A. We conducted a negotiated rule-making. 
2 5 I believe ou were on the committee in fact. We 
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1 conducted a negotiated rule-making. And all of the 
2 provisions of the existing rules and all of the 
3 provisions the new or modified provisions that were 
4 put in 02.04.19 were scrutinized by the negotiated 
5 rule-making committee. 
6 Q. Do you recall my presence at those 
7 series of meetings, correct? 
8 A. Yes, I couldn't state whether you were 
9 at all of them or not. But I do remember that you 
10 came to at least most of them, the meetings we had. 
11 Q. Do you remember me contesting any rules? 
12 A. I remember that you voiced an opinion 
13 that you didn't feel some of them were appropriate. 
14 Q. Could this be one of those? 
15 A. It could be. I don't remember which 
16 ones specifically that you had a concern with, but 
1 7 this certainly could be one of them. 
18 Q. Regardless of when this rule was 
19 originated, whether you either adopted it into a 
2 0 new set of rules or originated it yourself, you 
21 have extensive knowledge of that rule, correct? 
2 2 A. I have good knowledge of the rule. I 
2 3 don't know that you could say that I adopted it. I 
2 4 believe the Idaho legislature adopted it. 
llilllfE 2 5 Q. That's what I mean. You drafted it? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Is that correct? Or presented it? 
3 A. I drafted the rule. As you may 
4 remember, we would have a meeting, we'd talk about 
5 it, we would discuss it. And the points that we 
6 could reach consensus on in the meeting, I would go 
7 back and make those changes and bring it back to 
8 the negotiated rule-making committee. Yes, I was 
9 the one that typed it into the computer. 
10 Q. Are all of the rules that are 
11 negotiated, all of the desires of the operators, 
12 are they automatically put in the rules? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Who makes the final decision whether a 
15 rule is proposed or not? 
16 A. The director of the Department of 
1 7 Agriculture. 
18 Q. So it is very possible that this rule 
19 was contested and the - who did you say? The 
2 0 director? 
21 A. The director of? 
2 2 Q. Excuse me. The administrator of the 
2 3 division of animal ,industries; is that correct? 
2 4 A. The director has the final --
2 5 . The director. 
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1 A. - say. 
2 Q. So it's possible that the negotiated 
3 rule-making session that you are referring to, that 
4 we didn't want this rule back then, or at least 
5 some of us; is that correct? 
6 A. That's possible. 
7 Q. I thought you said that the reason it 
8 was in there is because it was negotiated and that 
9 the industry felt like it was good rule. That may 
1 0 not be the case; is that correct? 
11 A. I believe that the Idaho Elk Breeders 
12 Association testified at the hearing on this set of 
13 rules in 2003 that they supported the rules. 
14 Q. Does that mean that all of the elk 
15 breeders in the state of Idaho supported the rules? 
16 A. No, not necessarily . 
1 7 Q. In fact, isn't it true that at nearly 
18 every committee hearing we have had in the 
19 legislature, somebody has contested one or more of 
2 0 the rules? 
21 A. I would say that nearly every time a set 
2 2 of cervidae rules comes before one of the germane 
2 3 committees in the legislature, you have been there 
2 4 to protest the rules. 
2 5 Q. Have I been the only one? 
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1 has to be -- he doesn't have to be a veterinarian 
2 to write the rule. He shouldn't have to be a 
3 veterinarian to answer questions about it. 
4 THE HEARING OFFICER: He testified that 
5 Dr. Mamer, who, I believe, is a veterinarian, wrote 
6 the rule. He might have provided some assistance, 
7 but he didn't testify he wrote these rules. I 
8 think he testified that Dr. Mamer wrote these 
9 rules. 
10 Q. BY DR. RAMMELL: Mr. Chatbum; is that 
11 correct? 
12 A. Maybe for the record we ought to 
13 clarify. I'm not sure what Dr. Rammell means by 
14 "wrote the rule." The 2000 version of the domestic 
15 cervidae rules were drafted by Dr. Mamer and 
16 various other. people in cooperation with the 
1 7 domestic cervidae industry in the state of Idaho 
18 and the Department of Fish and Game. 
19 The 2003 version of the domestic 
2 0 cervidae rules, which were recodified as 02.04.19, 
21 were drafted by me with the language primarily 
2 2 coming from the Department of Fish and Game, The 
2 3 Wildlife Federation, the Idaho Elk Breeders 
2 4 Association, and the veterinary medical officers 
2 5 within the state De artment of A riculture. 
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1 Q. Thank you. 
2 DR. RAMMELL: Ms. Uranga, I think it's 
3 clearly obvious that, even though he's not a 
4 veterinarian, he just testified that he drafted 
5 this rule. 
6 THE HEARING OFFICER: But you're asking him 
7 for a medical opinion on how they prevent disease. 
8 That's beyond the scope of what he's qualified to 
9 testify. 
10 Q. BY DR. RAMMELL: Mr. Chatbum, could you 
11 identify the state's statutory authority to write 
12 this Rule 202, Inventory Verification? 
13 A. If I could get a copy ofTitle 25, 
14 Chapter 37 Domestic Cervidae Statutes. 
15 That would be Idaho Code, Title 25, 
16 Chapter 37. 3704. 
1 7 Q. Which briefiy states -- what in that 
18 statute gives the state authority to write a rule 
19 like this? 
2 0 A. This statute was not in its current form 
21 when this -- when the rules were written in 2002 
2 2 and codified by the legislature in 2003. The 
2 3 statute currently reads Rules For Registering 
2 4 Premises and Disease Prevention. In 2002 the 
,., i::: _,._,. __ ,. ___ ,., 'n , -
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1 Q. So do you remember the wording in the 
2 statute at the time that you wrote this rule that 
3 you felt gave you statutory authority? 
4 A. The wording in the statute that gave us 
5 authority to do the domestic cervidae rules was for 
6 the prevention of disease. 
7 Q. Prevention of disease. So it's your 
8 testimony, correct me if I am wrong, that inventory 
9 verification - the state has authority to require 
10 inventory verification to prevent disease among 
11 domestic cervidae; is that correct? 
12 A. You mayrecall during the negotiated 
13 rule-making process that all of these various 
14 provisions of the rules were discussed by 
15 veterinarians from the Department of Agriculture 
16 and biologists from the Department of Fish and 
1 7 Game. And it was their opinion, as I recall, that 
18 these rules were necessary for disease prevention 
19 reasons. 
2 0 Q. You took their --you consulted with 
21 them, and then you wrote this rule; is that 
2 2 correct? 
23 A. To refresh your memory, we would have 
2 4 negotiated rule-making meetings. And the members 
2 5 of the cervidae industr that had been invited to 
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1 serve on the negotiated rule-making committee, 
2 along with representatives from the Idaho Wildlife 
3 Federation, Department of Fish and Game, and 
4 Department of Agriculture would discuss the various 
5 rules and debate the language. And then I would. 
6 take the feeling, if you will, or the consensus 
7 from that committee and type it into the rule. And 
8 then we would bring that language back to the 
9 committee at a subsequent meeting. Then that 
10 language would be debated again until the group 
11 reached somewhat of a general consensus on how it 
12 should be written. 
13 Q. Would you describe your role in the 
14 making of this rule and others as merely a scribe 
15 or a liaison, or did you actually sit down and 
16 contemplate and digest the information and then 
1 7 come up with recommendations? What was your role? 
18 A. I would describe my role as the 
19 facilitator, if you will, of the meetings. I 
2 0 generally ran the meeting. I would take notes. 
21 Various o.ther people took notes of the discussions 
2 2 and the debates that were had over various 
2 3 phraseology and wording. Then I would take that 
2 4 input, adjust the rule -- the draft rule -- to 
2 5 reflect my interpretation of what the grou had 
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1 itself from the disease CWD when, in fact, 
2 Mr. Chatbum just testified that many of the rules 
3 in the current set of domestic cervidae rules are 
4 directly -- were directly implemented because of 
5 theCWD. 
6 CWD is a disease in a family of diseases 
7 called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies or 
8 TSEs. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, 
9 commonly known as mad cow disease is the most 
10 notorious of this family of diseases and has caused 
11 serious economic problems for the cattle industries 
12 in the United Kingdom, Japan, and recently Canada. 
13 A lesser notorious member of the family is scrapie, 
14 a TSE of sheep which causes severe itching and 
15 chronic weight loss which culminates in death. 
16 Scrapie has been found in sheep for 
1 7 decades. And even though it is a TSE, it has not 
18 received the attention like BSE because of its 
19 insidious nature. Scrapie has existed in the state 
2 0 of Idaho for many years and the United States since 
21 the late '50s. CWD, also a TSE, is thought to have 
2 2 existed since 1967 in cervidae. Although primarily 
2 3 a disease of mule deer and white tail dear, elk are 
2 4 also susceptible. CWD presents itself more like 
2 5 scra ie than BSE. Deer and elk become emaciated 
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1 over time, show signs of a nervous disorder, and 
2 eventually die. The morbidity rate is low, but the 
3 mortality rate is high. Inappropriately referred 
4 to by the media as mad deer disease suggesting the 
5 same devastating effects as mad cow disease, CWD 
6 has drawn the emotion of wildlife protectionists 
7 throughout United States and Canada. The public 
8 pressure has resulted in extreme legislative 
9 oversight. The state of Idaho, in an overzealous 
10 attempt to prevent the spread of the disease, has 
11 instituted regulations that have the domestic 
12 cervidae industry on the brink of elimination. 
13 This oversight is where my concern lies. I believe 
14 in prevention, but do not agree that our basic 
15 rights to freedom need to be violated in the 
16 effort. Much like the controversial Patriot Act, 
1 7 the protection is needed, but not to the extent 
18 that our basic rights to freedom are lost. 
19 The center of my contention with the 
2 0 rules governing domestic cervidae is the rules that 
21 deal with the mandatory CWD surveillance program. 
2 2 Many of the rules that the state has alleged that I 
2 3 have violated are directly tied to CWD 
?.4. e11Tir,::,.;1l,:,...-,ro 'T'l-.,,.o.-,._, •• -~ ~c,.L- _____ .:, "·-· 
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1 mandatory program, all cervidae over the age of 16 
2 months which die must have brain samples submitted 
3 for CWD testing. All animals must be inventoried 
4 on a yearly basis. This includes a declaration of 
5 inventory report and inventory verification by 
6 state inspectors. 
7 A visual validation of animal 
8 identification is allowed at present as long as the 
9 individual animal identification is legible from a 
10 distance and matches past inventory records. In my 
11 case where visible identification from a distance 
12 interferes with my ability to market elk as hunting 
13 animals, I am required to run each animal through 
14 the chute so their individual identification can be 
15 validated using their USDA tags which are not 
16 visible from a distance. After the inventory is 
1 7 validated, all deaths recorded, and testing 
18 completed, providing no positives are found, the 
19 producer is then certified as CWD free for that 
20 year. 
21 In my case where my main market is 
2 2 hunters, I turn the elk loose on a large acreage in 
2 3 the mountains where trees and brush make finding an 
2 4 elk that dies, for whatever reason, nearly 
2 5 im ossible. Man times we don't discover a death 
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1 until weeks or months later when we accidentally 
2 find the ren:i-ains. Testing of the brain requires a 
3 sample to be taken within hours when it is hot or 
4 when the days are temperate. Days or weeks destroy 
5 the samples depending on the weather. Sometimes 
6 animals are not even found leading to inventory 
7 validation problems. I have,been testing the 
8 animals I have found in a timely manner for several 
9 years now and have yet to have a year where the 
10 ISDA has given me a certified free status for CWD. 
11 I have been submitting my inventories to 
12 the best of my ability. I have been forced to run 
13 elk through the chute to validate the inventory and 
14 in the process have wounded or killed several elk. 
15 I al)1 forced into compliance with threat of fines, 
16 yet have received no direct benefit from the 
17 program. 
18 My recent question to Dr. Clarence 
19 Siroky, the state veterinarian over animal 
2 0 industries, was, why can't the elk ranchers be 
21 treated the same as the other livestock groups in 
2 2 Idaho, namely the sheep industry who actually have 
2 3 scrapie, yet their certification is voluntary. His 
2 4 answer was because of the highly emotional issues 
2 5 regarding CWD. 
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Petitioners Rex Ramrnell and L da Rammell, doing business as Elk Country 
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( IDAHO SUPREME COURT PREC DENT INDICATES VALIDITY OF AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE IS A Mm.E•D QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT 
In support of its contention that e validity of an administrative rule is a pure 
· question of law, the Respondent cites pri arily to three cases: Grayot v, Summers, 75 
1 
Idaho 125, 269 P.2d 765 (1954); Newman . Graham, 82 Idaho 90,349 P.2d 716 (1960); 
I an.d O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Id o 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949). AU three cases 
,. 
\ predate the seminal case of J.R. Simplot C . v. Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 
f (1991). ln .J.R. Simplot Co., the Court i di.cated therein that "the status of tb.e rule of 
:: judicial defer<:lnce in Idaho is currently te uous and uncertain." Id at 885, 820 P.2d at 
! 1212. As elaborated in Petitioners' Openi g Brief, the Court in J. R. Simplot Co. went on 
I 
I to establish the four part test of judicial efe.rence in Idaho that is still in force today. 
I 
[ Prior precedent on the rule of deference should be treated with caution as potentially 
\' being in conflict with J.J{ Simplot Co .. 
While the issue of judicial defe ce is often mentioned as being nominally a 
question of law, the fact remains that the Idaho Supreme Court ha$ set for criteria that 
\ cal.l for the consideration. of facts in dete "ning the validity of an administrative rule. 
!' For example, the third prong of the fo · element of the rule of deference asks whether 
,, the agency interpretation was formulated ontemporaneously with the enactment of the 
I 
I authorizing statute. Id. at 859, 820 P .2d t. 1216. This is purely a question of fact that 
i 
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) 
could require presentation of fhe records the relevant agency or perhaps testimony by 
!
·,. those who engaged in the rule maki11g 
rule/interpretation was adopted. 
rocess to prove precisely when the relevant 
I Further, in regard to the fifth pron of the fourth element., i.e. whether an agency I has expertise .in the relevant field, tbe Respondent cites several cases supposedly 
·, supporting t\le contention that this is also merely a question of law. See 
, Respondent's Response Brief, pp. 11-12. However, a review of the portions of those 
· cases quoted by Respondent sbow the urt making merely blanket statements with 
f regard to an agencies expertise, i.e. that th Tax commission has expertise in. tax laws etc. 
' Id. It would clearly be a denial of due rocess to deprive a litigant au opportunity to 
. prove that in fact the agency in question di not have expertise in the :6e.ld it attempted to 
regulate and that in fact the agency, whi nominally authorized to .regulated a certain 
I field, had never retained employees w:ith y understanding of that field or otherwise ever 
I had any experience in that field. In eed, it was Mr. Rarnmell's intent at the 
1. Administrative Hearing to show that the ~partmcnt of Agriculture had no knowledge or 
f expertise with regard to controlling or reg !~ting Chronic Wasting Disease ("CWD") and 
[ 1hat this fact was born out in the regulat ns the Department developed with regard to 
r CWD. Mr. Rammell wanted to presen evidence, particularly the testimony of Dr. 
I Clarence Siroky, that the Department's ~les had no correlation with any effective 
prevention of CWD. However, Mr. Ram ell was denied the opportunity to do so. 
Further, as to the issue of reas ableness, background knowledge would be 
l crucial for a court to understand whet ~ a certain regulation was the result of a 
I reasonable interpretation of the statute The challenger should be afforded the 
I 
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f opportunity to demonstrate why a rcgulati~n may in no way implement the meaning or 
1, in.tent of the authorizing statute. Again, !.n this case, Mr. Rammell wanted to present 
I evide.nce that the Department's rules had o correlation with any effective prevention of 
f CWD and that they were thus arbitrary an did .oot constitute a reasonable interpretation 
.. of the authorizing statute. 
I, Petitioners, assert th~t given 1he sf c.p o~ the rul~ of deference, development of a 
\ factual record could be crucial to understafding issues directly relevan.t to whether a rule 
I is reasonable, whether an agency in fact d~s have expertise in the relevant field, whether 
I, an agency interpretation is practical, ~d whether the agency interpretation was 
I I 
l, contemporaneously fonnulated with the f actment of the statute. This is particularly 
l critical in complex areas of regulation, sufh as regulating dissemination of diseases like 
CWD about which sci.ence has very little tnderstanding and a government agency could 
I not likely claim any expertise. The Pe+ioners should have been allowed to present 
!. evidence directly related to these issues. . [ , 
f III. 
,, THE IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE PR~CEDURES ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
\ CllALLENGJNG ADMINISTRATIV~'. RULES DURING A CONTESTED CASE 
I The Respondent claims that an a : . inistrative agency can only nullify its own 
,. ' 
f rules by commencing the rule mak:in '. process to replace unwanted rules. The 
i: Respondent cites to LC. § 67-5224(1) in, upport of this contention. See Respondent's 
f Response Brief, p. 14. However, I.C. § 67~5224(1) states: 
l t 
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Prior to the adoption, ame ment, or repeal of a rule, the agency 
shall consider fully all wri n and oral submissions respecting the 
proposed rule. 
PAGE 05/ _10 . 
\' Petitioners assert that this statute does n support Respondent's contenti.on that a ntle 
I may only be repealed through initiating a .new round of rule making. As stated in 
r Petition.ers' Opening Brief, the Idaho . ttomey General's Rules of Administrative 
Procedure explicitly state that the .issue o the validity of an administrative rule can be 
'determinedbyahearingoffi.cer. See IDA A04.11.0l.416. 
IV. 
\ 
IDAPA 04.11.01.416 FILLS !NA CRITICAL GAP IN THE 
I DEPARTMENT'S A lVUNJSTRATIVE RULES 
I '. With regard to IDAPA 04.11.01. 16, the Respondent makes the claim that this 
I 
[ rule only authorizes an agency to make o y a broad inquiry as to the scope of its overall 
. ' 
!. rule making power and not whether a. le is reasonable. Yet JDAPA 04.11.01.416 
! clearly states that an agency can decide in. . contested case "whether a rule of that agency 
j is within the agency's substantive rule making power." See lDAPA 04.Jl.Ol.416 
I 
r ( emphasis added). If an agency rule is not reasonable and does not rationally relate to the 
' I purpose of the autbori,d.ng statute, that ru; wo1,1ld clearly not be a part of that agency's 
i s1,1bstantive rule making power. The Resp ndent's interpretation oflDAP A 04.11.01.416 
j clearly cuts agaillst the ratio11.al ao.d plai., meaning of its words. IDAPA 04.11.01.416 
' 
specifically allows an agency to cooclude h a contested case whether a rule fails to meet 
f the standards contained with the rule of de erence. 
I 
f 
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, The Respondent also argues in th alternative that IDAPA 04.1 l.01.4l6 would 
. f not apply to the Department because the Department has implemented its own set of 
f administrative rules. See Respondent's esponse Brief, P- J7. However, again, the 
. Respondent ba~es its argument on an. un asonably narrow iutei:pretation of LC. § 67-
, 5206(5)(b), which states that the Attome General's Rules of Admini.strative Procedure I . 
! will control administrative proceedings o . Idaho agencies unless an agency adopts its 
· "own procedures ... [with] a finding that tes the reasons why the relevant portion of 
f the attorney general's rules were inappl.i ble to the agency under the circumstances." 
f See 1.C. § 67-5206(5)(b)(emphasis adde<f 'The plain meaning of LC. § 67-5206(5)(b), 
! particularly the phrase "relevant portion, ' clearly indicates that each of the Attorney 
General's Rules of Adm.inistrative Proc dure must be replaced rule by rule for the 
/: Department's administrative rules to e precedent. The fact still stands that the 
( Department never addresses the scope o. a Department Hearing Officer in a contested 
! case in relation to a challenge of the reas nableness of a Depai:tmen.t role. Thus, unde.t 
I I.C. § 67-5206(5)(b), IDAPA 04.11.01. 16 woul4 apply to the Department and the 
I: Hearing Offi.cer in this ca~e should h ve been able to consider the issue of the 
t 
I reasonableness of the Department rules. 
I 
I t v. 
I PETITIONERS' MOTION FORD QUALIFICATION WAS UNTIMELY I , 
I The Respondent claims that Petitif ers' Motion to Disqualify was untimely under 
I LC. § 67-5252(2)(b) because the Petition1rs did not move to "promptly" disqualify Ms. 
1 
u,_ ,.., '""""' ,he - .., ··~ '" 1- »-,,,,. _..,,, foc timely fiHng • 
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f motion to disqualify a hearing offl.cer is to ' le such a motion "promptly upon discovering 
facts" that establish the ground for disqua ification. See J.C. § 67-5252(2)(b). The fact 
. that Ms. Uranga. was going to be the hea ing officer obviously revealed nothing of her 
qualifications to hear the case. In the prev us cases in which she did preside, Petitioners 
l 
• did not challenge the reasonableness of tt Department roles, and thus her expertise in 
cervidae ranching was irrelevant. Petitio rs only learned of Ms. Uranga's total lack of 
· knowledge of cervidae ranching during ·. the actual contested hearing. Indeed, Mr. 
1 Rammell filed his motion on December J , 2004, after the first day of the administrative ,, 
/ hearing where he was put on notice of :Ms. Uranga's lack of expertise in cervidae 
I I ranching. See Agency Reco.rd, documen No. 49. Petitioners' Motion was timely and 
! should have been granted. . 
VT. 
. . I THE Aw ARD OF ATTORNE'l'S FEES SHOULD BE REVERSED 
' If Peti.tioners prevail on any of thelssues they raised on appeal, then, under I.C, § 
) 12-117, the Respondent.is notentitled to~ttomey'sfees as PetitiQnr;:rs would obviously 
I l have had a reasonable basis in fact to brin 
i 
It is a fact that Petitioners sou 
I• 
1· rules, but were prevented from doing so. 
f of Administrative .Procedure make clear 
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. to challenge the Department o:f Agriculture 
The Idaho Jaws and Attorney General's Rules 
· at Petitioners were entitled to bring such a 
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' I challenge at a contested hearing. . .. ore, the rule of deference makes clear that 
I issues of fact are entirely relevant to w ether an. adtn.inistrative rule is valid. Also, 
f Petitioners were also de rued their right 
\ these reasons Petitioners ask that tl:te a 
:: action or that the case be remanded so 
! properly challenged. 
obtaining a competent Hearing Officer. For 
inistrativc case be dismissed without further 
at the validity of the relevant rules may be 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN.that oral argument will be heard before the Honorable 
Brent J. Moss on the 24th day of September, 2007, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel 
can be heard, in the Madison County Courthouse, Rexburg, Idaho. 
DATED this 30th day of August 2007. 
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Brian J. Oakey 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Agriculture 
P.O. Box790 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
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I. OPINION SUMMARY 
Mr. Rammell refused to mark his domestic elk and rejected the Idaho State 
Department of Agriculture (ISDA) access to inventory the unmarked elk. 1 ISDA 
obtained an administrative search warrant, inventoried the elk, and charged Mr. Rammell 
with nine violations. At the administrative hearing, Mr. Rammell sought to challenge the 
validity of ISDA's. domestic elk rules before ISDA's hearing officer, but he was refused. 
Can ISDA legally limit the scope of a contested case before a hearing officer in this way? 
It can. The Court affirms ISDA's decision because it followed its procedural rules, and 
Mr. Rammell has failed to establish a constitutional right to challenge administrative 
agency rules before a hearing officer. 2 
II. ISSUES ON REVIEW 
Mr. Ramm ell's Petition for Judicial Review contains the following issues: 
1. Whether it was error for the Deputy Director to rule as a matter of law that the 
issue of the validity of an Administrative Rule is solely a question of Jaw? 
'. Tr. p. 30, II. 4-11 (Apr. 29, 2005). 
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2. Whether it was error for the Hearing Officer to exclude evidence of the 
reasonableness of the relevant Department Rules? 
3. Whether it was an error for the Hearing Officer not to disqualify herself? 
4. Whether the award of attorney's fees is justified? 
III. THE FACTS 
Mr. Rammell sought a forum to challenge ISDA's domestic elk rules-rules Mr. 
Rammell believed unreasonable, unconstitutional, and beyond the scope of the 
authorizing statute.3 He refused to mark his domestic and elk, and when ISDA inspectors 
sought access to inventory Mr. Rammell's unmarked elk in December 2003, Mr. 
Rammell refused them entry. ISDA obtained an administrative search warrant and 
conducted the inventory. 
The inventory disclosed one statutory violation (failure to pay a $5 per head fee) 
and eight ISDA rule violations: failure to properly identify his elk (by eartag, tattoo, or 
microchip), failure to cure gaps in his fences and gates, failure to submit annual reports to 
account for his elk, failure to gather and restrain elk for inventory, and failure to submit 
proper certificates before transporting elk. ISDA filed an administrative complaint and 
Mr. Rammell believed he had his opportunity to contest the rules. He reasoned that if the 
rules were unconstitutional or unreasonable, he was not obligated to follow them; he 
could not have violated illegal rules. 
ISDA refused to indulge Mr. Rammell. At the administrative hearing, Hearing 
Officer Jean Uranga granted the Department's motion in limine excluding evidence and 
testimony offered for the purpose of challenging the reasonableness of the domestic 
cervidae rules. She allowed Mr. Rammell to present enough evidence to create a record, 
but refused the bulk of Mr. Rammell's evidence and refused to rule on the validity of the 
department's rules. There would be no challenge to the rules' validity before Ms. 
Uranga. 
Mr. Rammell sought review of Ms. Uranga's preliminary order before ISDA's 
Director. Deputy Director Michael Everett affirmed Ms. Uranga's ruling in whole in his 
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May 2005 Final Order.4 On appeal, Mr. Rammell argues Ms. Uranga and Mr. Everett 
erred in refusing to allow Hearing Officer Uranga to take evidence or decide his rule-
validity arguments-Mr. Rammell's first two issues on appeal. 
Mr. Ramm ell's two remaining issues on appeal deal with Hearing Officer 
Uranga's refusal to disqualify herself and Ms. Uranga's award to ISDA of attorney fees 
and costs. Mr. Rammell sought to disqualify Ms. Uranga for lack of expert knowledge 
and bias. Ms. Uranga needed expert knowledge of the domestic elk industry and elk 
disease, Mr. Ramm ell argued, because ruling on the domestic elk rules' validity requires 
such knowledge. 5 Finally, attorney fees were awarded based on I.C. § 12-117; Ms. 
Uranga determined that Mr. Rammell's defiance of ISDA's domestic elk rules and Mr. 
Rammell's arguments at the administrative hearing were without basis in law or fact. Mr. 
Rammell argues that he had both legal and factual justifications. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of a final order of ISDA is governed by the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act ("IDAPA"), chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.6 Under IDAPA, the Court 
reviews an appeal from an agency decision based upon the record created before the 
agency. 7 The court shall affirm the agency decision unless the court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
agency; ( c) made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.8 The party 
challenging the agency decision must show that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
I.C. § 67-5279(3), and that a substantial right of the petitioner has been prejudiced.9 
4 AR 68 pp. 10-11. 
5 AR 65; Tr. pp. 488-490, ll. 17-16 (Dec. 16, 2004). 
6 LC. § 67-5270(3). 
7 J.C.§ 67-5277; Dovelv. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61,831 P.2d 527,529 (1992). 
8 LC.§ 67-5279(3); Barron v. IDWR, 135 Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (2001). 
9 rr Si'.7.,?7C/l4H2007):Barron, 135Idahoat417, 18P.3dat222. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
The legal issues in this petition were poorly framed. Petitioner's brief misstates 
Hearing Officer Uranga' s and Deputy Director Everett's decisions, and draws the 
argument away from the true issue--the scope ofISDA's procedural discretion-to an 
unfruitful distinction between legal and factual issues. The Court will limit the 
discussion to ISDA procedural discretion; in particular, ISDA 's discretion to prohibit its 
hearing officer from ruling on the validity of the department's domestic elk rules. 
Ms. Uranga's and Mr. Everett's decisions cannot fairly be summarized to stand 
for the principle, as Petitioners' brief suggests, that ISDA forbids its hearing officers 
from hearing all legal questions. ISDA regularly interprets the law-as it must. It is a 
state executive agency "clothed with power to construe [ the Jaw] as a necessary precedent 
to administrative action."10 ISDA only forbids hearing officers from ruling on a certain 
type of legal question-legal questions about the validity of its rules. Here, ISDA's 
limitation of its hearing officers in this way did not result in error in a manner specified in 
LC.§ 67-5279(3); the agency's decision is affirmed. 
1. Neither the Deputy Director nor the Hearing Officer violated procedural 
rules, violated Mr. Rammell's constitutional rights, or abused discretion by 
limiting the scope of the administrative hearing before the hearing officer. 
Only three rationales from Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) potentially apply in this case: 
the Court must affirm Mr. Everett's Final Order unless it (1) was made upon unlawful 
procedure, (2) violated a constitutional provision, or (3) was arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. The Court will first summarize Ms. Uranga's and Mr. Everett's 
decisions and then determine whether their decisions violated the above three provisions. 
Hearing Officer Uranga's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary 
Order states that Ms. Uranga Jacked authority to hear Petitioners' rule-validity arguments 
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hearing, 11 (2) ISDA's rules passed through a legislative process and enjoyed a 
presumption of validity, (3) ISDA's administrative head must delegate authority for a 
hearing officer to invalidate a rule at an administrative hearing, and ( 4) Ms. Uranga had 
not been delegated that authority. 12 Also, at the outset of the administrative hearing, Ms. 
Uranga explained to Mr. Rarnrnell numerous methods available to challenge ISDA's elk 
rules, other than a contested case before a hearing officer. 13 Deputy Director Everett's 
Final Order affirmed Ms. Uranga's preliminary order in whole. 14 
First, Hearing Officer Uranga and Deputy Director Everett did not apply unlawful 
procedure. ISDA 's procedural rules include a section entitled "Scope of Authority of 
Hearing Officers"; this section is silent regarding hearing officer authority to invalidate 
department rules. 15 
Petitioner argues that ISDA procedural rules' silence requires the department to 
apply the Attorney General's Rules of Administrative Procedure. 16 Even if the Court 
assumes that the AG procedural rules serve as gap fillers for ISDA's procedural rules, the 
AG procedural rules do not obligate hearing officers to hear rule-validity arguments. The 
AG procedural rules allow agency discretion: "The agency head may delegate to a 
hearing officer the authority to recornrnend a decision on issues of whether a rule is 
within the agency's substantive rulemaking authority or whether the rule has been 
promulgated according to proper procedure or may retain all such authority itself."17 At 
the outset of the administrative hearing, Ms. Uranga told Mr. Rarnmell she had not been 
delegated that authority. 18 Regardless of which procedural rules apply (ISDA's or the 
AG's), ISDA was within its discretion when it prohibited Mr. Rarnmell from presenting 
his rule-validity arguments before the hearing officer; Ms. Uranga and Mr. Everett did 
not violate any procedural rules. 
11 AR 74, 1] XVIII. 
12 AR 66, pp. 14-17. 
13 Tr. pp. 25-32 (Dec. 15, 2004). 
14 AR 68, p. 13. 
15 IDAPA 02.01.01.05. 
16 See I.C. § 67-5206(5)(b) (2007). 




Nor did Ms. Uranga's and Mr. Everett's decisions violate Mr. Rammell's 
constitutional rights. Petitioners have presented no authority to support the position that a 
respondent in a contested case before a hearing officer has a constitutional right to 
challenge the validity of the agency's rules. The Court is persuaded that there are 
multiple venues to challenge the validity of an agency's rules, but an administrative 
hearing before the hearing officer is not one of them. This limitation does not violate the 
Constitution. 
Ms. Uranga showed Mr. Rammell the multiple venues available to him to 
challenge ISDA's domestic elk rules: 
[Y]ou can challenge the reasonableness of the rules through a variety of 
methodologies. One is public comment before the rules are adopted; two 
is testimony before the legislature; three, there is a direct petition for 
judicial review of rules found at Idaho Code 67-5273(1) .... There is also a 
procedure to allow an individual to petition for adoption, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule if it's deemed to be unreasonable or inappropriate or if 
there are problems with it. And finally there is the possibility of filing 
declaratory judgments on the validity or applicability of rules in the 
district court. 19 
There are a number of forums available for Mr. Rammell to challenge ISDA's elk rules; 
there is no support for the position that an administrative hearing before a hearing officer 
is a constitutionally mandated forum. 
Lastly, Ms. Uranga and Mr. Everett's procedural decision to limit the scope of the 
administrative hearing before Ms. Uranga was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. Their decisions were justified on procedural grounds and did not violate Mr. 
Rammell's constitutional rights. Both Ms. Uranga and Mr. Everett made principled 
decisions supported by law. They recognized that it is not the obligation oflSDA's 
hearing officers to determine the validity of agency rules--rules created by negotiated-
rulemaking among numerous constituencies; rules reviewed by the state's legislature. 
Mr. Rammell may challenge the rules, but not before the hearing officer. 
The Court sees no justification in Idaho Code 67-5279(3) to overturn ISDA's 
decisions; ISDA enjoys discretion whether to permit its hearing officers to hear 
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arguments regarding the validity of its domestic elk rules. While civil disobedience holds 
an important place in the evolution of the law, and "[s]harp changes in the law depend 
partly upon the stimulus of protest,"20 contested cases before hearing officers are not the 
forum to make those changes. 
2. Ms. Uranga did not err when she refused to disqualify herself because Mr. 
Rammell's two reasons for her inadequacy were unsupported-she needed 
no expert knowledge to determine whether Mr. Rammell violated ISDA's 
domestic elk rules, and there is no evidence in the record of her bias. 
Mr. Rammell petitioned Ms. Uranga to disqualify herself for cause, per Idal10 
Code 67-5252, for lack of expert knowledge and bias. The expert knowledge Mr. 
Rammell claimed Ms. Uranga lacked was knowledge about the domestic elk industry and 
elk disease. As discussed above, Ms. Uranga did not need this expert knowledge because 
the validity ofISDA's domestic elk rules was not at issue. The only rationale that Ms. 
Uranga was biased against Mr. Rammell was that she was a hearing officer in a prior 
case. Having heard a prior case, with nothing more, is insufficient to show bias. On the 
contrary, having read the three days of hearings, the Court believes Ms. Uranga was more 
than impartial with Mr. Rammell. 
3. Half of Mr. Everett's award of attorney fees and costs is justified; Mr. 
Rammell's position lacked any basis in law or fact, but ISDA was equally 
responsible for the undue length of the administrative hearing. 
Hearing Officer Uranga and Mr. Everett found that Mr. Rammell had no basis in 
fact or law to intentionally defy ISDA's domestic elk rules and then use the 
administrative hearing as a forum to challenge the rules' validity. The Idaho Code 
provides for an attorney fee and cost award in administrative proceedings: "[I]n any 
administrative ... proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency ... and a person, 
the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
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· 'he Courts, 40 N.Y. State BJ. 161, 169 (1968). 
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rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."21 The Court affirms Ms. 
Uranga's and Mr. Everett's decisions. 
Mr. Rammell lmowingly violated ISDA's elk rules, admitted as much at the outset 
of the administrative hearing, and then used an administrative hearing before a hearing 
officer to submit evidence on the elk and cattle industries, legislative rulemaking, and elk 
disease. There is no basis in law or fact for such actions. However, ISDA is not without 
blame for the extent of the attorney fees. As Deputy Director wrote in his Final Order,22 
and as the Court has written above, ISDA has discretion to limit the scope of its 
administrative hearings before its hearing officers. Once that decision is made, there is 
no reason to accumulate a lengthy record. 
Individuals insistent on arguing about the reasonableness ofISDA's rules in a 
contested case must present their arguments before the agency's head-from Mr. 
Everett's Final Order this appears to be motion practice to the director.23 The director 
would not need a lengthy record. Respondents disgruntled with the director's order 
would appeal it to the district court; on appeal, that court would have no use for a lengthy 
record. Here, ISDA is partly responsible for the costs of Mr. Rammell's administrative 
hearing because Ms. Uranga permitted him to create a useless record. 
Accordingly, ISDA's attorney fees and costs are reduced by half: Mr. Rammell is 
obligated for $14,686.48 of the $29,372.96. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
That some disagree with ISDA's domestic elk rules is to be expected: the rules 
reflect compromises; some parties' interests are corralled and adopted, and other parties' 
interests escape through gaps in the rulemaking fence. After an agency rule is enacted, 
disgruntled parties may challenge the rules in other venues, greener pastures; but an 
administrative hearing before a hearing officer is not such a venue. An administrative 
hearing is a limited forum. ISDA's procedural rules allow it to limit the scope of a 
21 I.C. 12-117(1) (2007). 
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contested case before its hearing officers and such discretion is not forbidden by the 
Constitution. Mr. Everett's Final Order is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
DATED this __ -Jq'--_ day ofNovember 2007. ,,,,111111111//11,,1 -t ' ~,,, ".\.. DIST~ /,I//. 
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TO: The above named Respondents, and their attorney of record, and the Clerk of the 
above entitled Court: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant Rex Rammell and Lynda Rammell, d/b/a Elk 
County Trophy Bulls, appeals against the above named Respondent Idaho 
State Department of Agriculture to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District 
Court's Order in the above action on November 9, 2007, Honorable Judge 
Brent J. Moss presiding. 
2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the 
Memorandum Decision described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. Appellants' preliminary statement of issues is as follows: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Department of 
Agriculture hearing officer did not violate Appellant's due process 
rights, procedural rules, and Appellant's constitutional rights by 
preventing Appellant from challenging the reasonableness of certain 
Idaho Department of Agriculture Rules. 
b. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Department of 
Agriculture hearing officer was not obligated to disqualify herself. 
c. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Appellant's position in 
this case lacks basis in law or fact to justify an attorney's fees. 
d. Whether the Idaho Department of Agriculture Rules under which 
Appellant was fined are reasonable. 
e. Whether I.C. § 25-3708 is unconstitutional. 
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4. A reporter's transcript of the following hearings is requested: 
a. Administrative evidentiary hearing before the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture hearing officer Jean R. Uranga held on December 15, 
2004. 
b. Administrative evidentiary hearing before the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture hearing officer Jean R. Uranga held on December 16, 
2004. 
c. Administrative evidentiary hearing before the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture hearing officer Jean R. Uranga held on December 30, 
2004. 
5. The Appellant requests the clerk's record be prepared to include in addition to 
those documents automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R., specifically the 
following: 
a. The Entire Agency Record and Exhibits to the Agency Record. 
6. I certify that: 
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a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the filing fee; 
c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the clerk's record; 
d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e) That Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
~ 
DATED this~ day of December 2007. 
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RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on thisiday of December 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Steven Strack 
Office of Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-8810 
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Clerk of the Courts 
/208) 334-2210 
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
ATTN: GWEN CURETON 
PO BOX 389 
REXBURG ID 83440 
0 
COURT 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
MOTION/NOTICE TO SUSPEND/ ALL DUE DATES SUSPENDED 
Docket No. (App) RAMMELL, REX 
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Be advised that the following document(s) was/were filed in this 
office on JANUARY 18, 2008: 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL. 
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For the Court: 
STEPHEN W KENYON 
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DISMISS APPEAL IN NO. 
32538 AND AUGMENTING THE 
RECORD IN NO. 34927 
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 32538/34927 
Madison County Case No. 2005-438 
A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL with attachment was filed in Supreme Court Docket 
No. 32538 by Respondent January 18, 2008. The Court is fully advised; therefore good cause 
appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL be, and 
hereby is, GRANTED and Supreme Court Docket No. 32538 is DISMISSED. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcript and exhibits 
in Supreme Court Docket No. 32538 be, and hereby are, AUGMENTED INTO THE RECORD 
in Supreme Court Docke~No. 34927. 
DATED this :tl <; day of February 2008. 
cc: Rex Rammell, pro se 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Jud&e Brent J. Moss 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 34927 
CASE NO. CV-2005-438 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of tbe District Court of tbe Seventb Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify tbat tbe following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged witb tbe Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION SENT/RETAINED 
I TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SENT 
DATED DECEMBER 15, 2004 
2 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINJSTRA TIVE RECORD SENT 
DATED DECEMBER16, 2004 
3 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECEORD SENT 
DATED DECEMBER 30, 2004 
4 TRANSCRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SENT 
DATED APRIL 29, 2005 
5 TRANSRIPT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SENT 
DATED JUNE 21, 205 
6 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SENT 
( 4 FOLDING FILES) 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
..2-<j day of (=eh , 2008 
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MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CASE NO. CV-05-438 
SUPREME COURT NO. 34927 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in aud for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
Karl J.F. Runft 
RUNFT & STEELE 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Steven W. Strack 
IDAHO DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE 
PO Box 83720-0010 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my baud and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this ;JC( day of 4_}:, , 2008 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 34927 
CASE NO. CV-05-438 ) 




I, Marilyn R. Rasmussen, Clerk of the District Court of the 7th Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers 
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross 
Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for 
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 
of the Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
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